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ABSTRACT 
Thomas Jefferson's faith in man's capability for self-government, and in 
the ultimate success of the republican experiment that was undertaken by the 
founding fathers, are among the most familiar themes of his biographers. 
What is less clear, however, is the source of this faith. 
It is the purpose of this study to show that Jefferson's faith did not derive 
from a simple, naive optimism about man, nor solely from a belief in the 
efficacy of a particular form of government. His faith rested, rather, upon a 
consciously developed and well defined philosophy of human nature, which was 
largely shaped by his knowledge of and agreement with the writings of a group 
of eighteenth century British moralists. The influence of their ethical theory, 
clearly shown in his correspondence spanning the half-century after 1776, is 
reflected in his views on race, religion, man's social dispositions, as well as 
political systems. 
Jefferson's study and knowledge of the sentimentalist ethical theory, to 
the extent that it contributed to his own conclusions about human nature and 
human motivation, are essential to an understanding of the conceptual frame-
work from which he acted, and thus to the political faith which he professed. 
Four principles of the sentimentalist theory made a deep impression on him: 
1) that man is by nature moral, 2) that man is by nature benevolent, 3) that 
these natural characteristics are susceptible to development, and 4) that they 
prepare man for a harmonious social existence. These basic principles 
became strong intellectual supports for his optimistic hope for a harmonious 
democratic society in America. His faith, and the philosophical foundations 
on which it rested, are given a sharp clarity by a comparison with the more 
negative appraisals of his principal political rival, Alexander Hamilton. The 
comparison between Jefferson's and Hamilton's ideas on human nature and 
political institutions, and on the relationship of one to the other, also con-
tributes to the understanding of the philosophical differences between the 
democratical and aristocratical factions among the founding fathers. 
v 
THE INFLUENCE OF SCOTTISH SENTIMENT A LIST ETHICAL THEORY 
ON THOMAS JEFFERSON'S PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE 
CHAPTER I 
·· JEFFERSON'S FAITH 
A great deal has been written about Thomas Jefferson's faith in the ability 
of men to govern themselves in a harmonious society. It is indeed a consistent 
theme in his wrjtings throughout his political career. It is a faith embodied in 
the Declaration of Independence where he wrote that it is the right of the people 
to design their government "on principles and organizing its powers in such 
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness" 
[Italics mine]. One year later he pointed with pride to his native state where 
the people had "deposited the monarchical and taken up the republican govern-
ment with as much ease as would have attended their throwing off an old and 
putting on a new suit of clothes. Not a single throe," he wrote, "has attended 
this important transformation. " 1 As wartime governor of Virginia during the 
last two years of the Revolution, he was confronted with substantial evidence 
that the citizens did not share his commitment to political liberty. In the face 
of this discouraging experience, he still believed that the people themselves 
were the "only safe depositories" of government. 2 
1Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Franklin, Aug. 13, 1777, The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, ed. by Julian Boyd (19 vols. ; Princeton, 1950-- ), II, 26. 
Hereafter cited as Boyd Collection. 
2Notes ~the State of Virginia (written 1780-81; published privately 1785; 
first regularly published in English in London, 1787), ed. by William Peden 
(Chapel Hill, 1955 ), 148. Hereafter cited as Notes. 
When it appeared, in the half decade immediately following the Revolution, 
that the republican experiment was on the verge of collapse, his faith remained 
firm. "The happiness of governments like ours, wherein the people are truly 
the mainspring, is that they are never to be despaired of. The apprehensions 
you express," he wrote to Richard Price, "led me to note to you this character 
in our governments, which . • . has kept my mind in perfect quiet as to the 
ultimate fate of our union; . . . " [Italics mine]. 3 
Jefferson was minister plenipotentiary in France at the time of the insur-
rections in eastern Massachusetts culminating in Shays's Rebellion in the fall 
and winter of 1786-1787. The violent confrontations between armies of dis-
contented debt-ridden farmers and state militia, numbering more than a thou-
sand on each side, convinced most of the leaders of the new nation that their 
experiment was moribund. Their reactions, couched in demands for the over-
haul of the governmental system, frightened Jefferson. He feared that his 
compatriots might too swiftly push the pendulum of American political practice 
from republican liberty toward dictatorial suppression. He expressed his con-
cern that those who would redesign the government might "conclude too hastily 
that nature has formed man insusceptible of any other government but that of 
force, a conclusion not founded in truth, nor experience." He had been in 
Europe now for more than two years, and that experience had reaffirmed his 
dislike for oppressive gove:mment. Democracy "has its evils too," he contin-
ued in his warning to James Madison, "the principal of which is the turbulence 
3y1 to Richard Price, Feb. 1, 17 85, Boyd Collection, VII, 630-631. 
3 
to which it is subject. But weigh this against the oppressions of monarchy, and 
it becomes nothing. "4 In the face of the mounting fear of anarchy at home, he 
reaffirmed his faith "that the good sense of the people will always be found to 
be the best army. They may be led astray for a moment, but will soon correct 
themselves. The people are the only censors of their governors; and even their 
errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of their institution." Once 
again recognizing the danger of over-reaction to the events in Massachusetts, 
he added that "to punish these errors too severely would be to suppress the 
only safeguard of the public liberty. "S The short history of the democratic 
experiment in his native country revealed trends that were alarming, even to 
Jefferson. But as discouraging as that record was, his faith in the ability of 
men to exercise self-government, so confidently proclaimed in 1776, still 
burned brightly a decade later. 
Jefferson was still in France during the opening events of the French Rev-
olution in the summer of 17 89. He attended the meeting of the Estates General 
regularly from its opening on May 5. Within a month he had become the willing, 
though unobtrusive, counsel to the Patriot Party. He was indeed invited by the 
committee from the National Assembly that was charged with the framing of a 
constitution to guide them in this responsibility. He declined this invitation, in 
the name of diplomatic propriety, but did offer advice in less public ways. His 
4rJtoJames Madison, Jan. 30, 1787, Ibid., XI, 92-97. 
SrfJ to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, Ibid. , 48-50. 
4 
quarters at the Hotel de Langeac was the scene of what Jefferson considered 
one of the most important compromise agreements between the republican and 
constitutional monarchical wings of the Patriot Party. 6 In these fateful weeks, 
during which he held an optimistic view of the events that were occurring 
around him, he tried to convey to the French leaders his basic faith in people 
as self-governors. "We think in America," he wrote to Abb{ Arnoux, "that it 
is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government as 
far as they are capable of exercising it; and that this is the only way to ensure 
a long-continued and honest administration of it's powers." 7 
Jefferson returned to America late in November 1789, eight months after 
the inauguration of the first administration under the new Constitution. The 
success or failure of the republican experiment had not yet been determined. 
Indeed an important part of the shaping of the essentials of American political 
theory and practice rested in the hands of those who assumed leadership at this 
juncture. Jefferson was forty-six years old, and for the next twenty years, he 
devoted his energies to the molding of the American political institution to 
reflect his faith in the ability of the people to exercise self-government. 
The founding fathers were very conscious, as they began their tasks, that 
the eyes of the world were upon them. They conceived of themselves as being 
the vanguard of a great historical movement, and they were convinced that 
6Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson (1821), with an intr. by Dumas Malone 
(New York, n. d.), 113-114. Hereafter cited as Autobiography. 
7TJ to Abb; Arnoux, July 19, 1789, Boyd Collection, XV, 282-283. 
5 
their success or failure would hold mementous implications for the future 
happiness of mankind. The burden of such a responsibility was no doubt 
intensified by public speculation among Europeans as to the likely outcome of 
the American republican experiment. Although there were some who believed 
that the United States might emerge as the "new king of nations, " most Euro-
peans held a much more conservative estimate of its future. "In the first place," 
one observer wrote, "will not the success of the Americans be an endless source 
of divisions amongst themselves?" He believed that "ambition and love of power 
will soon begin to actuate the operations of the congress and provincial assem-
blies," and that as a result the Americans will never be able to "maintain one 
common interest and an unity of plans and operations; but will find a thousand 
objects for rivalship arising the moment their independency becomes acknowl-
edged, and their commerce free and uninterrupted." His conclusion contained 
a specter that was no doubt very familiar to the founding fathers: "Without 
having had occasion for, or perhaps without producing a Brutus, they will soon 
meet with a Caesar, and will then feelingly regret under the weight of a national 
despotism, the yoke of a distant government which had strength sufficient to 
protect, though it was too weak to oppress them. " 8 This kind of speculation 
served to impress more deeply upon the founding fathers the experimental 
character of their task. Jefferson expressed this awareness when he wrote that 
America, unique in time, place, and circumstance, furnished "hopeful imple-
8[Simon Nicolas Henri] Linguet, Political and Philosophical Speculations~ 
the Distinguishing Characteristics of the Present Century; ... with Occasional 
Reflections on the Probable Effects of American Independency (London, 1778), 
25-27. -- -
6 
ments for the interesting experiment of self-government. 11 He said that they 
felt that they were "acting under obligations" not confined to America alone. 
"It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all mankind; that 
circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the 
duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a 
society may venture to leave its individual members. " 9 The question of 
political competence implied in this quotation provided one of the major tensions 
in eighteenth century political theory. As far as Jefferson was concerned, fate 
had decreed that America would be the stage on which the question would be 
resolved. 
During his tenures as Secretary of State, Vice President, and President, 
Jefferson frequently reaffirmed his basic faith in the democratic possibility; 
though one might suspect that in the early years of this period he must have 
frequently felt very much alone in his optimism. As he and his colleagues 
went about the business of fashioning a viable political machine, he soon found 
that his faith, both in the ability of the people to exercise self-government and 
indeed in the ultimate success of the American experiment, was not widely 
shared. Later, in reflecting on those early years of the Republic, he said that 
the only point on which he and President Washington had ever differed was over 
the competency of the people to gove111 themselves. "I had more confidence 
than he had in the natural integrity and discretion of the people," he wrote, "and 
9TJ to Dr. Joseph Priestley, June 19, 1802, The Writings of Thomas Jeffer-
~· ed. by Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh (20 vols.; Washington, 
1903-1905 ), X, 324-326. Hereafter cited as Lipscomb and Bergh Collection. 
7 
in the safety and extent to which they might trust them -selves with a control 
over their government. " 10 Jefferson did not believe that either Washington or 
John Adams had any real faith that the experiment would succeed. 11 Alexander 
Hamilton left no doubt as to his pessimism. As late as 1802 Hamilton wrote that 
he was "still laboring to prop the frail and worthless fabric" even though this 
was contrary to all his "anticipations of its fate. "12 
This disparate appraisal of the future was ultimately reflected in the phil-
osophies of the Federalist and Republican Parties. In later years Jefferson 
came to believe that the people's competency for self-government was the 
essential difference between the parties. He wrote: "Men by their constitutions 
are naturally divided into two parties: 1. Those who fear and distrust the 
people, and wish to draw all powers from them into the hands of the higher 
classes. 2. Those who identify themselves with the people, have confidence 
in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest and safe, although not 
the most wise depository of the public interests. In every country these two 
parties exist, ... call them ... by whatever name you please, they are the 
same parties still, and pursue the same object. The . • . appelation of 
Aristocrats and Democrats is the true one expressing the essence of all. " 13 
10rJ to John Melish, Jan. 13, 1813, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XIII, 
206-213. 
11TJ to Dr. Walter Jones, Jan. 2, 1814, Ibid. , XIV, 46-52. 
12Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, Feb. 27, 1802, The Works of 
Alexander Hamilton, ed. by Henry Cabot Lodge (12 vols.; New York, 1904), 
X, 425-426. 
1~J to Henry Lee, Aug. 10, 1824, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XVI, 
73-74. 
8 
More specifically, he declared that those of the Republican persuasion believed 
"that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an 
innate sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and pro-
tected in right, by moderate powers, confided to persons of his own choice, 
and held to their duties by dependence on his own will. "14 The Federalist 
philosophy was shaped, Jefferson believed, by a lack of faith in the people. 
This same distinction between the Federalist and Republican parties was 
described by Jefferson's closest collaborator. James Madison wrote that 
"there has been in fact a deep distinction between the two parties or rather, 
between the mass of the Nation, and the part of it which for a time got posses-
sion of the Govt. The distinction has its origin in the confidence of the former, 
in the capacity of mankind for self Govt. and in a distrust of it by the other or 
by its leaders; and is the key to many of the phenomena presented by our 
political History. "15 
The essence of the Republican philosophy was most clearly expressed by 
Jefferson in a letter to an old friend in France in 1816. 
We of the United States [Republicanism was by this time triumphant] . 
are constitutionally and conscientiously democrats. We consider society 
as one of the natural wants with which man has been created; that he has 
been endowed with faculties and qualities to effect its satisfaction by 
concurrence of others having the same want; that when, by the exercise 
of these faculties, he has procured a state of society, it is one of his 
14TJ to Judge William Johnson, June 12, 1823, Ibid., XV, 439-452. 
15james Madison to William Eustis, May 22, 1823, The Writings of james 
Madison, ed. by Galliard Hunt (9 vols.; New York, 1900-1910), IX, 135-37. 
Hereafter cited as Hunt Collection. 
9 
acquisitions which he has a right to regulate and control, jointly indeed 
with all those who have concurred in the procurement, whom he cannot 
exclude from its use or direction more than they him. We think experience 
has proved it safer, for the mass of individuals composing the society, 
to reserve to themselves personally the exercise of all rightful powers 
to which they are competent, and to delegate those to which they are not 
competent to deputies named, and removable for unfaithful conduct, by 
themselves immediately . . • . I acknowledge myself strong in 
affection to our own form, yet both of us act and think from the same 
motive, we both consider the people as our children, and love them with 
parental affection. But you love them as infants whom you are afraid to 
trust without nurses; and I as adults whom I freely leave to self-
government. 16 
Only once did Jefferson's faith in the democratic experiment grow dim. 
As the debate over slavery in Missouri revealed intense sectional antagonisms, 
he began to despair for the future. "I have been among the most sanguine in 
believing that our Union would be of long duration. I now doubt it much, and 
see the event at no great distance, and the direct consequence of this question; 
My only comfort and confidence is, that I shall not live to see this; 
and I envy not the present generation the glory of throwing away the fruits of 
their fathers' sacrifices of life and fortune, and of rendering desperate the 
experiment which was to decide ultimately whether man is capable of self-
government?" Perhaps reflecting declining health, pressing financial worries, 
and the weariness of his seventy-seven years, he branded the failure of leader-
ship as a "treason against human hope. "17 It is clear however, that until this 
time an optimistic faith in the ability of the people to exercise self-government 
and in. the ultimate success of the American democratic experiment was a 
16.rJ to Monsieur Dupont de Nemours, Apr. 24, 1816, Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XIV, 487-491. 
17TJ to William Short, Apr. 13, 1820, Ibid. , XV, 243-248. 
10 
constant theme in Jefferson's thought. 
Jefferson's faith in republican democracy reveals much more than a faith 
in the efficacy of a particular form of government. It was a faith that rested 
upon an optimistic appraisal of human nature. Jefferson believed that man was 
basically good; that he was by nature reasonable, moral, compassionate, and 
generous; and that he could "be trusted with the formation of his own opin-
ions. " 18 This appraisal contrasted sharply with the pessimistic view of human 
nature which was still encountered in the eighteenth century. 
The distrust of human nature has a long tradition in Western thought. Its 
origins are to be found in the Christian emphasis on man's inferiority to God 
and, more specifically, in the Christian doctrine of original sin. But even 
those enlightened philosophers of the eighteenth century, who had rejected 
these theological doctrines as being contrary to reason, found on the more 
empirical and rationalistic grounds of observation and introspection, good 
reason to be cautious in their appraisal of human nature. That "the heart of 
man is deceitful altogether and desperately wicked" is a prevalent theme in 
eighteenth -century writing and can be found in the work of figures as diverse 
as Jonathan Edwards and Voltaire. Although attributing a degree of dignity to 
man, these writers usually portrayed him as being activated by non -rational 
passions such as vanity, ambition, or especially love of approval and praise. 
This abasement of human nature gradually gave way to the more optimistic 
18.rJ to james Madison, Dec. 16, 1786, Boyd Collection, X, 604; TJ to 
Monsieur Dupont de Nemours, Apr. 24, 1816, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 487-491. 
11 
view of the Religion of Humanity, but this did not occur until the turn of the 
century. Arthur 0. Lovejoy has labeled the era beginning in the latter part 
of the eighteenth century and extending into the early twentieth century as 
"the Age of Man's Good Conceit of Himself. " He notes that the optimistic view 
of human nature has had a long and gradual development, but that an intensifi-
cation of the trend is evident beginning in the late eighteenth century which 
reaches its clhaax in the second half of the nineteenth century. This was, 
according to Lovejoy, a self-confident era for Western mankind in which "the 
belief that man is 'naturally good' became a widely accepted premise alike of 
politics and pedagogics; the taste for satire largely went out of fashion in 
. 
literature, and the sense of sin rather largely in religion; and to express a 
'low view' of human nature became a kind of odious blasphemy. " 19 Jefferson 
matured during this period of transition, and, as far as his appraisal of human 
nature is concerned, he is as much a child of the Romantic Era as of the 
Enlightenment. 
Both the theological and the secular strictures on human nature were ern-
phasized in America during the eighteenth century. The concept of the total 
depravity of man, the notion that man is by nature corrupt as the result of 
19This appraisal of eighteenth century thought is developed in Arthur 0. 
Lovejoy, Reflections.£!!. Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), 1-51. Lovejoy 
describes approbativeness as one of the most powerful passions that motivated 
eighteenth century leaders. Douglass G. Adair finds this same passion dom-
inant among the American Founding Fathers. "It is my argument that the lust 
for the psychic reward of fame, honor, glory, after 1776 becomes a key in-
gredient in the behavior of Washington and his greatest contemporaries." 
"Fame and the Founding Fathers," Fame and the Founding Fathers, ed. by 
Edmund P. Willis (Bethlehem, Pa. , 1967), 27-52. 
12 
Adam's sin, was one of the basic themes of Calvinistic theology brought to 
America by the Puritans in the early seventeenth century. 20 Though the 
Puritan errand into the wilderness had not been realized, its influence on the 
shaping of American thought was still very much in evidence. The Great 
Awakening of the mid-eighteenth century, which had intellectual ramifications 
lasting beyond the end of the century, was very specifically characterized by 
a resurgence of Calvinist doctrine. Not only was there a renewal of these 
doctrines in the traditional Calvinist congregations, but the revival revealed 
that at least some of the "points" of Calvinism, including the distrust of human 
nature, were taught in some of the non-Calvinistic institutions outside New 
England. George Whitefield, the English evangelist who is usually portrayed 
as the catalyst of the revival, was said to have hardly preached any sermon 
without having emphasized the doctrine of original sin. 21 Benjamin Franklin 
expressed surprise at how much people admired and respected Whitefield 
"notwithstanding his common abuse of them, by assuring them they were 
22 
naturally 'half beasts and half devils'. " From a pulpit in Hanover, Virginia, 
one could hear the traditional harangue that we are all "even by nature children 
20yhis doctrine descended from Augustine, but the immediate Puritan debt 
was tu Calvin. See Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth 
Century (New York, 1939), Book I. 
21Josiah Smith, "A Sermon, on the Character, Preaching, etc. of the Rev. 
Mr. Whitefield, " 17 40, quoted in Alan Heimert and Perry Miller, The Great 
Awakening: Documents Illustrating the Crisis and its Consequences (Indian-
apolis, 1967), 63. - --
22The Autobiography (1771-1789) in Benjamin Franklin: The Autobiography 
and Other Writings, ed. by L. Jesse Lemisch (New York, 1961), 116. 
13 
of wrath, . . . corrupt from our very birth, transgressors from the womb, 
and liable to the wrath of God . . • • The innate depravity and corruption of 
the heart, and the habits of sin contracted and confirmed by repeated indul-
gences of inbred corruption, these are the poisonous, deadly things that have 
slain the soul; these have entirely indisposed and disabled it for living 
religion. "23 Or "take what dispensation of the law you please, the law of 
innocence, the law of Moses, or the moral part of the gospel, it is impossible 
for one of the fallen posterity of Adam to be saved by it; . . . and the reason 
is plain, there is not one of them but what has broken it; and therefore, there 
is not one of them but what is condemned by it, to suffer its dreadful penalty. "24 
From the pulpit at the College of New Jersey the students heard that unseemly 
behavior "springs out of the corruption of the heart. It is the dictate of its 
sinful inclinations, of its guilty wishes, of its criminal passions, which more 
than reason, contribute to form the moral system and rule of conduct of an 
unbeliever. "25 From the pulpit of a Dutch Reformed Church in New York City 
in 1794, the congregation heard that "there is necessarily contained in be-
lieving, that Jesus is the Christ, . . . a belief of the sinful state of mankind, 
and their inability to recover themselves. "26 An evangelical in Norfolk, 
23[Samuel Davies], Sermons £!!.Important Subjects,~ the late Reverend 
and Pious Samuel Davies, !:· M. to which is prefixed the Character of the Author 
~the Rev. David Bostick, M.A. , in Five Volumes (Philadelphia, 1818), I, 
97-101. 
24rbid. , nr, 62. 
25samuel Stanhope Smith, Sermons (Newark, N. J., 1799), 1-2. 
26wnliam Linn, Discourses£!!:. the Signs of the Times (New York, 1794), 
87-115. 
14 
Virginia heard a sermon on August 20, 1775 "on the dignity of human nature. 
Vain philosophy!", he exclaimed. "What is the dignity of depraved human 
27 
nature?" Even John Wesley, the father of the Arminian Methodist sect, 
warned against those who were painting "fair pictures of human nature." Though 
it was "Quite unfashionable . . . to say anything to the disparagement of 
human nature," he warned that neither the scriptures nor experience supported 
an optimistic conclusion. From both "we learn, concerning man in his natural 
state, unassisted by the grace of God, that 'all the imagination of the thoughts 
of his heart' are still 'evil, only evil' and that continually." And "let it be 
remembered, that the heart even of a believer is not wholly purified when he 
is justified. Sin is then overcome, but it is not rooted out: it is conquered, 
but not destroyed. " It was still necessary, even in the redeemed state, to be 
ever on guard against the root of sin, self-will, pride, which remained in his 
28 heart. 
Jonathan Edwards, the most respected defender of the revival in America, 
offered the most articulate explanation in support of human depravity. In The 
Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended; Evidences of its Truth 
Produced, and Arguments to the Contrary Answered, containing in Particular, 
A Reply to the Objections _and Arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his Book, entitled, 
"The Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin Proposed to Free and Candid Examin-
ation. " (1758), he undertook the defense of this Calvinist position which was 
27The Journal and Letters of Francis Asbury, ed. by Elmer T. Clark 
(3 vols:;-Nashville:-1958), I, 162-163. 
28John Wesley, Sermons on Several Occasions (2 vols.; New York, 1815), 
I, 351-353, II, 503. -
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under attack from some of the more liberal clergy. He argued that God im-
planted within man two kinds of principles, the operation of which reflected the 
duality of man's nature. The inferior principles were those which encompassed 
the natural appetites and passions of "mere human nature." There were also 
the superior principles "wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and 
man's righteousness and true holiness." This is Edwards' exposition of the 
scriptural dualism that describes man's fleshly and divine natures. According 
to God's plan, "these superior principles were given to possess the throne, and 
maintain an absolute dominion in the heart: the other to be wholly subordinate 
and subservient. " So long as these principles reigned, man enjoyed dignity and 
happiness. But "when man sinned, and broke God's covenant, and fell under 
his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed then God left him; 
that communion with God, on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; 
the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. " Without this com-
munion with God man was nothing but flesh without spirit. "The inferior prin-
ciples of self-love, and natural appetite, ... being alone, and left to them-
selves, of course became reigning principles; • . . they became absolute 
masters of the heart." Edwards' conclusion then was that the natural state of 
the mind of man is governed by inferior principles only, and that consequently 
man's nature "is corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity that amounts to 
and implies their utter undoing. " 29 
29Jonathan Edwards: Representative Selections, intro. and notes by 
Clarence H. Faust and Thomas H. johnson (New York, 1962), 321-327. 
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This emphasis on the depravity of man's nature was an enduring theme in 
the preaching of the evangelicals from the Great Awakening through there-
mainder of the century. During the Jeffersonian era, the great majority of 
church going Americans 30 were members of evangelical congregations and 
concurred with the negative appraisals of their own natural inclinations heard 
regularly from the pulpit. 
At the same time many of those to whom this theological reasoning was 
nonsensical were equally demeaning in their appraisal of human nature. Either 
through reflection on their own impulses, or, especially, in viewing the histor-
ical record of man's carnage, or the contemporary evidence of the influence of 
ambition and deceit, they were willing to accept the more secularly oriented, 
but equally pessimistic, Hobbesian portrait of natural man. This was a 
portrait which "put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and 
restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death"- -a portrait 
wherein man without an external control over his natural passions of greed and 
pride was at war against every other man. 31 
Jefferson found that, for the most part, his colleagues held a rather low 
estimation of human nature. He found that President Washington "was naturally 
30Robert G. Pope finds that "on the eve of the American Revolution at least 
three-fourths of the congregations in the rebellious colonies still professed, if 
they did not strictly adhere to the tenets of Reformed theology." In Michael 
McGiffert and Robert A. Skotheim, American Social Thought: Sources and 
Interpretations (2 vols.; Reading, Mass., 1972), I, 75. 
31Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,~ the Matter, Forme, ! Power of~ Com-
~-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (1651), ed. by W. G. Pogson Smith 
(London, 1909), 75, 96. 
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distrustful of men, and inclined to gloomy apprehensions about them" 32 The 
General had indeed written during the Revolution that "a small knowledge of 
human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, 
interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, 
under its influence." When applied to man in society this meant that "motives 
of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the 
observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves 
sufficient to produce a persevering conformity to the refined dictates and 
obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continued sacri-
fice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good." It 
was, he concluded, "vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on 
this account," but when the time comes to build a government it should be 
remembered that "no institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these 
maxims can succeed. " 33 As we have noted, Jefferson believed that it was this 
kind of thinking, that shaped the Federalist political philosophy. 34 The two 
32TJ to Dr. Walter Jones, Jan. 2, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 46-52. 
33George Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army, Jan. 29, 
1778, The Writings of George Washington: From th~ Original Manuscript 
Sources 1745-1799, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick (39 vols.; Washington, 1931-
1944), X, 362-403. 
34Marshall Smelser finds that the Federalist's rejection of egalitarian 
principles "was based on a theory of human nature which emphasized differ-
ences of individual abilities and the inherent depravity of passionate, self-
interested human nature." "The Federalist Period as an Age of Passion," 
American Quarterly, X (1958), 391; also see Lovejoy, Reflections, 51. 
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dominant leaders of the Federalists, Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, did 
not attempt to conceal their distrust of human nature. Hamilton from his earl-
iest writing frequently made such charges as: "a vast majority of mankind is 
intirely biassed by motives of self-interest"; and "jealousy is a predominant 
passion of human nature. " 35 His defense of the new constitution in 17 87-17 88 
was in many ways a paraphrase of Hobbes's philosophy. "Why has government 
been instituted at all?" he asked. "Because the passions of men will not con-
form to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. " 36 "Has it 
not . . . invariably been found, that momentary passions and immediate 
interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than 
general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice?" 37 Most 
eighteenth century Americans found this declaration that the history of human 
conduct does not warrant an "exalted opinion of human virtue" 38 compatible 
with their religious confessions. "To judge from the history of mankind," 
Hamilton wrote, "we shall be compelled to conclude, that the fiery and de-
structive passions of war, reign in the human breast, with much more powerful 
sway, than the mild and beneficient sentiments of peace: and, that to model 
our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, is to calculate on 
35"A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress, etc.," Dec. 15, 1774, 
"The Farmer Refuted, etc. " Feb. 23, 1775, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 
ed. by Harold C. Styrett (17 vols.; New York, 1961--), I, 53, 94. 
36"The Federalist No. 15," Dec. 1, 1787, Ibid., IV, 362. 
37 
"The Federalist No. 6," Nov. 14, 17 87, Ibid. , 313. 
38
"The Federalist No. 75," Mar. 26, 1788, Ibid. , 630. 
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the weaker springs of the human character. " 39 John Adams rejected the con-
cept of the total and universal depravity of human nature, but he still confessed 
his conviction to Jefferson that human reason and human conscience were no 
match for "human passions, human imaginations and human enthusiasm. " He 
had little respect for "those profound philosophers, whose sagacity perceives 
the perfectibility of human nature." He was convinced that man's "passions, 
ambition, avarice, love, resentment, etc. , possess so much metaphysical 
subtlety, and so much overpowering eloquence, that they insinuate themselves 
into the understanding and the conscience, and convert both to their party. ,.40 
Neither Adams nor Hamilton subscribed to any theory of human depravity 
in the sense of some awesome affliction from above. They both frequently 
reaffirmed their belief that man enjoyed the faculty of reason. But both were 
students of human motivation. And in their conclusions they belonged to the 
school that believed, inHume's words, that "reason is, and ought to be, the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
41 
and obey them. " Because passion was superior to reason as the motive 
39"The Federalist No. 34," Jan. 5, 1788, Ibid., 473. 
40John Adams to TJ, Apr. 19, 1817, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XV, 
103-108; and Feb. 2, 1816, Ibid., XIV, 423-427. Douglass G. Adair states 
that the Founding Fathers' "reading of history, equally with their immediate 
experience, defined for them both the short-range and the long-range potential-
ities for evil inherent in a uniform human nature operating in a republican gov-
ernment." " 'Experience Must be Our Only Guide:' History, Democratic 
Theory and the United States Constitution, " The Reinterpretation of Early 
American History, ed. by Ray Allen Billington (New York, 1968), 141. 
41David Hume, !: Treatise ~Human Nature (1738), with intro. by A. D. 
Lindsay (2 vols. ; London, 1911), II, 127. 
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power of human action, republican virtue, though appealing to reason, would 
prove to be a clay foundation for the new republic. "We may preach till we are 
tired of the theme, the necessity of disinterestedness in republics, without 
making a single proselyte, " proclaimed Hamilton. "Men are rather reasoning 
than reasonable animals, for the most part governed by the impulse of 
passion. "42 This did not mean that man was depraved. Nor did it mean that 
passions were to be despised. It simply meant that if one was engaged in de-
signing a government for men, he should take into consideration the motivating 
force within their lives. Quoting Hume, Hamilton wrote that "in contriving any 
system of government, . . . every~ ought to be supposed a knave; and to 
have no other end in all his actions, but private interests. ,.43 If the motivations 
of the governed were recognized, whether they were private interest, ambition, 
or the love of fame, the latter being in Hamilton's hierarchy "the ruling passion 
of the noblest minds, "44 they could be used in binding the governed to the 
governor. 45 
42
"The Continentalist No. VI," July 4, 1782, Papers of Hamilton, Styrett, 
ed. , Ill, 103; Alexander Hamilton to James Bayard, Apr. 1802, Works of 
Hamilton, Lodge, ed. , X, 433. 
43
"The Farmer Refuted, etc. , " Feb. 23, 1775, Papers of Hamilton, 
Styrett, ed. , I, 94-95. 
44"The Federalist No. 72," Mar. 19, 1788, Ibid., IV, 613. 
45For an excellent analysis of the relationship of Hamilton's appraisal of 
human nature and his ideas on government see Gerald Stourzh, Alexander 
Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), 76-125. Most 
eighteenth century writers from Mandeville to Hume and Adam Smith claimed 
that the craving for admiration "was ingeniously implanted in man by his Creator 
as a substitute for the Reason-Virtue which he does not possess, and is the 
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Jefferson rejected the Federalist design for government, and the somber 
view of human nature proclaimed by its architects, with the same vehemence 
that he rejected the five points of Calvin as a religion of Daemonism. 46 "I do 
not believe with the Rochefoucaults and Montaignes, that fourteen out of fifteen 
men are rogues," he wrote in 1795. But in obvious reference to his immed-
iate political experience he added that this proportion was probably not too 
strong for those who "always contrive to nestle themselves into the places of 
power and profit. "47 To say that Jefferson held an optimistic view of human 
nature does not imply that he was blind to history, or to the behavior of men 
in his own time, or to the role of ignoble passions in shaping human conduct. 
He knew that man was susceptible to the "seduction of self-love," and that one 
had to acknowledge "the bias of the human mind from motives of interest." He 
knew that there were occasions when even irrational motives might overcome 
the motive of self-interest. I know of no more eloquent, and revealing discourse 
sole subjective promoting of good conduct, and the motive of virtually all the 
modes of behavior necessary for the good order of society and the progress of 
mankind." Lovejoy, Reflections, 157. Also see james Scanlan, "The Federal-
ists and Human Nature," The Review of Politics, XXI (1959), 657-677, re-
printed in McGiffert and Skotheim, American Social Thought, 200-210. 
46TJ to John Adams, Apr. 11, 1823, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, ed. by 
Lester J. Cappon (2 vols., Chapel Hill, 1959; Clarion pb edition, New York, 
1971), 591. Gilbert Chinard places Jefferson within the prevailing tradition by 
asserting that he held a pessimistic view of human nature. Thomas Jefferson: 
The Apostle of Americanism (Boston, 1929), 129-130. I believe that this is one 
instance in which Chinard errs in his otherwise thoughtful study. 
47TJ to Mann Page, Aug. 30, 1795, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, IX, 
306-307. 
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on the struggle between reason and passion that takes place within every human 
breast than that found in the Head and the Heart dialogue in his much quoted 
letter to Maria Cosway. He knew there was much vice and misery in the world, 
but he believed there was more virtue and happiness. He believed that "moral-
ity, compassion, generosity, are innate elements of the human constitution," 
and refused to relinquish his general confidence because of "occasional in-
fidelities. "48 
This optimistic appraisal of the human constitution placed Jefferson in a 
philosophical minority, just as did his optimistic faith in the ultimate success 
of the democratic experiment. It is my conviction that the latter faith rested 
upon his confidence in human nature. I shall suggest in the succeeding chapters 
that both these faiths were a subtle but clear expression of a deeply held belief 
that man is ~ nature a social creature, and that he is innately prepared for a 
harmonious social existence, and further, that these beliefs rested firmly on 
a consciously developed and well defined ethical theory, a theory that was 
largely shaped by his knowledge of and agreement with the philosophical writings 
of a group of eighteenth century British moralists. Although Jefferson may 
never have completely grasped the subtleties of their moral philosophy, most 
familiarly known as Scottish sentimentalist moral philosophy, he was an 
attentive student to the essential arguments on which it was based and the con-
4~J to David Ross, May 8, 1786, Boyd Collection, IX, 473-475; TJ to 
Maria Cosway, Oct. 12, 1786, Ibid., X, 443-453; TJ to AbbeSalimankis, Mar. 
14, 1810, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XII, 379-380; TJ to Monsieur Dupont 
de Nemours, Apr. 24, 1816, Ibid., XV, 103-108; TJ to Thomas Leiper, Jan. 1, 
1814, Ibid. , XIV, 41-45. 
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elusions about human nature that it offered. 49 His study and knowledge of the 
Scottish philosophy, to the extent that it contributed to his own conclusions 
about human nature, are essential to an understanding of the conceptual frame-
49Alrnost all of Jefferson's biographers have made at least a passing ref-
erence to the influence of the Scottish Common Sense Philosophers, but they 
have not felt the necessity to elaborate much beyond that. For examples see 
Henry S. Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson (Philadelphia, 1865), I, 26; 
Karl Lehmann, Thomas Jefferson: American Humanist (Chicago, 1947), 131-135; 
Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, Vol. II: Jefferson and the Rights of 
Man (Boston, 1951), 215; Nathan Schnacher, Thomas Jefferson: !!: Biography 
(New York, 1951), I, 36-37; John Dos Passos, The Head and Heart of Thomas 
Jefferson (New York, 1954) 91-110, 152; and Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas 
Jefferson and the New Nation: !: Biography (New York, 1970), 54·55. Gilbert 
Chinard sees the influence primarily in the field of legal theory. Thomas 
Jefferson: The Apostle of Americanism, 24-31. Douglass G. Adair finds the 
Scottish influence more important than the French in the fields of social and 
political theory. "'That Politics May be Reduced to a Science:' David Hurne, 
James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, " Huntington Library Quarterly, XX 
(1957), 343-360. The most extensive treatment is in Adrienne Koch, The 
Philosophy o_· Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1943). She believes that Jefferson 
leaned slightly to the "hopeful" side in his appraisal of human nature, but she 
concludes that he was not unduly influenced by his "flirtation with Scottish 
intuitionist philosophy." She believes that "the predominant influences in 
Jefferson's views on human nature carne from eighteenth-century France." 
(113-116) I believe that this is true in only the very small area of the relations 
between man's physical organs and the thinking process. In this area the works 
of the French materialists P. J. G. Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy were certainly 
influential, but in the more general view of human nature, I believe that the 
Scots were far more important. 
It is the purpose of this study to measure the nature and extent of the in-
fluence of the Scottish philosophers on Jefferson's concept of human nature and 
to comment upon the implications of this for his political theory. It is not an 
attempt to explain the intellectual origins of his ideas on government, but is 
intended to complement that kind of study such as is found in Douglass G. Adair, 
"The Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, " (unpublished Ph. D. diss. , 
Yale University, 1943), or H. Trevor Colbourn, Lamp of Experience: Whig 
History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 
1965), and "Thomas Jefferson's Use of the Past, 11 William and Mary Quarterly, 
3rd Ser., XV (1958), 56-70. 
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work from which Jefferson acted, and thus to the political faith which he 
professed. 
This dissertation is thus one chapter in the intellectual biography of Thomas 
Jefferson, and at the same time one chapter in the intellectual history of late 
eighteenth century America. It proposes an interaction between ideas and 
events, and rests upon the assumption that, at least in some instances of human 
endeavor, ideas precede and influence activity. More specifically, it proposes 
that at the beginning of the American democratic experiment, Jefferson was 
drawing upon certain assumptions about human nature that he felt were basic 
to the theory of democratic government. It is a virtually universal assumption 
among political scientists today that all political theories are or must be 
premised on either explicit or implicit assumptions about human nature. It is 
more and more being recognized that earlier "political scientists, " from 
Aristotle to Rousseau, were also seriously concerned with questions about 
human nature. 50 This was no less true for the more important theorists at 
work in late eighteenth century America. Although they were certainly com-
mitted to the experience of history as their most reliable guide, 51 they were 
equally sensitive to their immediate experience with human nature. Their 
5
°For example see Glenn Tinder, Political Thinking: The Perennial Ques-
tions (2d ed. ; Boston, 1974), 4; Lucian W. Pye, "Personal Identity and Political 
Ideology," Psychoanalysis and History, ed. with intro. by Bruce Mazlish 
(rev. ed.; New York, 1971), 150-151. 
51oouglass G. Adair, "'Experience Must be Our Only Guide:' History, 
Democratic Theory, and the United States Constitution, " The Reinterpretation 
of Early American History, ed. by Billington, 129-150. 
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beliefs about human nature were shaped by a knowledge of history, by theo-
logical dogma, and by a kind of primitive psychology based on evidence derived 
from both observation and personal introspection. Their goal was to develop 
a scientific theory of government based on both the lessons of history and the 
psychology of human nature as they understood it. I will propose that Jefferson's 
beliefs about the psychology of human nature, more than those of any of his 
colleagues, were influenced by the teachings of early motivational theory in 
addition to observation and introspection. 
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CHAPTER II 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
The most generally held concept of human nature in eighteenth century ·· · 
America rested on the Calvinist doctrines of original sin and the depravity of 
man. According to these doctrines all human beings were heirs of Adam's sin, 
and as God had withdrawn his spiritual communion from the common head of 
the species, "so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come 
into existence; whereby they come into the world mere flesh, and entirely under 
the government of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt, 
as Adam did. " 1 In other words, man, governed by the evil passions of his 
natural state, would sin. He was powerless in his own volitions to make right 
moral decisions and follow them. But this belief, like so many others, came 
under serious scrutiny and attack by eighteenth century philosophes on both 
sides of the Atlantic. By the middle of the following century, such a belief 
about human nature would appear at least uninteresting, if not totally discredited, 
in most of the western world. The years of Jefferson's greatest intellectual 
development, roughly the last quarter of the eighteenth century, were the years 
that witnessed the most intense debate about this issue and its implications for 
the whole realm of human endeavor. It is hardly necessary to state that 
1Jonathan Edwards, The Great Christian Doctrine •.. Defended; 
• ' 301-309. 
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Jefferson was quickly persuaded to the side of the more romantic image of 
human nature that would emerge triumphant in the nineteenth century. A 
knowledge of the general outlines of this important transition in thought will be 
necessary, however, in order to follow Jefferson to his conclusions. 
The Calvinist doctrine of innate depravity precluded the necessity for or 
development of a philosophy of morals, and indeed moral philosophies were 
considered by most Calvinists as evil attempts to evade God's law. Their 
religious doctrine clearly defined the nature of man and of morality and thus 
any secular statement on either subject would be at best superfluous. But 
because their philosophy of morality was theologically founded, its acceptance 
and influence depended upon a fervor of religious affection, and religion in 
America by the early eighteenth century was, according to Samuel Wiggles-
worth in an election sermon in 1733, only "the shadow of past and vanish'd 
Glory! . . . If the Fear of the Lord be to Hate Evil, as Prov. !!· 13. Then 
it is to be feared that our Religion runs low. " 2 All across the Colonies 
frightened ministers agonized over the decline of piety and religious ardor. 
They told of a society that had been founded by men dedicated to realizing on 
earth a community founded on God's immutable principles, a goal that had 
become progressively lost in the business of fishing, trade and settlement. 
2samuel Wigglesworth, An Essay for Reviving Religion. !!; Sermon 
Delivered . . . May 30th. MDCXXXIII. Being the Anniversary for the 
Election • . . (Boston, 1733), in Heimert and Miller, Great Awakening, 
4. 
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I shall only now add, that the Powerful Love of the World, and Exorbitant 
Reach after Riches, which is become the reigning Temper in Persons of all 
Ranks in our Land, is alone enough to awaken our concerns for abandon'd, 
slighted and forgotten Religion. 'Tis this that takes up our Time, seizes 
our Affections, and governs our Views: Straitens our Hands: respecting 
Works of Charity, and pusheth us into the most wicked Schemes and Methods. 
This Worldly Spirit has in a great measure thrust out Religion, and given it 
a Wound which will prove Deadly unless infinite Mercy prevent. . . • 3 
The loss of religious ardor and the emergence of a worldly spirit probably 
reveals more than a turning to the pursuit of economic opportunities. The 
historical portrait of America as a crucible in which European ideas were re-
molded and fused into a unique new intellectual culture 4 can easily be over-
emphasized. But the change in the American mind during the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries was not something peculiar to America. It was 
a change that was occurring in the mind of Western man on both sides of the 
Atlantic. It was simply the continuation of a trend that had begun long before --
a trend toward the secularization of Western thought. Over a period of two 
centuries after 1600 Western man came to hold new beliefs about himself and 
about the universe. Many of these beliefs were incompatible with the teachings 
of traditional Christianity. Questions arose about the validity of any absolute 
truth. The authority of tradition was severely diminished by a new faith in 
investigation. The progress of scientific theory and discovery pointed man from 
the world of the spiritual to the world of the natural or material. The physical 
world was man's abode, and it was here that he would work out his destiny. 
3Ibid. ' 6. 
4This theme is developed at length in Max Savelle, Seeds of Liberty: The 
Genesis of the American Mind (Seattle, 1948), and David J. Boorstin, The 
Americans: The Coloniaf'EXPerience (New York, 1958). 
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The writings of Newton on natural laws and Locke on the theory of knowl-
edge had made their mark in America as well as in Europe. In the new picture 
God was subject to the laws of order a11:d reason, and was thus more intelligible. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the new picture reflected a new faith in human 
activism in matters both secular and beyond. Natural theology, while not 
denying the validity of the Calvinistic thesis of scriptural revelation, also 
insisted that reason was of equal importance as a vehicle through which God 
revealed Himself, and His moral will, to man. True virtue was still defined 
by God, but it was by the use of natural reason that man apprehended and under-
stood divine principles. 
In sum the change was one that reflected Western man's passage from one 
intellectual world to another -- from a theocentric to an anthropocentric con-
ception of man and the universe. The change that occurred in the American 
mind that so alarmed the Colonial ministers was as much an accident of time 
as a response to a unique environment. 
The importance and implications of the secularization of Western thought 
were far-reaching. In America this trend was temporarily altered in the 
eighteenth century by the Great Awakening that revived for the commonalty the 
traditional "world picture" of God immediately participating in the universe 
and in the fortunes of their lives. But the revival held little appeal for many of 
the learned minority. These found the new secular "world picture" more 
intellectually acceptable. This new picture did not obliterate the traditional 
concept of the relationship between man and God. But it emphasized the tran-
scendence rather than immediacy, the benevolence rather than wrath of God; 
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and de-emphasized the depravity of man and the concept of predestined moral 
actions. Most significantly, the focus of interest in the new picture was on 
man in the physical world working out his own destiny. And in this sense, the 
new picture emerged as a reaction against Calvinist determinism; or the 
providential view of history. 
One of the greatest contrasts between the old and new pictures of the 
universe was the contrast between the pessimistic and optimistic appraisals of 
human nature. And because ethical theory is largely dependent on some under-
standing of human nature, the new optimism caused serious alterations in 
moral thought. It was these "ethical difficulties of secularism" that, according 
to Lester G. Crocker, reached a first critical focus in the eighteenth century 
and constituted an intellectual "age of crisis. "S Or as Sir Leslie Stephen has 
so succinctly stated it, "Wider speculations as to morality inevitably occur as 
soon as the vision of God becomes faint; when the almighty retires behind 
second causes, instead of being felt as an immediate presence. "6 Just as they 
had rejected the theological concept of the depravity of human nature, the hand-
ful of American philosophes rejected the concept of revealed ethical law. Con-
5An Age of Crisis: Man and World in Eighteenth Century French Thought 
(Baltimore, 1959), 180, 199. 
6History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (2vols. , New York, 
1962, fp 1876), II, 1. But one should also note L. A. Selby-Bigge's suggestion 
that "it was perhaps rather the emptiness and insufficiency of theological ethics 
in which sanctions were the chief interest, which set serious people upon 
original moral inquiries, rather than contempt for theology altogether." British 
Moralists: Being Selections from Writers Principally of the Eighteenth Century. 
(2 Vols.; fp 1897, New York, 1965), I, xxi. 
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sequently the theological sanctions of divine reward and punishment as incent-
ives to virtuous conduct became progressively less efficacious. The new 
natural theology substituted for the old Calvinist dogma the belief that "~ 
enlightened Mind . . . ought to be the Guide of those who call themselves Men. " 
The aim of "the Influence of the Spirit of God" was "as much intended to open 
the Understanding, as to warm the Affections; and not only so, but to keep the 
Passions within their proper Bounds, restraining them from usurping Dominion 
over the reasonable Nature." 7 
The development of an optimistic theory of human nature was accompanied 
by a search for a compatible philosophy of ethics. The books and pamphlets 
published and read during the eighteenth century on both sides of the Atlantic 
testify to the increased interest in the nature of man and morals. 8 The result 
was an expression of moral philosophy through the proliferation of secular 
moral theories that attempted to solve the human moral problem; the selection 
of and doing of right and the avoidance of wrong actions as a means for the 
achievement of present and eternal happiness. William Smith, first president 
of the College of Philadelphia (now University of Pennsylvania), defined moral 
7 Charles Chauncy, Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New 
England . . . (Boston, 1743), in Heimert and Miller, Great Awakening, 298. 
8Gerald Stourzh writes that "it would be more accurate . . . to regard 
the eighteenth century as the Age of Human Nature, or the Age of Psychology" 
than the Age of Reason. "Psychology, in fact, dominated the moral and political 
science of the eighteenth century as theology had dominated the seventeenth 
century." Alexander Hamilton, 76. 
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philosophy as "deducing the laws of our conduct from our situation in life and 
connexions with the Beings around us; settling the whole Oeconomy of the Will 
and Affections; establishing the predominancy of Reason and Conscience, and 
guiding us to Happiness thro' the practice of Virtue. "9 And Samuel Johnson, 
first president of .King's College (now Columbia University), wrote that "Moral 
Philosophy is the Knowledge of the moral World; . . . and the general Laws of 
the moral Nature, together with all that practical Conduct and Behavior thereon 
depending, that is necessary to promote our true Happiness both in our present 
and future State," and that "ETHICS is the Art of living happily, by the right 
Knowledge of ourselves, and the Practice of Virtue: Our Happiness being the 
End, and Knowledge and Virtu~, the Means to that End. " 10 The development 
of moral theories obviously necessitated a confrontation with some very basic 
philosophical questions. What is the nature of man? What are the nature and 
criteria of virtue? On what foundation or authority do they rest? Why is man 
obligated to conform to the knowledge of true virtue? 
The nature of these questions plus the number of persons offering solutions 
resulted in a variety of theories that frequently conflicted. The most serious 
conflicts seemed to grow out of questions of epistemology, as applied to the 
knowledge of virtue; and motivation, as applied to moral behavior. As Thomas 
Clap, head of Yale College (1739-1766) observed, the authors of moral philosophy 
9Quoted in James J. Walsh, Education of the Founding Fathers: Scholasti-
cism in the Colonial Colleges (New York, 1935), 216. 
10Elmenta Philosophica: Containing chiefly, Noetica, ..£!Things relating to 
the Mind or Understanding: and Ethica, or Things relating to the Moral Be-
ha'ViOUr(Philadelphia, 1752), 1-2. - -- -
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usually agreed on rules of conduct, but differed greatly in "the Foundation of 
the Obligation to observe those Rules, and in Criterion of Moral Good and 
Evil. ,ll 
John Locke provided an early impulse for the eighteenth century develop-
ment of secular moral theory. Because he believed that man's greatest con-
cern was with the condition of his "eternal estate," he concluded that "morality 
is the proper science and business of mankind in general. " In An Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding (1690), which was standard fare in every college 
by the middle of the eighteenth century, he argued cogently for a rationally 
conceived system of ethics. He employed the same arguments in destroying 
the concept of divinely implanted moral principles that he had used to attack 
the concept of innate ideas in general. In the latter case he attempted to dis-
prove the widely held idea that there were "primary notions" or characters 
"stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its first being and 
brings into the world with it," by showing the fallacies of the very evidence 
which was offered in its support. The most popular argument in behalf of the 
concept of innate ideas was that there are certain principles "universally 
agreed upon by all mankind." Locke countered that "if it were true in matter 
of fact that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed it would not 
prove then innate, . . • but, which is worse, this argument of universal 
consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles seems to me a 
llAn Essay on the Nature and Foundation of Moral Virtue and Obligation; 
Being a Short Introduction to the Study of Ethics, For the Use of the Students 
of Yale College (New Have-;,- 1765), 1.- ------ --
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demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all 
mankind give an universal assent. " 12 
Locke argued that ideas do not exist in the mind "before the senses have 
conveyed any in." This meant that "ideas in the understanding are coeval with 
sensation.,, In other words, all of the materials of reason and knowledge 
come from experience. 13 He believed that moral ideas, or principles, had to 
be derived from experience, i.e., sensation and reflection, in the same 
manner. Some had argued that "universal agreement" to certain moral prin-
ciples indicated an innate knowledge of moral truth. Locke dismissed this 
argument by turning the evidence as before. "Where is that practical truth that 
is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be innate?" he 
asked. "Whether there be any such moral principles wherein all men do agree, 
I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of man-
kind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys." Neither 
the history of mankind nor the observation of different societies offered any 
evidence of the existence of innate moral principles. 14 
Locke concluded that there were no such things as innate moral rules. But 
the fact that there were no innate moral principles did not mean that there was 
no moral truth, or that man could not discover this truth. Locke believed that 
12John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), ed. by 
John w: Yolton (2 vols, London, 1961), I, 9-10. 
13Ibid. I I, 9-10. 
14Ibid. ' 25-36. 
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moral good is defined by the peculiar relationship between God and man, and 
that the comprehension of this relationship affords "such foundations of our 
duty and rules of action as might place morality amongst the sciences capable 
of demonstration." He believed that "the measure of right and wrong might be 
made out to anyone that will apply himself with the same indifferency and 
attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences." But he warned 
that moral ideas are complex ideas that "require reasoning and discourse, and 
some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. " 15 Locke 
believed that mental laziness would prevent most men from acquiring a certain 
knowledge of moral truth by the process of reason, .and conceded that divine 
revelation would be the most familiar source of this truth. But he also be-
lieved that there was only a very fine line between inspiration and delusion. 
If one depended too much upon intuition or feeling, or "if strength of persuasion 
be the light which must guide us, I ask how shall anyone distinguish between 
the delusions of Satan and inspiration of the Holy Spirit?"16 It was, to be sure, 
divine law which was the ultimate criterion of moral right and wrong. But the 
light of nature, or reason, would reveal those moral principles which reflected 
divine law. 
Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything. I do not mean that 
we must consult reason and examine whether a proposition revealed from 
God can be made out by natural principles and if it cannot, that then we may 
reject it; but consult it we must, and by it examine whether it be revelation 
151bid. , n 154. 
161bid. ·, II, 294. 
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from God or no; and if reason finds it to be revealed from God, reason 
then declares for it as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of 
her dictates. 17 
Those who were convinced by Locke that there were no innate moral principles 
were faced with the task of defining the source and nature of moral virtue by 
reason, or by some human faculty other than reason, such as sentiment. 
The eighteenth century moral theories most familiar to Americans were 
developed by British philosophers, with a significantly large number of moral 
tomes emanating from the Scottish universities at Edinburgh, Glasgow, and 
Aberdeen. Wollaston and Price, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Locke and Hume, 
Stewart and Paley, were familiar names to those who had attended either 
British universities or one of the Colonial colleges. While seventeenth century 
curricula had placed great emphasis on divinity and metaphysics and had only 
reluctantly tolerated moral philosophy, during the first half of the eighteenth 
century this was reversed.. By mid -century "moral philosophy was supreme 
and alone as the queen of the sciences ... IS The subject was almost always 
taught by the college president and was usually the core of the senior year's 
work. It was primarily through the American colleges that eighteenth century 
moral theories were introduced into American thought during the Jeffersonian 
era. 
17 Ibid. ' 295. 
18Norman S. Fiering, "President Johnson and the Circle of Knowledge," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XXVIII (1971), 201; also see Fiering 
"Moral Philosophy in America 1650 to 1750 and its British Context" (unpublished 
Ph. D. diss. , Columbia University, 1969). 
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These theories have been lumped into two major categories by historians 
of philosophy --the Intellectual and Sentimental Schools. 19 There were some 
areas of agreement between these two schools of moral philosophy. As L. A. 
Selby-Bigge has noted, they shared the common object of showing "that virtue 
is real and is worth pursuing in itself; that virtue and the motive to it are 
irreducible to a merely animal experience of pleasure and pain." And both 
schools "were agreed that it was not the mere will of God which constituted the 
distinction between right and wrong, nor his power which constituted the obli-
gation to goodness. "20 The essential question on which they differed, one that 
held important implications for the development of a psychology of human nature, 
was whether moral perceptions originate in sense or in reason. 
In broad outline, those who fell within the Intellectual School generally held 
that morality was a matter of absolute and immutable truth that reflected the 
essence of divine nature, and which was perceptible by the human intellect. The 
principal authors of this School were Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), William 
Wollaston (1660-1724), and Richard Price (1723-1791), all of whose works were 
read in the American college communities. Wollaston's The Religion of Nature 
delineated (privately printed 1722; first published 1724), which was used as a 
textbook of moral philosophy at Yale from 1740 to circa 1760, proclaimed 
19The eighteenth century categorization was more complex than this and 
will be developed in a subsequent chapter. 
20selby-Bigge, British Moralists, I, xxii-xxviii. 
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reason to be the only valid foundation of virtue. In Review of the principal 
questions, etc., in Morals (1758), Price argued that reason was not only the 
source of the knowledge of virtue, but that the perception of right and wrong 
was alone a sufficient motive to obedience. Samuel Johnson, one of the first 
American writers on moral philosophy, asserted the primacy of reason when 
he wrote that "MORAL good consists in freely chusing and doing whatsoever 
Truth and right Reason dictate as necessary to be chosen and done, in order to 
our true Happiness: Moral Evil the contrary; for moral Good must mean, the 
Good of a moral agent; i.e., of [a] rational, conscious, free, self-exerting and 
self-determining Agent. "21 To establish the criteria of virtue, these authors 
tried to identify morality with the intelligible nature of God and moral law with 
ultimate truth. Clarke, in Discourse concerning the unchangeable obligations 
of Natural Religion (1706 ), explained that the difference between good and evil 
was determined absolutely by the Nature of Things. "Some things are in their 
own nature Good and Reasonable and Fit to be done," he wrote, and "other 
things are in their own nature absolutely Evil." Even the will of God is sub-
ject to the eternal rules of justice, equity, goodness and truth which define the 
nature of things. And since God has made men in his own image and has given 
them "those excellent Faculties of Reason and Will, whereby they are enabled 
to distinguish Good from Evil, and to chuse the one and refuse the other, " they 
"should neither negligently suffer themselves to be imposed upon and deceived 
in Matters of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, or willfully and perversely allow 
21Elementa Philosophica, 3. 
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themselves to be overruled by absurd Passions, and corrupt or partial Affections 
to act contrary to what they know is Fit to be done. "22 In summary, the 
Intellectual School of moral philosophy elevated moral law to the sphere of 
ultimate truth, reflecting the immutable nature of God, and communicated to 
man through his~ priori knowledge of the divine nature. And man's actions 
should be both governed and judged by this immutable standard. 
The sentimentalists generally did not deny the concept of absolute moral 
truth, but they rejected the intellectualists' claim that reason alone was 
sufficient guide to that truth. They argued that human intuition was a surer 
basis for ethics than discursive reason. Like the intellectualists, most of the 
sentimentalists stopped short of totally disregarding divine revelation, but in 
general they played down the doctrine of supernatural sanctions. 
The Scottish sentimentalist philosophy was first introduced in a serious 
way in America in the middle third of the eighteenth century through the writings 
of Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson, who was professor of moral philosophy at 
Glasgow from 1729 until his death in 1746, undertook the task of laying a solid 
foundation for moral judgment that honored reason, as demanded by the pro-
ponents of natural religion, while rejecting the brand of rationalism that claimed 
that reason alone was a sufficient guide to right conduct. For Hutcheson, the 
ultimate source of human conduct was located not in reason, but in emotions 
and feelings. Hutcheson founded his ethical theory on the concept of a moral 
sense, an internal human sense capable of perceiving moral right and wrong. 
22selby-Bigge, British Moralists, II, 3-13. 
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This concept was introduced early in the eighteenth century by Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, developed by Hutcheson, and elaborated 
in subsequent writings by Scottish authors such as Lord Kames (Henry Home), 
Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart. All of their works were widely read in 
America. Scottish Realism, "purportedly rational and scientific, yet rejecting 
skepticism and affirming the reality of the world and the evidences of a divine 
creator, " was particularly suited in both its positive and negative aspects to 
the i~tellectual climate of eighteenth century America. 23 It owed its appeal to 
"its systematic exposition of both reason and moral sentiment as supplementary 
factorP. in human life. "24 It endorsed the validity of absolute moral standards 
without demanding a return to the theocentric ethics of the Calvinist era. In 
this commonsense approach, divine revelation was supplemented by a natural 
instinct, and thus the best of both possible worlds were brought together in a 
harmonious philosophy. To a small degree it provided the resolution of the 
dialectical antagonism between theologically and secularly oriented ethical 
theories. In contrast to the intellectualists, the Scottish sentimentalist ethical 
theory rested on the belief that human passions, emotions, feelings, etc., were 
good-- that they were divinely ordained-- perhaps they were the guiding voice 
of the Author of virtue within. Gladys Bryson has noted that "as the day was 
already past for arming oneself confidently out of the armory of the Bible and 
23Douglas Sloan, The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College 
Ideal (New York, 1971), 238. 
24Herbert W. Schneider, !: History of American Fhilosophy (New York, 
1946), 246. 
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the church, the day was now passing for trusting to reason as an infallible 
weapon and as a motive force in human life. What impressed these protestants 
against rationalism as universally effective in action was the equipment of 
senses, affections, passions, with which all men are endowed. "25 They did 
not demean the role of reason in human affairs, but simply insisted that reason 
follows intuition in the perception of true virtue. 
The triumph of the sentimentalist philosophy in America is most vividly 
evidenced by the adoption of Scottish texts by practically every American 
college in the second half of the eighteenth century. This trend has been 
frequently attributed to the influence of the Scottish minister, John Witherspoon, 
who was brought to America to be president of the College of New Jersey (now 
Princeton) in 1767. But the earlier use of Scottish moral texts at other Colonial 
colleges shows that the Scottish philosophy preceded Witherspoon. Nonetheless 
Witherspoon's lectures on moral philosophy drew freely on the Scottish moral-
ists, especially Hutcheson and Lord Karnes. There is no doubt that their ideas 
were widely transmitted through his students, especially those who taught in 
the Presbyterian academies which proliferated in the south and west in the 
closing decades of the century. Another Scot, Francis Alison, a graduate of 
the University of Edinburgh, who taught moral philosophy at the College of 
Philadelphia, was also a close follower of Hutcheson, to the extent of requiring 
his students to prepare abridgements of Hutcheson's !!; Short Introduction to 
25Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century 
(Princeton, 1945), 26. 
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Moral Philosophy (1747). It appears that either this work, or his more fully 
developed!: System of Moral Philosophy (1755}, were used as either primary 
or secondary texts, or as in the case of the College of New Jersey, were used 
as models in almost every American college by the mid-1780's. 26 
Samuel Johnson, who was mentioned above as an early exponent of the 
intellectual school at King's College, was one of the first American writers on 
moral philosophy. The evolution of his thought, as revealed in his published 
works, recapitulates the trend toward sentimentalist ethics described in this 
chapter. Before 1745 his writing reflected a faithful adherence to the intellec-
tualist doctrines of Wollaston. His New System of Morality (1746), and 
Elementa Philosophica (1752), reveal the persuasive influence of the Scottish 
philosophy. 27 
The Scottish sentimentalist moral philosophy enjoyed its greatest popu-
larity in America in the late eighteenth century, and found a very apt and 
responsive student in at least one of the Founding Fathers -- Thomas Jefferson. 
26Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Princeton 1746-1896 (Princeton, 1946), 85-93; 
John MacLean, History of the College of New Jersey 1746-1854 (New York, 
1969), 292-295; Francis L. Broderick, "Pulpit, Physics, and Politics: The 
Curriculum of the College of New Jersey, 17 46-1794, " William .and Mary 
Quarterly, 3d Ser., VI (1949), 42-68; Walter C. Bronson, The History of Brown 
University 1764-1914 (Providence, 1914), 167, 509; Colyer Meriwether, Our 
Colonial Curriculum 1607-1776 (Washington, 1907}, 52-128; George P. Schmidt, 
The Liberal Arts College: A Chapter in American Cultural History (New 
Brunswick, 1957), 47-48, 108-111; Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: 
The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783 (New York, 1970), 300, 380-384, 462-465; 
Sloan, Scottish Enlightenmeiit,"" 88-125, 186. 
27Fiering, "Moral Philosophy in America," 294. 
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Jefferson had embraced eighteenth century natural theology over traditional 
religious dogma while still a young man. His humanist inclinations had led 
to a search for a theory or system of ethics free of the need for divine sanction, 
one that would be sanctioned by the inward spirit of natural man. The senti-
mentalists attempted to show "that virtue is real and natural by relating it, not 
to the 'nature of things,' but to 'human nature,' " 28 and it is in this emphasis 
that their theory becomes an important part of this dissertation. It implied an 
optimistic view of human nature, and in its ultimate development it suggested 
that man is innately prepared for a harmonious social existence. Both of these 
themes were important elements in Jefferson's views on human nature. 
28selby-Bigge, British Moralists, I, xii. 
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CHAPTER III 
JEFFERSON'S INTRODUCTION 
TO SENTIMENTALIST MORAL THEORY 
Jefferson's knowledge of moral philosophy was comprehensive in the 
sense that he was familiar with at least the basic tenets of most of the moral 
theories propounded in the eighteenth century, and indeed with earlier theories 
extending back into antiquity. His grasp of the subject can be attributed both 
to formal study while at the College of William and Mary (1760-1762), and to 
extensive reading and study for the remainder of his life. His continuing 
fascination with moral philosophy is attested to by frequent references in his 
correspondence throughout his adult life, especially during his years of re-
tirement at Monticello beginning in 1809. 
Jefferson was probably introduced to moral philosophy in his last year of 
study at the College of William and Mary. His earlier formal training had been 
first under the Reverend William Douglas in St. James Parish, Goochland 
County from 1752 to 1757, where he was taught the rudiments of Latin, Greek, 
and French, and then for two years under the Reverend James Maury, a "correct 
classical scholar, " in Fredericksville Parish, Hanover County. 1 During the 
succeeding generation academies such as Maury's multiplied rapidly in the 
!Autobiography, 20. 
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more populated areas of Virginia, and some of the more advanced ones in-
eluded introduction to moral philosophy through the writings of Locke, Hutche-
son, Paley, Hume, etc. But during Jefferson's tenure the educational fare was 
probably restricted to classical languages and natural philosophy. 2 
Precise description of the teaching of moral philosophy at the College of 
William and Mary is hampered by the absence of early records. It is clear, 
however, from a plan of reorganization approved by the Board of Visitors in 
1727, that it was considered one of the main programs of study. And from 1729 
there is a record of the continuous appointment of professors of moral phil-
osophy until well into the nineteenth century. Though there is no record of the 
textbooks used at William and Mary, there is no reason to believe that the 
trend toward the sentimentalist school of ethics was not as definite there as in 
the other colleges. 3 The Flat Hat Club, a student organization at the College, 
owned a copy of Hutcheson's ~System of Moral Philosophy (1755) at the time 
2Richard Beale Davis, Intellectual Life in Jefferson's Virginia 1790-1830 
(Chapel Hill, 1964), 35-45. -- -- --
3Lyon G. Tyler, The College of William and Mary in Virginia: Its History 
and Work 1693-1907 (Richmond, 1909); A Catalog of the College of William and 
Mary in virginia from its Foundation to the Present Time (1859);Early Courses 
and Professors at William and Mary College. From ~address delivered by 
Lyon Q. Tyler, December~' 1904, before the Phi Beta Kappa Society William 
and Mary College, Williamsburg, Va. (1904); Herbert B. Adams, The College 
of William and Mary: ~Contribution to the History of Higher Education, With 
Suggestions for its National Promotion (Washington, 1887); John M. Jennings, 
The Library of the College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1693-1793 
(Charlottesville:-1968); The History of theCOiiege of William and Mary from 
its Foundation, 1660, to 1874 (Richmond, 1874). 
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Jefferson was a member. 4 
Though the formal record of the college curriculum does not exist, there 
is sufficient evidence to show that the Scottish philosophy was impressed upon 
Jefferson during his stay at Williamsburg. William Small, professor at the 
College, George Wythe, distinguished Williamsburg lawyer, and Lieutenant 
Governor Francis Fauquier, each had a part in this process. Reminiscing 
fifty years later he recalled that at dinners with these three men he had heard 
"more good sense, more rational and philosophical conversations, than in all 
my life besides. "5 Jefferson looked upon both Small and Wythe as models of 
moral integrity, and as a young man, when faced by temptations or difficulties, 
frequently made his decisions after having tested the alternatives by asking 
himself what they would do in the same circumstances, or "what course in it 
will insure me their approbation. "6 I think that it may be surmised that 
Jefferson was introduced to the Scottish philosophy by Small, and that both 
Wythe and Governor Fauquier contributed subsequent stimulation. 
Although fifty years after the fact Jefferson described Small as having been 
"as a father" to him, it is obvious that their relationship was on a more 
fraternal plane. Small was only eight years older than Jefferson, and it seems 
4TJ to Thomas McAuley, June 14, 1819, Thomas Jefferson and the College 
of William and Ma!J: An Exhibit of Books, Manuscripts, and Artifacts Pre-
pared in Observance of Charter Day, February ~. 1963 (Williamsburg, 1963). 
5 TJ to L. H. Girardin, Jan. 15, 1815, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 231-232. 
6rrJ to Thomas Jefferson Randolph, Nov. 24, 1808, Ibid, XII, 196-199. 
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that their social life extended beyond sedate philosophical conversations at the 
Governor's table to activities more characteristic of young men in the society 
of "Devils burg. "7 
On the more serious plane, Jefferson did have a high regard for Small as a 
teacher, and accepted his academic guidance as well as his friendship. He 
later wrote that meeting him "was my great good fortune, and what probably 
fixed the destinies of my life. " 8 Small was appointed professor of natural 
philosophy at William and Mary in 1758, three years after having graduated 
from Marischal College, Aberdeen University. By a strange twist of events, he 
was suddenly called upon to fill temporarily the chair of moral philosophy in 
addition to his regular duties. He assumed this responsibility for two years, 
1760-1762, the same years that Jefferson attended the College. 
Small was a member of the Arts Class of 1751-1755 at Marischal College 
in Aberdeen and graduated M.A. in 1755. Until 1753 the regenting system was 
used at Marischal, under which a student was taught different subjects by the 
same regent throughout his college tenure. But in 1753 the curriculum was 
reformed, and each regent assumed the teaching responsibility within their 
areas of specialization. This would mean that Small in his fourth or magistrand 
year would have attended the moral philosophy class of Professor Alexander 
7TJ to L. H. Girardin, Jan. 15, 1815, Ibid., XIV, 231-232; TJ to John Page, 
Apr. 9, 1764, Boyd Collection, I, 17; Autobiography, 20-21. 
8Autobiography, 20. Also see Herbert L. Ganter, "William Small, 
Jefferson's Beloved Teacher," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., IV, 
(1947), 505-511. 
48 
Gerard, then holder of the chair of Moral Philosophy at Marischal College. It 
was, incidentally, Gerard who was most responsible for the curriculum reform 
of 1753. 9 It is likely that Small, when called upon to teach moral philosophy 
at William and Mary six years later, would have naturally fallen back upon his 
own student days under Gerard for the basic outlines of his course. 
Though Gerard is not one of the most well known moral philosophers, his 
few publications and, just as importantly, his professional associations, place 
him in the sentimentalist school. He was a member of the Select Society of 
Edinburgh which in 1756 awarded him its first gold medal for the "best essay 
on taste. " This was published in 1759 as An Essay ~Taste and, passing 
through three English editions and two French, proved to be the most popular 
of his philosophical works. 10 
As the title indicates, the Essay belongs to the vast genre of works in the 
eighteenth century that aimed at explaining the nature of beauty. Gerard, like 
other Scottish sentimentalists, was fascinated by human sensitivity to beauty. 
The natural human faculty that differentiated among visual scenes, among works 
of literature or music, and judged some to be aesthetically agreeable and others 
disagreeable, proved that man possessed an "internal sense," a sense of taste, 
9Peter John Anderson, ed. , Fasti Academiae Mariscallanae Aberdonensis, 
(2 vols.; 1889-1898), II, 322-323; R. S. Rait, The Universities of Aberdeen 
(Aberdeen, 1895), 299-303. Gerard's first published work was "Plan of Educa-
tion in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen," (1755). 
10Robert Chambers, !=Biographical Dictionary of Eminent Scotsmen (2 
vols. ; Scotland, n. d. ), II, 290-291. 
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that blended intellectual and physical sensations in an experience of beauty. 
Gerard cited Francis Hutcheson as one of the "modern philosophers" who 
recognized the internal sense of taste. 11 
As was true of many other similar undertakings in the eighteenth century, 
Gerard's Essay developed into a broader treatise on faculty psychology. Moral 
apprehension and appreciation fell within its scope as well as the apprehension 
and appreciation of beauty. Like the other Scottish sentimentalists, Gerard 
proposed a close relationship between moral philosophy and aesthetics. 12 
Indeed, one of the most frequently recurring descriptive phrases in sentimental-
ist philosophy is "moral beauty. " 
Gerard described the moral sense as the faculty "by which, in characters 
and conduct we distinguish between the right and the wrong, the excellent and 
the faulty." (69) The relationship between the app.rehension of aesthetic and 
moral beauty is revealed in his description of the moral sense as the faculty 
to which "belongs our perception of the fairness, beauty, and loveliness of 
virtue; of the ugliness, deformity, and hatefulness of vice." Gerard described 
the moral sense as not only a perceptive faculty, but as "our internal governor 
prescribing a law of life." In other words, the moral sense operated not only 
in the simple judgment between virtue and vice, but it also conveyed the knowl-
11Quotations are taken from the third edition (1780), facsimile reproduction 
with an introduction by Walter J. Hipple, Jr. (Gainesville, Florida, 1963), 
pages cited in the text. 
12For example see Francis Hutcheson's Inquiry into the Original of Our 
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), and Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism 
1762. 
50 
edge that "virtue is obligatory, right, and due; and that vice is undue, unlaw-
ful and wrong. " (71) 
The moral sense, and the other faculties of taste, according to Gerard, 
are universal "mental principles common to all men." (72) This was one of 
the essential tenets of sentimentalist moral philosophy, and perhaps the one 
most vulnerable to criticism. Gerard did not insist that all men are equally 
perceptive of or equally motivated by an appreciation of virtue. He specifically 
noted that internal senses "are originally implanted in very different degrees 
in different men. " In some cases they are so languid "they scarce at all show 
themselves," and in some instances these senses are "incapable of a very high 
degree of improvement by any education, care or exercise. " But he insisted 
that such a condition was very rare and that, in the generality of men, the 
internal senses were improvable. Indeed, Gerard laid upon man a responsi-
bility for their improvement. They are "in a considerable degree intrusted to 
our own care, 11 he wrote, and "the key to the improvement of any of the prin-
ciples of taste, including the moral sense, is judicious exercise." (90-93) 
Gerard also taught that human behavior could be explained, at least in 
part, by the healthy development of the sense of taste. He believed that when 
this internal sense was properly balanced, i.e., made up of a due proportion 
of the various components, it had "a peculiar tendency to confirm virtuous 
affections and principles." Conversely, he believed that ' 1most wrong passions 
may be traced to some perversion of taste which produces them, by leading us 
to misapprehend their objects. 11 (189-190) 
In addition to all this, Gerard held that the development of taste also had 
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social implications. He believed that the person who exercised this internal 
sense enjoyed an increased serenity and satisfaction, and, in consequence of 
this, was prone to an increased attitude of benevolence. The refinement of 
taste will "increase the acuteness of the moral sense," he wrote, and thus "a 
man of nice taste will have a stronger abhorrence of vice, and a keener relish 
for virtue, in any given situation, than a person of dull organs can have, in the 
same circumstances." (192) Clearly, a community of men with developed 
tastes would exhibit qualities preferable to one in which the moral faculty 
remained undeveloped. In a related theme, he noted that a comparison between 
civilized and savage societies showed that civilization itself tended to encourage 
the cultivation of taste. 
Gerard's description of the moral sense as an inherent faculty of percep-
tion and appreciation of moral virtue, and indeed as an encouragement to 
virtuous conduct, places him in the tradition of Scottish sentimentalist ethical 
theory. His theory of the developmental nature of the moral sense, and of the 
social implications of its operation, follow faithfully the tenets of the more well 
known Scottish writers and thus reinforce this classification. Since the Essay 
was first submitted to the philosophical society in Edinburgh in 1756, one might 
assume that it reflected his teaching in 1754, the year in which William Small 
was his student at Marischal College. 
Whatever the case may be with Small and Gerard, there is evidence that 
the young Jefferson was impressed by another Scottish writer at this stage, 
Henry Home, Lord Kames. It is not known whether Small or George Wythe was 
responsible for pointing him to this Scottish jurist whose writings ran the gamut 
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from law to agriculture to metaphysics. It seems impossible to determine 
whether Jefferson first read Kames as a student of moral philosophy under 
Small, or as a student of law under Wythe. 
In 1779 Wythe became the first "professor of law and police" in America. 
Prior to this date, American law students had to choose between study abroad, 
or individual study under the direction of some established lawyer in the 
colonies. It was Small who procured for Jefferson "a reception as a student 
of law" in Wythe's office in about 1762. Jefferson later described his teacher 
of law as "my faithful and beloved mentor in youth, and my most affectionate 
friend through life. " 13 Unfortunately little is known about his course of study 
and reading beyond his respectful abhorrence of Sir Edward Coke's Institutes 
of the Lawes of England. His reaction to Coke was probably not very different 
from that of other students of his generation, though he did later reveal a bit 
of pride in having conquered Coke before the appearance of the easier Black-
stone's Commentaries. Wythe undoubtedly directed his student's attention to 
more modern legal works, and there is good reason to believe that Kames' 
Historical Law Tracts (1758) and Principles of Equity (1760) were among them. 
Although there is no extant record of Wythe's library, his later citation of 
Kames' Principles while judge of the High Court of Chancery in Virginia suggests 
his respect for the Scottish jurist. 14 More importantly, the entries in 
13Autobiography, 20-21. 
14George Wythe, Decisions of Cases in Virginia .!?X_ the High Court of 
Chancery, With Remarks upon Decrees .!?X_ the Court of Appeals, Reversing 
some of those Decisions (Richmond, 1795 ), 28. 
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Jefferson's commonplace book, a collection of quotations from various authors 
probably compiled during his years as a law student, reveal a keen interest in 
Kames' legal theories. As one biographer has put it, "from the evidence 
furnished by the Commonplace Book it cannot be doubted that the Scottish Lord 
was for him a master and a guide. "!S The commonplace book contains ex-
tracts made by Jefferson from thirteen of the fourteen theses outlined by Kames 
in Historical Law Tracts. Although these entries cannot be dated with perfect 
exactness, the editor determined from internal evidence that they were written 
"when Jefferson was still a young man, before the conflict between the American 
colonies and the mother-country became quite acute, and certainly before the 
existence of the United States of America had become an accepted fact. " 16 In 
the years following when Jefferson accepted the responsibility of guiding younger 
men in self study programs in law, he always recommended strict attention to 
the study of "kindred sciences" such as ethics, religion, belles lettres, and 
criticism. The books Jefferson recommended usually included Kames' Prin-
ciples of Equity as a legal text, but also his "moral essays" and his "Elements 
of criticism" in one of the categories of kindred sciences. 17 The Law Tracts, 
15Editor's note in The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson: ~Repertory 
of His Ideas£!!, Government, ed. by Gilbert Chinard, Johns Hopkins Studies in 
Romance Literatures and Languages, Extra Vol. II (Baltimore, 1926), 19. 
Hereafter cited as Commonplace Book. 
16Ibid.' 11-16. 
17TJ to John Garland Jefferson, June 11, 1790, Boyd Collection, XVI, 
480-482; TJ to General Mercer, Aug. 30, 1814, quoted in Southern Literary 
Messenger, March, 1848, 187. 
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especially the tract on Property and the tract on Promises and Covenants, con-
tain examples of Kames' interest in moral philosophy. Perhaps it was through 
the study of law that Jefferson was led to his Essays ~the Principles of Moral-
.!!land Natural Religion (1751). 
But it is also equally plausible that Kames' Essays was used by Small in 
his moral philosophy course. It was a popular exposition of the Scottish senti-
mentalist theory and was widely circulated in America during the second half 
of the century. In any event, by 1771 Jefferson was already recommending 
"Ld Kaim 's elements of criticism, " his "Natural religion, " as well as his 
"Principles of equity" as proper books for a gentleman's library. 18 Since this 
was within three years of his having completed law studies with Wythe in 
Williamsburg, it would seem to indicate that his familiarity with Kames dated 
to his student days there. This assumption is further confirmed by a remark 
written by Jefferson in 1814 in which he stated that it had been "fifty years" 
since he had read Kames' Principles of Natural Religion [sic]. 19 
Governor Fauquier's part in stimulating Jefferson's interest in the Scottish 
philosophy is less certain than that of Small and Wythe, though it is worth 
mentioning. One of Jefferson's biographers has written that "Fauquier is known 
to have been a follower of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke and there is a possibility 
that he introduced the young student of William and Mary to the works of the 
1&I'J to Robert Skipwith, Aug. 3, 1771, Boyd Collection, I, 76-81. 
l9TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XIV, 138-144. 
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English philosophers. "20 Though no citation is given, this was presumably 
based upon George Tucker's biography of Jefferson published in 1835 which 
stated that "the Governor was saiel to have been a follower of Shaftesbury and 
Bolingbroke, in morals and religion," and that "the opinions recommended by 
[his] genius and taste, as well as rank, were not without their effect on a 
youthful mind, at once ductile and bold. "21 Tucker indicates in an explanatory 
note that he was basing his "explanation of some of Mr. Jefferson's opinions" 
on information that he had received from such of his contemporaries as John 
Randolph and James Madison. Shaftesbury is generally credited with having 
invented the term moral sense early in the eighteenth century. In Character-
istics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711)22 he defined the moral sense 
as a natural human instinct toward virtue. He argued, in opposition to the 
cynics, that man was inherently good and that his natural tendency to virtue 
was a reflection of the authority of the moral sense. Although some of the 
later writers in the sentimentalist tradition were critical of Shaftesbury, they 
were all in some degree indebted to him. Therefore, if Governor Fauquier 
20Editor's note in The Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson: His Common-
place Book of Philosophers and Poets, ed. by Gilbert Chinard, (Baltimore, 
1928). 34. 
21The Life of Thomas Jefferson, Third President of the United States, With 
Parts of His Correspondence Never Before Published, and Notices of His 
Opinions~ Questions of Civil Government, National Policy, and Constitutional 
Law (2 vols. ; Philadelphia, 1837), I, 41. 
22This work included two treatises published earlier: 1) The Moralists, 
or the Rlilosophical Rhapsody (1709) and 2) Enquiry concerning Virtue, in~ 
discourses (1699). 
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was a follower of Shaftesbury to the extent that this was taken note of by his 
contemporaries, one would have to assume that the philosophical conversations 
that Jefferson enjoyed reflected the sentimentalist ethical theory. 
The evidence thus outlined seems to leave little doubt that Jefferson was 
acquainted with sentimentalist ethical theory by the time he had completed his 
studies at Williamsburg. At least one, or more probably all of his "amici 
omnium horarum, "23 William Small, George Wythe, and Governor Fauquier, 
in their own way gave what was to be a lasting direction to his conception of 
moral philosophy. 
23 Autobiography, 20-21. 
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CHAPTER IV 
JEFFERSON'S CONCEPTUAL 
DEFINITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Following his admission to the bar in 1767 Jefferson returned to Albemarle 
County, presumably planning to assume the traditional role of a member of the 
Virginia aristocracy. His membership in the Virginia gentry was assured by 
both inheritance and education. The initial construction of Monticello in 1769, 
his election to the House of Burgesses in the same year, his marriage to 
Martha Wayles Skelton in 1772, in short, the major events of his life in the 
brief interlude before other events propelled him to a position of national lead-
ership and international prominence, followed a pattern that would hardly be 
distinguishable from that of other young Virginia gentlemen of similar circum-
stances. 
But if his life style during these early years was predictable in its con-
formance to tradition, there were already two visible personal characteristics 
that would soon set him apart from his peers. These characteristics, which 
bore a complementary relationship to one another, were an extraordinary 
intellectual curiosity and a prodigious devotion to study. 
Near the end of his life Jefferson wrote: "I was a hard student until I 
entered on the business of life, the duties of which leave no idle time to those 
disposed to fulfill them; and now, retired, and at the age of seventy-six, I am 
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again a hard student. "1 One of his classmates at the College of William and 
Mary testified that the young Jefferson "could tear himself away from his dear-
est friends, to fly to his studies. "2 There is abundant evidence that his intel-
lectual curiosity and studious discipline did not cease with the completion of his 
formal studies in Williamsburg, but that on the contrary, these traits remained 
constant for the remainder of his life. William Carmichael, the American 
/ 
charge at the Spanish Court, sent Jefferson some books in 1788 with an accom-
parrying note that said others would follow "to contribute to satisfy that thirst 
for general knowledge for which you are Distinguished. " 3 The Marquis de 
Chastellux, who met Jefferson for the first time in the spring of 1782, wrote 
that "it seems indeed as though, ever since his youth, he had placed his mind, 
like his house, on a lofty height, whence he might contemplate the whole uni-
verse." Jefferson was at that time but fifteen years beyond the completion of 
his law studies, but the French visitor described him as one "whose mind and 
attainments could serve in lieu of all outward graces; an American, who, with-
out ever having quitted his own country, is Musician, Draftsman, Surveyer, 
Astronomer, Natural Philosopher, Jurist, and Statesman, ... and finally a 
1TJ to Dr. Vine Utley, Mar. 21, 1819, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XV, 186-188. 
2John Page to Skelton Jones, Esq., c. 1808, The Virginia Historical 
Register, and Literary Note Book, III Quly, 1850), 142-151. 
3wnliam Carmichael to TJ, May 18, 1788, Boyd Collection, XIII, 
176-177. 
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Philosopher. "4 This description points to the two distinctive qualities of 
Jefferson's intellect -- the catholicity of his interests and the impressive 
competency that he achieved in so great a variety of subjects. His corres-
pondence offers ample proof of the Marquis's observation that "no object has 
escaped Mr. Jefferson." His election to philosophic and scientific societies, 
both in America and Europe, and the conferring of honorary doctors degrees 
by William and Mary, Yale, and Harvard College, before his prominence as a 
national political leader, are further evidence of his intellectual distinction. 
The diploma tendered by his alma mater in January 17 83 seemed to summarize 
widespread opinion in its description of Jefferson as one "so imbued with 
letters, whether popular or recondite and abstruse, that all the fine arts seem 
to foregather in one man. " 5 
The more specific evidence of his continuing career as a "hard student" 
is found in his library and his correspondence. And these sources reveal that 
he had more than a cursory interest in the subject of moral philosophy. 
Jefferson's love for books is well known. "Sensible that I labour grievously 
under the malady of Bibliomanie, " he wrote in 17 89, "I submit to the rule of 
buying only at reasonable prices, as to a regimen necessary in that disease. "6 
He made this confession while in Paris, and later admitted that while there 
4Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America in the Years 1780, 
1781, and 1782 (1786), rev. trans. with intro. and notes by Howard C. Rice, 
Jr. (2 vols. ; Chapel Hill, 1963), II, 391-392. 
SBoyd Collection, VI, 221-222. 
6TJ to Lucy Ludwell Paradise, June 1, 1789, Ibid., XV, 162-163. 
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"I devoted every afternoon I was disengaged, for a summer or two, in exam-
ining all the principal bookstores, turning over every book with my own hand, 
and putting by everything which related to America, and indeed whatever was 
rare and valuable in every science. "7 During his lifetime he put together three 
personal libraries, and was largely responsible for the selection for the first 
collection for the University of Virginia. 8 His first collection, the nucleus of 
which he inherited from his father, was lost by fire in February 1770. There 
is no inventory of this library available but presumably the major part would 
have been made up of those books he had bought while at Williamsburg. He 
estimated the cost of the books that were burned to be 200 pounds sterling, and 
sighed, "Would to God it had been the money!" 9 He began his second collection 
immediately. When he returned to America from Europe in 17 89, fifteen of 
the eighty-six crates containing his personal goods were filled with books. 10 
By 1814 this, the greatest of his libraries, had grown by his estimate to between 
nine and ten thousand volumes, well bound, the "abundance of them elegantly, 
and of the choicest editions existing." It had been accumulated through standing 
orders in the principal book-marts of Europe, in Amsterdam, Frankfort, 
7TJ to Samuel H. Smith, Esq., Sep. 21, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XIV, 190-194. 
8see William Peden, "Some Notes Concerning Thomas Jefferson's Libraries," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., I (1944), 265-274; and Peden, "Thomas 
Jefferson: Book Collector" (unpubl. Ph. D. diss., University of Virginia, 1942). 
9TJ to John Page, Feb. 21, 1770, Boyd Collection, I, 34-36. 
10Editorial note, Ibid. , XVIII, 35. 
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Madrid, London, and Paris. When he offered the library to the United States 
Congress in 1814 he could justly say with pride that "such a collection was 
made as probably can never again be effected, because it is hardly probable 
that the same opportunities, the same time, industry, perseverance and 
expense, with some knowledge of the bibliography of the subject, would again 
happen to be in concurrence. " 11 Within only a matter of weeks after having 
delivered this library to the Congress, Jefferson wrote to John Adams "I cannot 
live without books," and he set about the selection of his third library. He 
noted that this time, however, "fewer will suffice, where amusement, and not 
use, is the only future object. " 12 This last collection accumulated during the 
last decade of his life, had grown to more than nine hundred items by the time 
of his death. 
The catalogs of these last two libraries, the first by Jefferson in prep-
aration for its transfer to Congress and the other printed for the auction of his 
second library in February 1829, present a valuable insight into his intellectual 
pursuits. 13 As on~ might anticipate, history, law, and political theory are 
the subjects most amply represented. But in addition to these subjects, 
natural philosophy, moral philosophy, agriculture, fine arts, and belle lett res 
are extremely well represented. 
11TJ to Samuel H. Smith, Esq. , Sep. 21, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XIV, 190-194. 
12TJ to John Adams, June 10, 1815, Ibid., 299-302. 
13see ·E. Millicent Sowerby, compiler, Catalogue of the Lib1·ary of Thomas 
jefferson (5 vols.; Washington, 1952-1959); Catalogue. President jefferson's 
Library (Washington, 1829). 
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Jefferson's catalogs also reveal his categorization of knowledge. And in the 
long run, this is probably a more essential tool in the understanding of his con-
cept of moral philosophy than the simple listing of his book collection. In the 
organization of his library Jefferson followed the major divisions of human 
learning outlined by Francis Bacon in Advancement of Learning (1605). He had 
gained an early respect for Bacon and considered him and Locke and Newton, 
as the "greatest men that have ever lived . . . as having laid the foundation 
of those superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and Moral 
sciences. " 14 The Baconian classification was well known in America by the 
end of the eighteenth century, and its first great division of knowledge, i.e. , 
between Divinity and Philosophy, would undoubtedly have been very appealing 
to Jefferson. According to Bacon these two areas of knowledge were distinguish-
ed by the fact that Divinity (sacred theology) is "grounded only upon the word 
and oracle of God," whereas Philosophy is grounded in "the light of nature," 
i. e. , is known to man through the operation of reason, sense induction, or 
"inward instinct. " 15 
Secular knowledge was divided in the Baconian scheme in accordance with 
"the three parts of man's understanding, which is the seat of learning: history 
to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. " 16 
14TJ to John Trumbull, Feb. 15, 1788, Boyd Collection, XIV, 561. 
15sir Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605 ), Vol. 30: Great 
Books of the Western World, ed. by Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago, 1952), 
40-96. 
16Ibid., 32. Although Jefferson followed his model, he was aware that 
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Jefferson adapted this classification of the faculties of the human mind, and 
organized his library under the major categories of history, philosophy, and 
the fine arts, each corresponding to that faculty of the mind that would have 
cognizance of the subject. His subdivision of these categories into more 
specific disciplines reveals a significant departure from the Baconian scheme, 
but this is probably due simply to the advanced sophistication of knowledge 
over the two centuries that separated the careers of Bacon and Jefferson. In 
the latter's classification scheme, history was divided into civil history 
(ancient and modern) and natural history (natural sciences). Fine arts were 
divided into beaux arts (architecture, gardening, painting, sculpture, music) 
and belles lettres (poetry, prose, oratory, criticism, etc. ). Ihilosophy, 
reflecting its assignment to the faculty of reason, was divided into the major 
categories of mathematics and moral philosophy. It is the analysis of his 
assignment of titles to this last category that provides us with an insight into 
his concept of moral theory. 
Jefferson prepared two tabular classifications; one begun c. 17 83 for the 
arrangement of his greatest library, and the other for his last library which 
he began accumulating in 1815. The two tables are thus separated by approx-
imately thirty years and reflect his categorization of knowledge at widely 
this division of knowledge did not originate with Bacon but had "been proposed 
by Charron more than twenty years before, in his book della Sagesse." TJ 
to Judge Augustus B. Woodward, Mar. 24, 1824, Lipscamb and Bergh Collection, 
XVI, 17-21. His reference was to Sieur de Charron, Of Wisdom, trans. 
George Stanhope, 3d. ed. (London, 1729), 124-134, who divided all knowledge 
into the basic divisions of Human and Divine, and subdivided the former accord-
ing to the human faculties of Understanding, Memory, and Imagination. 
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separated stages in his intellectual development. But as far as moral philos-
ophy is concerned, though there are changes in descriptive terminology, the 
essential body of knowledge represented in this classification remained the 
same in both tables. Under moral philosophy Jefferson subsumed a vast area 
of knowledge, including, generally, ethics, religion, law, and politics. This 
division conformed rather well to Bacon's category of Human Philosophy. In 
Bacon's scheme Human Philosophy encompassed the knowledge of "man segre-
gate" and "man congregate." It was the knowledge of man in his individual 
physical and thinking existence, and in his social existence. It was the 
knowledge of human nature; of man as a rational and moral being; of man as 
an individual and as a part of a collective society. 
In Jefferson's first classification, he divided moral philosophy into the 
major divisions of Ethics and Jurisprudence. Ethics is as then divided into 
I\loral Philosophy, used here in the sense of ethical theory, and the Law of 
Nature and Nations. An interesting footnote at the bottom of the page gives an 
inslght into his definition of moral philosophy: 
*in classing a small library one may throw under this head [moral 
philosophy] books which attempt what may be called the Natural history 
of the mind or an Analysis of it's operations. The term and division of 
Metaphysics is rejected as meaning nothing or somethin~ beyond our 
reach, or what should be called by [some other name?]1 
Though the footnote cannot be dated with any certainty, jefferson's reference 
to "the Natural history of the mind or an Analysis of it's operation" is important 
in that, with the passage of time, the operation of the mind tends to assume a 
17 See facsimile in Sowerby, Catalogue, I, frontispiece. 
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greater importance in his thinking about human nature. Bacon had described 
man as a thinking and a physical being, and human nature as the mixture of 
these two sides of his being. Jefferson revealed in his correspondence an 
increasing interest in "mental philosophy" and the problems associated with 
the distinction between physical and mental man. 18 · 
Jurisprudence, the second major classification of moral philosophy, was 
divided into Religious, Municipal and Oeconomical categories, and thus filled 
out the subject in the following tabular scheme: 
Moral 
Ethics • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . • [Moral Philosophy 
Law of Nature & Nations 
Jurisprudence 
Religious ............. . 
Domestic 
Municipal 
Foreign 
ReEgion 
Equity 
Common Law 
Law Merchant 
Law Maritime 
Law Ecclesiastical 
Foreign Law 
[
Politics 
Oeconomical ..•....... 
Commerce 
18Jefferson,s correspondence reveals a growing fascination with mental 
philosophy. In 1824, he contemplated the recomposition of his classification 
table to transpose the subject of "the faculty of thought" from Hlilosophy to 
Natural History as a subdivision of Zoology. TJ to Judge Augustus B. Wood-
ard, Mar. 24, 1824, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XVI, 17-21. 
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Jefferson's second classification, designed after 1815, encompassed the same 
areas of knowledge under the major division of Philosophy, but the descriptive 
terminology revealed a growing sophistication in his concept of moral philoso-
phy. According to this table it included Morality, or ethics; Moral Supple-
ments, or religion and law; and Social Organization, or politics, in the 
following scheme: 19 
Ethical . .............. . 
[
Ancient 
Morality ............ Ethics 
Modern 
[
Religion 
Moral Supplements ......•• 
Law 
Social Organization ....... . Politics 
Jefferson considered moral philosophy, in its broadest sense, as the 
knowledge of the "government of man," of the knowledge ·of "man segregate" 
and "man congregate." But he also considered it in a narrower sense as a 
psychology of human nature. In this sense, designated as Ethics in the above 
scheme, it encompassed "ideology, ethics, and mental science," or the 
knowledge of "man segregate" as a rational moral being. It embraced with 
essentially equal emphasis moral theory and mental philosophy. Jefferson 
considered ethics, religion, and law as complementary forces in the "govern-
ment of man. "20 Thus from his categorization of knowledge and from his 
19From 1829 Catalogue. 
20-rJ to Judge Augustus B. Woodard, Mar. 24, 1824, Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XVI, 17-21. 
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correspondence, it is evident that he considered moral philosophy as the 
knowledge of the government of man in both his individual and social existences. 
It is also evident that he recognized that the knowledge of human nature bore a 
vital relationship to a proper knowledge of social organization. 
Of the 4931 titles in the library sold to Congress in 1814, nearly half 
(2425) were classified by Jefferson under the heading of moral philosophy in 
its broader sense, and 138 were books falling under the more narrow definition 
of moral philosophy as the knowledge of human nature. 21 Of the 931 titles 
listed for auction in 1829, the corresponding categories contained 308 and 80 
respectively. 22 Of course, neither the number of books in a library, or their 
subjects, offer satisfactory evidence of their influence on the owner. 23 This 
is particularly true in the case of such extensive collections as those under 
consideration, which contained many presentation volumes as well as titles 
purchased by Jefferson simply because they "belonged" in a gentleman's 
library. When, however, it can be shown through other evidence such as 
marginalia and references in correspondence that the owner did indeed read 
certain books and thoughtfully considered their ideas, accepting some and 
rejecting others, one can begin to draw some conclusions as to the sources and 
21From Sowerby's inventory. 
22From 1829 Catalogue. 
23Chinard specifically rules out the use of Jefferson's library as a 
guide to the sources of his thought. The Literary Bible, 2. 
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development of his thought. What follows is an attempt to present that kind 
of evidence in the case of Jefferson and the eighteenth century theories of 
moral philosophy. 
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CHAPTER V 
JEFFERSON'S APPRAISAL 
OF MORAL THEORIES 
One can presume, with some assurance I think, that Jefferson's first 
exposure to moral philosophy was through the writings of one or more of the 
Scottish sentimentalists. And one might argue that this fact alone largely 
accounts for his lasting loyalty to their theories, even in his later years when 
those theories were being subjected to numerous challenges. But one should 
not presume that this was a blind loyalty, or that its longevity can be attributed 
to his ignorance of other theories. His correspondence gives ample testimony 
of his awareness of the great proliferation of moral philosophies in the 
eighteenth century. In fact he found it "curious that on a question so funda-
mental, such a variety_ of opinions should have prevailed among men, and 
those, too, of the most exemplary virtue and first order of understanding. " 
But this very proliferation of theories in itself, he concluded, showed "how 
necessary was the care of the Creator in making the moral principle so much 
a part of our constitution as that no errors of reasoning or of speculation 
might lead us astray from its observance in practice. " 1 Jefferson weighed the 
contrary arguments offered by various writers and found them less appealing 
1TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138 ... 144. 
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than the moral sense theory offered by the Scots. 
Discussions of moral philosophy in America in Jefferson's generation 
tended to categorize the various theories in accordance with their description 
of the "foundation of morality. " The writings of the moralists themselves, 
and more frequently the writings of their critics, by their references to kinds 
of moral theories, established categories that were familiar to most contem-
porary students of the subject. The major categories thus established, and 
most familiar to the Americans, were those in which the foundation of morality 
was specified as either truth, reason, love of God or obedience to God, taste, 
egoi::>m or self ... love, utility, benevolence, sympathy, or the moral sense. The 
resulting classification of moral theories facilitated discussion and provided 
the structure on which most American criticism was raised. 2 
In a like manner, Jefferson classified moral theories by the same criteria, 
and divided them into categories in which the foundation of morality was 
described as truth, love of God, taste, egoism, or the moral sense. 3 The 
depth of his understanding may be subject to question, but it is obvious that he 
had more than a passing familiarity with the basic terms of the various theories 
2Good examples are John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy (1800), 
ed. by Varnum L. Collins (Princeton, 1912), 11-28; and Thomas Clap, An 
Essay~ the Nature and Foundation of Moral Virtue and Obligation, (New Haven, 
1965), 13-40. 
3Jefferson did not make a sharp distinction between moral sense and 
utility as the foundation of morality. He in fact described the moral sense as 
being utilitarian by nature. This will be developed at greater length in a later 
chapter. 
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and that he had given thoughtful attention to their strengths and weaknesses. 
In the summer of 1814 Jefferson received from Thomas Law a copy of his 
recently published Second Thoughts on Instinctive Impulses. 4 Law, a former 
officer in the East India Company, had emigrated from England in 1793 and 
taken up residence in Washington, D. C. He later achieved some prominence 
by his efforts to establish a national currency in the United States. 5 He was 
also a not very sophisticated writer on the subject of moral philosophy. The 
book presented to Jefferson was a sequel to Thoughts~ Instinctive Impulses 
published by Law three years earlier. 6 Both books, undertaken to simplify 
the "metaphysics" of the subject, were firmly on the side of the sentimentalists 
and cited the writings of such Scottish moralists as Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, 
and Dugald Stewart. Law was convinced "from self-examination, that God has 
inspired man with instinctive impulses to goodness, and aversions to evil, and 
with a consciousness giving happiness for beneficence, and misery for in-
justice," and that "discord, conflicts, and devastation ensue by a violation of 
these internal, immutable laws [impulses]. "7 Law's gift is important not only 
because Jefferson said that it contained exactly his "own creed on the foundation 
~homas Law, Second Thoughts on Instinctive Impulses (Philadelphia, 
1813). 
5see Gordon Goodwin in DNB s. v. "Law, Thomas." 
6Thomas Law, Thoughts ~Instinctive Impulses (Philadelphia, 1810). 
7 Law, Second Thoughts, 7. 
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of morality in man," but because in his letter of appreciation to the author 
Jefferson wrote a systematic exposition of his reactions to the contrary philos-
h . 8 op 1es. 
Jefferson first took up William Wollaston's The Religion of Nature delin-
eated, a book widely circulated in America. "Of all the theories on this 
question," Jefferson wrote, "the most whimsical seems to have been that of 
Wollaston, who considers truth as the foundation of morality. "9 Wollaston 
held that moral distinctions have their origin in reason. "Whatever will bear 
to be tried by right reason, is right," he wrote, "and that which is condemned 
by it, wrong. " 10 Reason was, for Wollaston, the bar of ultimate appeal in 
matters of moral judgment. 
Jefferson would not have found great fault with this argument, but what he 
found "whimsical" was Wollaston's "great law" of natural religion: "That 
every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no 
act to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is." 
The "fundamental maxim" on which this "great law" was erected was "that 
whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that 
BrJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
9Ibid. 
1 0Jefferson owned the seventh edition (17 46) of The Religion of Nature 
delineated, which he acquired with the purchase of the Richard Bland library 
about 1776. Sowerby, Catalogue, II, 10. Quotations are from the eighth 
edition (1759) reprinted in Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, 372. 
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they are so, or not so; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality." 
And "no act (whether of word or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and 
evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any 
thing to be as it is can be right." Wollaston built his moral philosophy on the 
association of immorality and untruth; i.e., an immoral act was the acting of 
an untruth. Conversely, morality was associated with truth; i.e. , a moral 
act conformed to truth apprehended by the intellect. 
Following Samuel Clarke, Wollaston declared that truth, the immutable 
standard by which all behavior is to be judged, "is determined and fixt by the 
natures of the things themselves." Clarke had said that acts are reasonable 
or unreasonable, fit or unfit, in their own nature. Wollaston agreed that truth 
was to be equated with the "nature of things, " and that nothing can interfere 
with this truth without interfering with nature. "Truth is but conformity to 
nature, " he wrote, "and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth. " 
Wollaston's conclusion was that all acts or omissions inconsistent with 
truth are morally evil and the forbearance of such acts and the acting in 
C?PPOsition to such omissions are morally good, and that "if the formal ratio 
of moral good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of men's acts to the 
truth of the case or the contrary, . . . the distinction seems to be settled in 
a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. " 11 
Jefferson conceded that "truth is certainly a branch of morality," but he 
was particularly opposed to what he conceived to be Wollaston's equation 
11lbid.' 364-375. 
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between moral evil and intellectual error. He said that according to this 
theory, "the thief who steals your guinea does wrong only inasmuch as he acts 
a lie in using your guinea as if it were his own. 11 Wollaston's attempt to 
establish truth as the foundation of morality was as 11 if a tree taken up by the 
roots, had its stem reversed in the air, and one of its branches planted in the 
ground. " 12 It cannot be determined whether this dismissal of Wollaston's 
theory resulted from Jefferson's failure to comprehend its philosophical 
subtleties, or that he was turned away by what he considered a purely meta-
physical construct as a foundation for a philosophy of human morality. In 
either case, his criticism was brief but perceptive. He charged Wollaston 
with having attempted to posit a peripheral or secondary aspect of moral con-
duct as the foundation of morality. 
Having thus disposed of Wollaston's theory, Jefferson turned to those moral 
philosophers who made the love of God the foundation of morality, without 
identifying any one author in particular. 
Several eighteenth century moral theorists wrote of man's duties to God, 
to neighbor, and to self as the foundation of morality. To love God was one of 
those duties consistently enumerated, along with the obligation to fear, trust, 
and worship Him. This list of duties to God held several implications for 
moral theory. Depending upon one's understanding it might jmply the obligation 
of obedience to or imitation of God because of the love of God; or because of 
-------
the relationship existing between ~ and God, i. e. , between Creator and 
12TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
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created; or because of divine sanction, i.e. , the expectation of divine reward 
or fear of divine punishment. 
One American author wrote that "Moral Virtue is a Conformity to the moral 
Perfections of God; or it is an Imitation of God, in the moral Perfections of his 
---
Nature, so far as they are imitable by his Creatures. 11 This statement of 
course recognized the impossibility of the perfect imitation of God, but did not 
relieve man of the obligation to strive for perfection. "When God makes a 
Creature, he communicates to him some Degree of his own Perfections, though 
being limited, they cannot exist in the same Form and Manner, but under 
different Circumstances from what they are in the Creator. " The different 
degrees to which God's perfections were communicated were what constituted 
the different ranks in the animal kingdom. "To Man, 11 he continued, "he has 
communicated the superior Power of Reason and Understanding, whereby he is 
capable of forming some Ideas of the natural and moral Perfections of God and 
his Works." The conclusion suggested is that man can understand the nature 
of right and wrong, and is capable of moral virtue, i.e., limited conformity 
to the Perfections of God. The obligation to moral virtue arises from the fact 
that all creatures derive their degrees of Perfection from God, and therefore 
"their highest Perfection must consist in being like to the original and all-perfect 
Standard." For man to digress from the standard would mean the "Destruction 
of the Works of God." In summary, when God creates man as a moral agent 
"he endues him with a perfect Disposition and full Powers to do his duty, and be 
perfect," and to fall short of this duty is a "moral pefect" or sin. And to give 
sanction to the obligation "God's Favour and Approbation is necessarily extended 
to his Creatures according to the Degree of their Likeness and Conformity to 
him. " According to this writer, the expectation of divine reward or fear of 
divine punishment do not create obligation, but nevertheless, "for as our 
Existence depends upon his meer Good-Will and Pleasure, we ought to exist in 
such a Manner and for such Purposes as are agreeable to him. " According to 
this theory then, man's morality is founded upon his duty to imitate God, an 
obligation imposed by his relationship to his Creator and reinforced by "that 
Sovereign Power and Authority which God has over us. "13 
Another American writer of moral philosophy, the Scottish president of 
the College of New Jersey and fellow signer with Jefferson of the Declaration of 
Independence, proposed that the foundation of morality lay in man's relationship 
to God. He believed that this foundation could be reduced to the proposition 
that "from reason, contemplation, sentiment and tradition, the Being and 
infinite perfection and excellence of God may be deduced; and therefore what 
he is, and commands, is virtue and duty," and that "we ought to take the rule 
of duty from conscience enlightened by reason, experience, and every way by 
which we can be supposed to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention in 
creating us such as we are." The obligation to virtue lay both in duties owed 
God (love, fear, trust, worship) and in self-interest (i.e., the hope of divine 
reward and avoidance of divine punishment. ) He proposed that our relation to 
God "not only lays the foundation of many moral sentiments and duties, but 
13rfhomas Clap, An Essay~ the Nature and Foundation of Moral Virtue 
and Obligation, 3-12. 
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com pleats the idea of morality and law, by subjecting us to him, and teaching 
us to conceive of him, not only as our Maker, preserver and benefactor, but 
as our righteous governor and supreme judge. As the being and perfection of 
God are irrefragably established, the obligation of duty must ultimately rest 
here. " The belief in reward or punishment in a future state, and the fact that 
virtuous conduct does tend to promote happiness in the present state, simply 
~'add to" the obligation imposed by man's relation to God. In summary, this 
writer believed that the obligation to virtue included intrinsic excellence, 
present happiness, duty to the Supreme Being, hope of future happiness and 
fear of future misery, but of these, the love of God was the most important. 14 
These two examples seem to explain the love of God in terms of those 
duties owed by man to God, which were then proposed at least as part of the 
foundation of human morality. This may have been the conception to which 
Jefferson was responding when he wrote that the love of God, like truth, "is but 
a branch of our moral duties, which are generally divided into duties to God 
15 
and duties to man. " But it is also possible that his criticism was in response 
to another moral theory in which "the love of God" was given a more specific 
and philosophical meaning. 
Jonathan Edwards, described earlier as the most articulate defender of 
the Great Awakening, was also the author of a unique tract on moral 
14John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 29-35. 
15TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
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philosophy. 16 Although he had earlier voiced a predictable Calvinist disdain 
for secular philosophies of morals, his treatise entitled The Nature of True 
Virtue was not totally devoid of secular flavor. 17 Edwards was critical of 
sentimentalist moral theories and this work was largely an attack on them. 
His criticism however did not deny them any value, but rather emphasized that 
they were the foundations of a secondary or inferior virtue. A moral sense, 
he wrote, as a fountain of personal benevolence or virtue "is a moral sense of 
a secondary kind, and is entirely different from a sense or relish of the original 
essential beauty of true virtue in the heart." (51-52) There did exist, he 
recognized, a general approval of the "common virtues" such as meekness, 
benevolence, charity, and justice, and a general disapproval of malice, envy, 
and the like, and he conceded that in some persons these likes or dislikes 
could emanate from high principles. "But yet," he warned, "I think it is 
certainly true, that there is generally in mankind a sort of approbation of them, 
which arises from self love." (57) In other words, the "common virtues," 
rather than being the result of the prodding of natural instinct, were frequently 
the result of man's approval of that style of life which would ultimately se:rve 
16I find it puzzling that none of Edwards' works are included in the cata-
logues of Jefferson's libraries. But just as the inclusion of books is no evidence 
of their having been read, neither is their absence evidence of Jefferson's not 
having read them. I find it difficult to believe that he was not familiar with 
Edwards' writings, and indeed the tone of his criticism of the love of God 
theory, now under discussion,seems to have been in response to Edwards. 
17Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue (written 1755, published 
posthumously 1765 ). Foreword by William Frankena (Ann Arbor, 1960). Page 
citations will be given in the text. 
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his own interests. 
He wrote that God has established in man a natural conscience that will 
approve and disapprove of the same things as a spiritual sense, but under a 
very specific condition. "The natural conscience, if the understanding be 
properly enlightened, and stupefying prejudices are removed, concurs with 
the law of God, is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every 
article." That is to say that "if men's consciences were fully enlightened, if 
they were delivered from being confined to a private sphere, they would 
approve nothing but true virtue." It is at this very point, Edwards contended, 
that the sentimentalists make their mistake. "The sense of moral good and 
evil, and that disposition to approve virtue and disapprove vice, which men 
have by natural conscience, is that moral sense so much insisted on in the 
writings of many of late. A misunderstanding of this seems to have misled 
those' moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal 
in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, con-
sisting in a benevolent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. " 
But, he continued, "neither this, nor anything else wherein consists the sense 
of moral good and evil which there is in natural conscience, is of the nature 
of a truly virtuous taste. " The sense of conscience is not the same as a sense 
of true virtue because "wickedness may by long habitual exercise greatly 
diminish a sense of conscience. " But even those natural instincts which result 
in the "common virtues," are not of the nature of true virtue because they are 
limited in the scope of their beneficence. (61-93) 
Edwards' purpose was not to dismiss these "common virtues" but to show 
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their inferiority by comparing them to the nature and foundation of~ virtue. 
He said that to inquire as to the nature of true virtue is to ask "what it is, 
which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly beautiful?" 
He offered as an answer that "true virtue most essentially consists in benevo-
lence to being in general," which he then defined as meaning that "true virtue 
must chiefly consist in love to God; the Being of beings, infinitely the greatest 
and best. " Therefore one who has true virtue "must necessarily have a 
supreme love to God," and indeed "all true virtue must ..• summarily 
consist in this." (2-15) Thus Edwards asserted that the love of God was the 
foundation of true morality. 
Hence it appears that those schemes of religion or moral philosophy 
which --however well in some respects they may treat of benevolence 
to mankind ... yet --have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him 
laid as the foundation, • . . are not true schemes of philosophy, but are 
fundamentally and essentially defective. And whatever other benevolence 
or generosity towards mankind, . . . or moral qualifications which go by 
that name, any are possessed of, that are not attended with a love to 
God . . . to which they are subordinate, . . . there is nothtng of the 
nature of true virtue or religion in them. And it may be asserted in 
general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the 
first and the last; or which with regard to their exercises in general, have 
not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme 
dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not 
respect to God as the supreme end. (25-26) 
Jefferson's criticism of this theory was sharply to the point: "If we did a 
good act merely from the love of God and a belief that it is pleasing to Him, 
whence arises the morality of the Atheist?" 18 Obviously, to posit the love of 
God as the foundation of morality would exclude atheists from the ranks of moral 
18rJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
81 
mankind. Jefferson dismissed such a conclusion as nonsensical. "Diderot, 
D'Alembert, D'Holbach, Condorcet, are known to have been among the most 
virtuous of men." And since they were all professed atheists, "their virtue, 
then, must have had some other foundation than the love of God. " 19 Jefferson's 
retort was not a defense of atheism, but was a rejection of the love of God as the 
foundation of morality, a rejection demanded by his experience and intellectual 
integrity. 
Jefferson's criticism resembled that of Shaftesbury who argued that religion 
and virtue, though in many respects related, should in the light of "the practice 
of the world" be considered separately. "We have known people," Shaftesbury 
wrote, "who, having the appearance of great zeal in religion, have yet wanted 
even the common affections of humanity, and shown themselves extremely 
degenerate and corrupt. Others again, who have paid little regard to religion, 
and been considered as mere atheists, have yet been observed to practice the 
rules of morality, and act in many cases with such good meaning and affection 
towards mankind as might seem to force an acknowledgement of their being 
virtuous. " The sense of right and wrong, according to this writer, is as 
natural to man as natural affection itself, is a "first principle in our constitution," 
and one's being an atheist or theist would have no direct effect upon that faculty. 
In fact if the theist is incited to do good even when he hates it, or is restrained 
from doing some ill to which he is not otherwise averse, simply because of a 
belief in a Deity who enforces obedience to his absolute will by rewards and 
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punishments, then there is no virtue or goodness in his action or restraint. 
In fact, where "awe alone prevails and forces obedience, the obedience is 
servile, and all which is done through it merely servile. "20 True morality, 
according to Shaftesbury, is not the result of the love or fear of God, but of 
the love of virtue for its own sake. The belief in a God would be supportive 
only. 
Jefferson turned next to the more secular moral theory in which the 
foundation of morality was held to be taste. Again he did not identify particular 
authors, but Shaftesbury is a good representative of the ethics of taste. 
According to this theory, if love of virtue was the motivation of a moral life, 
the cognition of virtue was found in the acquired faculty of taste. Shaftesbury 
asserted that there was "a beauty and charm in moral as well as natural 
subjects" and attempted to demonstrate the reasonableness of a proportionate 
taste and determinate choice in life and manners. "21 He proposed, in other 
words, that a developed taste was as essential to the appreciation of morals 
as to the aesthetic beauty of a work of art. 
Shaftesbury based this part of his moral theory on the notion that "actions," 
20Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, An Inquiry Concerning 
Virtue£!' Merit (1699), Reprinted in Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times (1711), ed. by John M. Robertson (Indianapolis, 1964), 237, 261-268. 
Jefferson owned a 1714 edition which was part of the collection sold to Congress, 
and he purchased another copy for his last library. Sowerby, Catalogue, II, 13; 
1829 Catalogue, 2. 
21shaftesbury, Miscellaneous Reflections, the third volume of Character-
istics (1711 ), 344. 
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insomuch as they are reflections of pity, kindness, gratitude, or their "con-
traries," become as "objects," and thus are subject to "liking or dislike." 
He wrote that "the case is the same in the mental or moral subjects as in the 
ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense," and therefore, "in behaviour 
and actions, when presented to our understanding there must be found, of 
necessity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity 
of the subjects." The mind scans each sentiment which comes before it; "it 
feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable in the affections; and 
finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant as really and truly here as 
in any musical numbers or in the outward forms or representations of sensible 
things."· This faculty, or sense of taste, can in no case remain passive, but 
"must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove 
what is dishonest and corrupt. "22 
This theory of taste as a foundation of morality was expanded by Francis 
Hutcheson, a professed disciple of Shaftesbury. In defense of the taste theory, 
he argued that there is a "Sense of Beauty natural to Men," a sense that deter-
mines "the Mind to be pleas'd with Forms, Proportions, Resemblances, 
Theorems," and that there is "another superior Sense, natural also to Men 
determining them to be pleas'd with Actions, Characters, Affections. "23 
22shaftesbury, An Inquiry, 251-252. 
23prancis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue (London, 1725) xvii. Citations are from a facsimile copy of the 
second edition of 1726 (New York, 1971 ). Jefferson owned a fifth edition (1753) 
which was part of the collection sold to Congress, purchased another copy for 
his last library, and selected it as a part of the first library at the University 
of Virginia. Sowerby, Catalogue, II, 13; 1829 Catalogue, 2; Catalogue of the 
Library of the University of Virginia (Charlottesville, 1828), 69. ---
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Jefferson rejected taste as the foundation of morality, and indeed denied 
that it was even a "branch of morality. " He agreed that man has "indeed an 
innate sense of what we call beautiful," but this sense, he said, was "exercised 
chiefly on subjects addressed to fancy, whether through the eye in visible forms, 
as landscapes, animal figure, dress, drapery, architecture, the composition 
of colors, etc., or to the imagination directly, as imagery, style, or measure 
in prose or poetry, or whatever else constitutes the domain of criticism or 
taste. " In other words, he agreed that man had an innate sense by which he 
appreciated aesthetic beauty, but he considered this "a faculty entirely distinct 
from the moral one. " 24 
Jefferson's opposition to the "taste theory" raises a puzzle. Both Hutcheson 
and Shaftesbury treated the moral sense as closely analogous to the sense of 
beauty even though the objects were different. Both posited a faculty of taste 
as the foundation of their moral sense theory. Yet despite Jefferson's basic 
agreement with .. heir ideas, he seems to have rejected a key tenet. His re-
jection of taste as the foundation of morality reveals either confusion about the 
moral sense (as it was presented by Shaftesbury and the early Hutcheson), or 
a well-worked out conviction that aesthetic appreciation could be entirely 
distinguished from moral judgment. 
Jefferson next turned to the egoists, who posited self-interest or self-love 
as the foundation of morality. Jefferson had studied at least three of the best 
"' known modern works written in this vein: La Rouchefoucauld's Reflexions ou 
24-fJ to Thomas Law, Esq. , June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138·144. 
85 
Sentences et Maximes morales (1665), Bernard Mandeville's The Fable of the 
Bees, or Private Vices, Public Benefits (1714), and Claude Adrien Helvetius' 
---
De _!'Esprit (1759). 
The first of these was not a philosophical work in the strict sense, but 
was simply a collection of ?bservations that in total presented a rather dismal 
appraisal of man as the victim of his own selfish passions. 25 The appraisal 
is made up of observations which assign the primary motivational forces in 
human actions to passion rather than reason. His main conclusion is summed 
up in the maxim that "the mind is always the dupe of the heart. "26 Jefferson 
rejected La Rouchefoucauld's pessimistic appraisal of human nature as being 
inconsistent with experience. 27 
Mandeville's work, if equally cynical in its conclusions, was more phil-
h . 1 . . . . f h f 2 8 H 1 d d h 11 osop Ica m Its expositiOn o t e nature o man. e too cone u e t at a 
25La Rochefoucauld's Reflexions was published in several editions. Be-
cause Jefferson's copy has been lost, it is not known which edition he owned. 
Sowerby, Catalogue, II, 46. 
26"VII. Ces grandes et eclatantes actions qui ehlouissent les yeux sont 
repnfsentes par les politiques com me les effets des grands desseins, au lieu 
que ce sont d'ordinaire les effets de l'humeur et des passions. XLII. Nous 
n'avons pas assez de force pour suivre toute notre raison. CII. L'esprit est 
toujours la dupe du coeur." La Rouchefoucauld, Reflexions ou Sentences et 
Maximes morales (Fp 1665; Paris, 1961) 5, 15, 33. -
27TJ to Mann Page, Aug. 30, 1795, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, IX, 
306-307. 
2&rhe Fable of the Bees was first published in 1714, and a second Part 
appeared in 1729. Jefferson owned the work in two parts. The first Part went 
through several editions and since his copy is missing, it is not known which 
one he owned. He owned a first edition of Part II. Sowerby, Catalogue, II, 13. 
Citations are from Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees or 
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human behavior is ultimately reducible to some form of self-love, but, as the 
title of his book suggests, he did not believe that this was necessarily a bad 
thing. He argued that the private vices that resulted from individual selfish-
ness (self-love) accounted for the material progress of human society. 
Mandeville's work was written largely as a retort to the generally optim-
istic portrait of human nature presented in Lord Shaftesbury's Characteristics 
of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Shaftesbury had written that "vice and 
virtue are found variously mixed and alternately prevalent in the several 
characters of mankind. " By this he meant that man was governed by the 
mixture of three passions: "1) The natural affections, which lead to the good 
of the public, 2) or the self affections which lead only to the good of the private, 
3) Or such as are neither of these . . . and which may therefore be justly 
styled unnatural affections." A man was to be judged virtuous or vicious in 
accordance with the comparative degree of influence exercised on his behavior 
by each of these passions. He emphasized that the "natural affections," those 
which enjoyed the approval of the moral sense, were those which tended to the 
public good. 
We have found that, to deserve the name of good or virtuous, a creature 
must have all his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and 
temper, suitable, and agreeing with the good of his kind, or of that system 
in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a part. To stand thus 
well affected and to have one's affections right and entire, not only in 
Private Vices, Public Benefits, ed. by Douglas Garman from the 1723 edition 
of Part I and 1733 edition of Part II (London, 1934). 
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respect of oneself but of society and the public, this is rectitude, 
integrity, or virtue. 
In other words, man's natural affections tended toward the public good. His 
behavior, if faithful to his natural affections, if true to the apprehensions of 
his moral sense, would exhibit a natural benevolence to society at large and 
would be judged virtuous. No one could deny, said Shaftesbury, that "this 
affection of a creature towards the good of the species or common nature is 
as proper and natural to him as it is to any organ, part, or member of an 
animal body. "2 9 
But it was exactly this point that Mandeville denied in The Fable of the 
Bees. If moral judgment was a matter of feeling as Shaftesbury proposed, 
man's actions would naturally be self-serving, according to Mandeville. 
Mandeville and Shaftesbury, in their conceptions of the ruling passions of man 
(egoism vs. benevolence), held fundamentally antagonistic appraisals of human 
nature. 
"The reader . . . will soon perceive," wrote Mandeville, "that two 
systems cannot be more opposite than his lordship's [Shaftesbury's] and mine. 
His notions . . . are generous and refined: they are a high compliment to 
humankind, and capable by the help of a little enthusiasm of inspiring us with 
the most noble sentiments concerning the dignity of our exalted nature. What 
a pity it is that they are not true!" Such a portrait was inconsistent with daily 
experience, and indeed such "generous notions concerning the natural goodness 
29shaftesbury, An Inquiry, 257, 280-286. 
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of man," he continued, "are hurtful as they tend to mislead and are merely 
chimerical. " 30 He believed, like Shaftesbury, that man was "a compound of 
various passions," and that all the passions, "as they are provoked and come 
uppermost, govern him by turns, whether he will or no. "31 But unlike 
Shaftesbury and more like La Rochefoucauld whom he cited in the text, he 
believed that the passions centered in self-love. "It is impossible," he de-
clared, "that man . . . should act with any other view but to please himself. " 32 
Jefferson rejected Mandeville's appraisal of human nature, not because he 
did not recognize "the bias of the human mind from motives of interest," but 
because he was convinced that compassion and generosity were more influential 
in shaping human behavior. 33 He was undoubtedly offended by Mandeville's 
moral cynicism which seemed to be prompted by an utter contempt for the 
human race. Perhaps he did not realize that Mandeville's contempt was less 
directed at the race than at man's attempts to gloss over his own true nature. 
From a philosophical viewpoint, Jefferson rejected egoism as the basis of a 
moral theory simply because he considered man's "relations with others as 
constituting the boundaries of morality." In other words, like Shaftesbury, he 
30Mandeville, Fable, 196-210. 
31Ibid. ' 42. 
32Ibid.' 213-214. 
33-r'J to David Ross, May 8, 1786, Boyd Collection, IX, 473-475; TJ to 
Mann Page, Aug. 30, 1795, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, IX, 306-307; 
TJ to Monsieur Dupont de Nemours, Apr. 24, 1816, Ibid. , 487-491. 
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conceived of morality and the obligation thereto in terms of man's social 
relations. Mandeville said that man was devoid of social concern, and that 
moral theories founded upon the supposition of such concern were exercises 
in self-deceit. Jefferson wrote that this concern was the only basis of 
morality -- for "to ourselves ... we can owe no duties." Therefore 
self-love, he concluded, "is no part of morality." As if to underscore the 
argument, he proposed that self-love is exactly the "counterpart" of morality. 
"It is the sole antagonist of virtue, leading us constantly by our propensities 
to self-gratification in violation of our moral duties to others." These selfish 
propensities seduce us from the practice of benevolence and therefore they 
should be subdued by education, instruction or restraint. 34 Jefferson seems 
to have ignored Mandeville's basic thesis, i.e., that private interests are not 
inconsistent with society's interests. To be sure, he had described man's 
selfish passions as the moving forces that accounted for human behavior, but 
he had also attributed the progress of human achievement to these same forces. 
Jefferson, in his rebuttal, seemed to fear that private interests and societies' 
interests were necessarily antithetical. 
Both Mandeville and Helvetius added a further argument to the theory of 
egoism. Both argued, with different examples, that man's benevolence to man, 
when it did exist, was motivated by the pleasure generated in the actor and was 
thus still an expression of self-love. Mandeville, in support of this idea, wrote 
that "there is no merit in saving an innocent babe ready to drop into the fire: 
the action is neither good nor bad, and what benefit soever the infant received, 
34TJ to Thomas Law, Esq. , June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
IX, 132-144. 
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we only obliged ourselves; for to have seen it fall, and not strove to hinder it, 
would have caused a pain, which self-preservation compelled us to prevent." 
This reasoning was completed in his proposition that "the humblest man alive 
must confess, that the reward of a virtuous action, which is the satisfaction 
that ensues upon it, consists in a certain pleasure he procures to himself by 
contemplating on his own worth. " 35 
Jefferson specifically cited the French philosophe, Claude Adrien Helvetius, 
"one of the best men on earth, " as "the most ingenious advocate of this prin-
ciple. " He quoted Helvetius as having written that "the humane man is he to 
whom the sight of misfortune is insupportable, and who to rescue himself from 
this spectacle is forced to succor the unfortunate object. " 36 Helvebus was 
one of the most well known writers in the eighteenth century who supported the 
notion that self-interest is the sole motive to human action. He denied that 
man possessed any natural instinct or impulse to morality, and indeed denied 
that compassion or altruism were natural feelings. Man's benevolence, or 
sympathy, to man, insofar as it existed, was motivated solely by the antici-
pation of pleasure or reward of some kind. Thus self-interest or self-love 
was, according to Helvetius, the source of human virtue. 
' 
"It has been said," Jefferson wrote in rejoinder, "that we feed the hungry, 
35Mandeville, Fable, 52. 
36-rhe quotation is from Claude Adrien Helvetius, De 1 'Esprit, Disc ours 
II, Chap. 2. "L'homme humain est celui pour qui la vue du malheur d'autrui 
est une vue insupportable, et qui, pour s'arracher a cer spectacle, est, pour 
ainsi dire, force de secourir le malheureux. " Oeuvres Compl~tes (14 vols. ; 
Hildesheim, 1967), I, 19-20n. 
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clothe the naked, bind up the wounds of the man beaten by thieves, pour oil 
and wine into them, set him on our own beast and bring him to the inn, because 
vie receive ourselves pleasure from these acts. " To be sure, he continued, 
man does feel a pleasure in acting benevolently or sympathetically toward his 
fellow man, but this does not make that pleasure the foundation of man's 
virtuous behavior. This is still "one stop short of the ultimate question." The 
ultimate question was not whether man received pleasure from good acts, or 
even if this pleasure motivated such acts. The ultimate question, Jefferson 
said, was "how happens it that they give us pleasure?" And the answer? 
"Because nature hath implanted in our breasts a love of others, a sense of duty 
to them, a moral instinct, in short, which prompts us irresistibly to feel and 
to succor their distresses, and protests against the language of Helvetius. " 37 
It is evident that Jefferson was familiar with most of the moral theories of 
the eighteenth century. In his quest to comprehend the nature of man he had 
obviously given thoughtful consideration to the several theories discussed above, 
but found them unsatisfactory. It might be argued that his reasons reveal a 
lack of analysis or appreciation of the philosophical sophistication of the theories 
that he criticized. I would propose that the shallow character of his criticism 
can be attributed to the fact that his letter to Law was intended as nothing more 
than a superficial survey of moral theories and that his conclusions were the 
casual reflection of a correspondent. He was seventy-one years old when he 
37TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
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wrote the letter. The comments are incisive and penetrating, though frustrat-
ingly brief, and are valuable for two reasons. First, they reveal an earlier 
determination to understand the psychology of human nature through study. 
Second, his criticisms of these moral theories provide further insight into his 
approval of the moral sense theory. He concluded that the Creator had made 
the matter of morality a more natural part of the human constitution than was 
allowed in the other theories. He believed that God had planted within man's 
breast a moral instinct that both recognized virtue and urged man to its ful-
fillment. This instinct, this moral sense, was the foundation of morality in the 
theory of the Scottish sentimentalists. 
These conclusions abouthuman nature, formulated early in his life, exerted 
a molding influence on many related areas of Jefferson's thought. They shaped 
his views on race, religion, man's social dispositions, and political systems. 
The sources of his ideas on human nature, and their impact on these other areas 
of thought, will be shown in the following chapters. This development will 
affirm that Jefferson was at home in the realm of ideas, and that there is a 
chronological consistency, though not rigidity, in his views that reveals con-
sciously developed intellectual convictions. 38 
38Even Daniel Boorstin, who has described all Jeffersonians as builders of 
"a kind of community which did not need the fiat of Scripture or the support of 
doctrine," and as pragmatists who "expected not thought but action, not ideas 
but things to hold his society together, " concedes that Jefferson's social thought 
"was not a miscellany of practical maxims" but came rather "from a world of 
assumptions in science, metaphysics, and theology." Lost World, 7, 25. 
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CHAPTER VI 
"THE BRIGHTEST GEM WITH WHICH 
THE HUMAN CHARACTER IS STUDDED" 
The book which Jefferson said "contained exactly my own creed on the 
foundation of morality in man" 1 was Thomas Law's Second Thoughts on In· 
stinctive Impulses (1813). Law was a minor, but ardent, proponent of the 
sentimentalist view of human nature and ethical theory. His frequent citations 
to the writings of Lord Kames, Francis Hutcheson, Dugald Stewart, and Adam 
Ferguson reveal his indebtedness to the Scottish school, and h.i.s own writings 
are a faithful reflection of their ethical theories. His thesis is founded on the 
general proposition that "God has inspired man with instinctive impulses to 
goodness. and aversions to evil. "2 In his first book on moral philosophy he 
had designed a classification of the several impulses to which man is susceptible. 
These were "Desires" and "A versions. " or those impulses such as hunger or 
sex or shelter that arise from man's sensual feelings; "Sympathy" and 
"Antipathy," those impulses "implanted in him, to be attracted by a kind of 
magnetic influence to promote the happiness of his fellow creatures, as a social 
being, and to repulse those who evince dissocial passions;" "Gratitude" and 
1TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
2 Law, Second Thoughts, 7. 
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"Revenge, " the retributory impulses to requite kindnesses and retaliate 
injuries; "Desire" of "Approbation" and "Emulation;" and "Hope" and "Fear." 
All of these instinctive impulses were, said Law, "given by our creator for our 
benefit and happiness" in accordance with the following scheme: 
Desires to obtain gratifications, and aversions to avoid evil. 
Sympathy to create harmony, and antipathy to restrain from discord. 
Gratitude to requite kindness and revenge to punish injury. 
Desire of approbation for the pleasure of pleasing, and emulation to equal 
the meritorious. 
Hope to stimulate to action, and fear to deter from danger. 
Law believed that a moral code based on these principles, a code that would be 
in unison with the natural impulses "implanted in us for our own good," would 
tend toward human happiness. Moral codes that ignored these principles would, 
conversely, lead to confusion and misery. 3 His second book, which was the 
one to which Jefferson responded, was simply an illustrative elaboration of this 
theme, and seems to have been prompted by William Paley's attack on the moral 
sense theory in The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (17 85 ). Law 
described Paley as having questioned the existence of any such human faculty as 
a moral sense, and having suggested that what moral maxims were supposedly 
apprehended by such a faculty were more likely laws of custom than laws of 
nature. But "is it not impious," Law countered, "to entertain for a moment 
the idea that the All-wise, All-good Creator has not implanted in man primary 
3Law, Thoughts, 24, 72-73. 
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principles for morality, as in water for hydraulics, as in matter for mechanics, 
as in the universe for order?" The answer was plain: "Moral sensations are 
emanations from the Supreme, the peculiar gifts of God to man, which raise 
him above the animal, and prepare him for a more exalted state. " 4 Opposing 
moralists stray into error, he continued, because they "found their notion of 
faith, as they do their other tenets, on that rotten and crumbling pillar of their 
theology, the innate depravity of man. Did, indeed, man issue from the womb, 
as they pretend, a mass of morai putrefaction, with his heart ulcerated with 
guilt, and his mind darkened with prejudice, he would certainly want capacity 
to discover and honestly to confess the truth . . . . A man born blind might 
as easily form just and accurate ideas of the nature and properties of light, as 
a man born radically corrupt and irresistibly propelled by the bias of his nature, 
to the commission of iniquity, could form of the nature and tendt:mcies of moral 
obligation. " 5 
God, said Law, has not created man morally blind, but has, rather, given 
him a sensitivity to moral sensations. Our judgment of human conduct, he 
continued, is conditioned by the favorable or unfavorable sensations we feel. 
"There is an attraction or repulsion produced by every thing more or less. 
God has implanted these sensations in his creatures, to direct them what to 
avoid and what to obtain for their happiness." In the contemplation of a moral 
decision, man only has to be sensible to this voice of God within, or in Law's 
4Law, Second Thoughts, 4-7. 
51bid. , 19. 
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words, he only has to be sensible to "the preponderance of one or more sen-
sations in favour or against a measure, or plan, etc. "6 Law chided Locke 
for having, "in his zeal to overcome his antagonists," not only overlooked 
instinctive impulses but even having denied their existence. "It is usual to 
say [according to Locke and his disciples], that all knowledge is acquired~ 
the five senses, but in correct language we should say through the five senses, 
which are merely the vehicles; because pleasurable or painful sensations are 
the corporeal, sensual or moral laws implanted in us for the preservation of 
health, for the enjoyment of our senses, and for the gratification of spiritual 
affections. "7 Law believed that the sensations that man feels are more than 
simply experience transmitted to the consciousness through the senses. He 
believed that the sensations were products of the interaction of experience and 
man's natural principles, or the result of the judgment by the moral sense of 
the experience that had been transmitted through the senses. The importance 
of these moral sensations for man's happiness could not be overestimated. 
They are, Law concluded, "the ingredients which compose individual and gen-
eral happiness or misery; health of body, peace of mind, tranquility in society 
and universal harmony depend upon these ever operating divine laws. "B 
"I sincerely . . . believe with you," Jefferson wrote to Law after having 
read his book, "in the general existence of a moral instinct. I think it the 
6Ibid. , 33•34. 
7Ibid. , 53•54. 
8Ibid. , 140. 
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brightest gem with which the human character is studded, and the want of it as 
more degrading than the most hideous of the bodily deformities. " 9 These were 
the words of a seventy-one year old student of human nature. It was an affir-
mation of the Scottish moral philosophy that he had embraced a half century 
before, and that had not been seriously altered by subsequent study or exper-
ience. Since this philosophy, founded as it was on a generally optimistic view 
of human nature, shaped the former president's appraisal of mankind, it 
inevitably influenced his conception of the institutions by which a society should 
be governed. It will be important and necessary therefore to discover with 
more clarity just what Jefferson learned from the Scottish sentimentalists. 
I think that there is little doublt that his conception of the Scottish philos-
ophy was taken from the writings of Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and 
Lord Kames. And of these three, whose writings are all directly related to 
one another and reflect the progressive refinement of a basic theme, the latter 
two were of greatest influence. This judgment is based upon both explicit 
references and the general statement of Jefferson's own philosophy as it can be 
constructed from his correspondence. This philosophy of human nature is 
firmly grounded on four basic principles that underlaid the sentimentalist 
ethical theory as developed by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Kames. The 
evidence also shows clearly that Jefferson's knowledge of this moral sense 
theory went beyond the simple acceptance of their conclusions. Though his 
9 TJ to Thomas Law, Esq. , June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
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philosophical sophistication was modest, it is evident that he knew well the 
postulates and arguments that these moralists employed. He did not feel it 
necessary in his correspondence to reveal the systematic structure underlying 
his own philosophical conclusions. Most men do not. Yet there are references 
that show conclusively that he had been an attentive student of the sentimental-
ist theory, and that he had relied upon the essential building blocks that he 
found there in the erection of his own philosophy. To follow jefferson to his 
own conclusions, and to establish with certainty the influence of the British 
moralists, it is necessary to describe those building blocks in some detail. 
The first of the principles that Jefferson embraced was that man is by 
nature moral -- that he is endowed v . ."1;h an innate sense of moral right and 
wrong by which he is urged to moral actions. Shaftesbury in 1699 described 
this moral sense as a faculty that recognized "a beauty and a deformity as well 
in actions, minds, and tempers, as in figutes, sounds, or colours, " and which 
was "as natural to us as natural affection itself," a faculty that cannot "without 
much force and violence, be effaced, or struck out of the natural temper, even 
by means of the most extravagant belief or opinion in the world. " 10 This 
notion was attacked, as described in the preceding chapter, in Mandeville's 
Fable of the Bees (1714). The question of the existence of such a natural moral 
10shaftesbury, An Inquiry, 260-262. Jefferson bought copies of Shaftes-
bury's Characteristics for both of his major libraries. See Chapter 5, fn #20 
above. His early familiarity with the work is revealed in his "Notes on Dis-
continuing the Establishment of the Church of England" (1776), Boyd Collection, 
I, 548-549. 
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sense was one of the most heatedly debated questions in ethical theory in the 
eighteenth century. 
The most influential defender of the Shaftesbury thesis was Francis 
Hutcheson, professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow. 11 Hutcheson had been 
a stu_dent at Glasgow from 1710 to 1716, after which he began his own private 
academy in Dublin. He continued in this vocation until accepting the chair of 
moral philosophy at Glasgow, where he succeeded his old teacher, Gershom 
Carmichael, and continued there until his death in 17 46. Either while as a 
student at Glasgow, or during his early years in Dublin, he became disenchanted 
with the~ priori arguments in Samuel Clarke's intellectualist moral philoso-
12 phy. In the early 1720s he wrote his first book, the title of which announced 
his defense of Shaftesbury's moral theory against Mandeville's attack: An 
Inquiry into the original of~ ideas of beauty and virtue; in two treatises. In 
which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury ~ explain' d and defended, 
against the author of the Fable of the Bees ... with~ attempt to introduce~ 
mathematical calculation in subjects of morality (1725). 13 
I lone scholar finds that though he introduced the phrase moral sense, 
"the fact is that no coherent view can be extracted from Shaftesbury about the 
moral faculty or view about moral theory in general. In the course of his 
essays . . . are to be found simply certain suggestions which were taken over, 
adapted and elaborated into an explicit theory by Hutcheson." [David] Daiches 
Raphael, The Moral Sense (London, 1947), 16. 
I2see Leslie Stephen in DNB s. v. "Hutcheson, Francis." 
13In February 1726 the Dublin Journal published three articles by Hutcheson 
also attacking the Fable of the Bees. Jefferson bought copies of Hutcheson's 
Inquiry for both of his major libraries. See Chapter 5, fn. #28 above. 
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In the preface Hutcheson declared his "principal Design" to be to show 
"that Human Nature was nor left quite indifferent in the affair of Virtue to form 
it self Observations concerning the Advantage, or Disadvantage of Actions, and 
accordingly to regulate its Conduct. " In reply to the argument in this vein by 
the intellectualist moralists he countered that "the weakness of our Reason, and 
the avocations arising from the Infirmity and Necessitys of our Nature, are so 
great, that very few Men could ever have form'd those long Deductions of 
Reason, which shew some Actions to be in the whole avantageous to the Agent, 
and their Contrarys pernicious. " He did not believe that God would leave such 
an important matter as morality to be solely dependent on such an unreliable 
instrument as human reason. "The AUTHOR of Nature, " he argued, "has 
much better furnish'd us for a virtuous Conduct, than our Moralists seem to 
imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have for the 
preservation of our Bodys. He has made Virtue, a lovely Form, to excite our 
pursuit of it; and has given us strong Affections to be the Springs of each 
virtuous Action. " 14 
Hutcheson's basic plan was to first show that there is a sense of beauty 
natural to man which is evidenced by a near universal agreement among men in 
their approval of certain forms or proportions in art, architecture, etc. He 
believed that if he could persuade his readers that there was such an innate 
sense, then it would be an easy matter to persuade them "to apprehend another 
superior Sense, natural also to Man, determining them to be pleas'd with Actions, 
14Hutcheson, An Inquiry, xiv. 
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Characters, Affections. " 15 In other words, if it was accepted that there was 
a sense of beauty natural to man, then it should not be too difficult to demon-
strate that there was also a natural sense by which men perceived the beauty 
of moral virtue. 
According to Hutcheson's scheme, man is possessed of two types of per-
ceptual senses. There are first of all, the external senses by which one 
perceives such simple ideas as color and sound and more complex ideas made 
up as compounds of simple ideas. These are ideas that "are rais'd in the Mind 
upon the presence of external Objects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are 
called Sensations." The mind is totally passive in this experience and has 
neither the power to refuse the idea nor to influence it in any way. These 
sensitive perceptions are accompanied immediately by either the sensation of 
pleasure or pain, and again, the recipient has no knowledge of the source of 
this sensation nor does he have the power to vary it. 16 To this point, 
Hutcheson's theory parallels Locke's sensationalist theory. 
But, according to Hutcheson, there is a higher order of ideas and sensations 
that derive from perceptions more complex than the simple discernment of 
length, breadth, color, etc. "There are," he wrote, "vastly greater Pleasures 
in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, 
Harmonious." He was thinking of art, architecture, musical compositions, 
awe inspiring natural scenes, etc. Obviously one could argue that these ideas 
15Ib"d .. 
_1_., XVll. 
16Ibid. , 1-4. 
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of beauty and harmony were perceptions of the external senses of seeing and 
hearing. But Hutcheson believed that the perception of beauty was superior to 
the simple faculty of seeing or hearing, and he believed that man is endowed 
with a faculty -- a sense of beauty -- which is a "Power" for perceiving the 
idea of beauty, and a sense of harmony which is the power for perceiving this 
idea, etc. He designated the powers by which these more complex ideas were 
perceived as internal senses. 17 
Hutcheson constructed his argument carefully to show that there is a sense 
of beauty natural to men that is spontaneous, disinterested, and universal. In 
doing this he was laying the groundwork for the more questionable argument in 
the following treatise "Concerning MORAL GOOD and EVIL." He planned here 
to use many of the same arguments to demonstrate another internal sense from 
which arises "that Determination to be pleas'd with the Contemplation of those 
Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous." 
This internal sense, superior to all the others of beauty, harmony, etc., he 
called the moral sense. 18 
Moral goodness was defined by Hutcheson to denote man's "Idea of some 
Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward 
the Actor, from those who receive .!!£Advantage El_ the Action. " This quality 
would necessarily have to be constant and subject to universal recognition. 
Hutcheson believed that man was a rational creature in a universe governed by 
171bid.' 7-ll. 
18Ib'd . .. 
__ 1_. , x1v-xvu. 
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general laws. Because in the scheme of things man's happiness depended upon 
his actions, then "the Universe must be govern'd not by particular Wills, but 
by general Laws, upon which we can found our Expectations, and project our 
Schemes of Action. " 19 He believed that the standard of moral goodness was 
fixed as a general law of nature, and that the moral sense was the faculty by 
which man immediately recognized the reflection of the general law of morality 
in human virtue. 
The second treatise, taken as a whole, was a strong attack against 
Bernard Mandeville's theory of self-interest as the prime motivation in human 
behavior. It is constructed around two major themes. First of all, Hutcheson 
attempted to prove "that some Actions have to Men an immediate Goodness." 
By this he meant that by a superior sense we feel pleasure in the contemplation 
of certain actions when observed in ourselves or in others. The second theme 
is an expansion of the first. What excites us to these virtuous actions, Hutche-
son said, is not the pleasure felt in their contemplation, and much less the 
prospect of future reward, but a principle of action entirely different from 
interest or self-love. 20 
The moral sense bore many of the characteristics of the other internal 
senses familiar to the readers of the first treatise. For example Hutcheson 
said that the operation of the moral sense was immediate and totally independent 
of the human will, and thus operates independently of any expectation of 
19Ibid. ' 1 06-111. 
20Ib.d 
__ I_.' 116. 
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advantage or any apprehensions of self-interest. "This moral Sense," he 
wrote, "either of our~ Actions, or of those of others, has this in common 
with our other Senses, that however our Desire of Virtue may be counter 
ballanc'd by Interest, our Sentiment or Perception of its Beauty cannot; as it 
certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of 
Advantage." Like the sense of beauty in objects, the perception of beauty in 
virtue cannot be influenced or denied. An additional evidence of the disinter-
ested nature of the moral sense is to be seen in the fact that it causes us to 
admire "even feign'd Characters, in the most distant Ages and Nations, 
according as they appear Kind, Faithful, Compassionate, . . . toward their 
imaginary Contemporaries." This would be impossible if there were no moral 
sense to make these actions appear beautiful. 21 
Hutcheson anticipated another argument that might posit the approbation of 
virtue as deriving from a different kind of self-love; i.e., from the hope of 
divine reward. He dismissed religion as the basis of moral approbation by 
observing that "many have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, 
who have scarce any Opinions about the DEITY, or any Thoughts of future 
Rewards; and abhor any thing which is Treacherous, Cruel or Unjust, without 
any regard to future Punishments. n 22 
Following the arguments employed in the defense of the idea of the sense 
of beauty, Hutcheson declared that the perception of moral good is not derived 
21Ibid., 117-127. 
22Ibid. , 128. 
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from custom, education, example, or study, since the judgment of an action is 
antecedent to the influence of either. 23 He denied that this meant that the 
moral sense depended upon innate ideas or knowledge. His conclusion, drawn 
from all of the arguments outlined above, was that the human mind is deter-
mined by the Creator "to receive amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions 
. . . antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound our selves 
from them; even as we are pleas'd with a regular Form, or an harmonious 
Composition, without having any Knowledge of Mathematicks, or seeing any 
Advantage in that Form, or Composition different from the immediate 
Pleasure. "24 
The description of the moral sense as outlined above was recapitulated by 
Hutcheson in essentially the same terms in the first book of Philosophiae 
moralis institutio compendiaria, ethices et jurisprudentiae, naturalis elementa 
continens. Lib. III (1742). 25 In this work, intended for use as a textbook by 
university students, he combined his philosophy of ethics and pneumatology with 
his ideas on individual rights and civil law, the rights and obligations of the 
family relationship, political theory, and international law, to form a complete 
23Ibid. ' 134. 
24Ibid., 132-135. 
25Published in English translation in 1747 as A Short:_ Introduction to Moral 
Philosophy, in Three Books; Containing the Elements of Ethicks And the Law 
of Nature (Glasgow, 1747). Citations are from a facsimile copy of this edition 
(Ann Arbor, 1970). Jefferson owned a third edition (1764) which was part of 
the collection sold to Congress and purchased another copy for his last library. 
Sowerby, Catalogue, II, 12; 1829 Catalogue, 2. 
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system of moral philosophy typical of the eighteenth century model. 
In Pb.ilosophiae moralis Hutcheson gave additional suggestions about the 
power of the moral sense. This "noble and most divine of all our senses, " 
he wrote, has been implanted by nature "to regulate the highest powers of 
our nature, our affections and deliberate designs of action in important affairs." 
It is "that Conscience by which we discern what is graceful, becoming, beauti-
ful, and honourable in the affections of the soul, in our conduct of life, our 
words and actions. "26 Hutcheson now described the moral sense as the 
governing power in man. It is, he declared, "the judge of the whole life, of 
all the various powers, affections and designs, and naturally assumes a 
jurisdiction over them; pronouncing that most important sentence, that in the 
virtues themselves, and in a careful study of what is beautiful and honourable 
in manners, consists our true dignity, and natural excellence, and supreme 
happiness. " The authority of the moral sense is confirmed in that "altho' 
every event, disposition, or action incident to men may in a certain sense be 
called natural; yet such conduct alone as is approved by this diviner faculty, 
which is plainly destined to command the rest, can be properly called agree-
able or suited to ~ nature. "27 The moral sense obviously possessed an 
authority transcending that normally attributed to the human conscience. 
In summary, Hutcheson argued that God had implanted within man a faculty, 
a moral sense, by which he was made immediately conscious of moral right 
26Hutcheson, Short Introduction, 15-17. 
27Ibid. ' 23-26. 
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and wrong. It was a faculty analogous to man's more easily demonstrated 
sense of beauty and harmony, but because its object was the superior beauty, 
i.e., virtue, the moral sense was the superior of all of man's internal senses. 
Its judgments were not dependent upon education, contemplation, custom, 
example or religion. Nor were its judgments subject to the bribery posed by 
the knowledge of advantage or the apprehension of self-interest. The moral 
sense was a reflection of God's concern for man's happiness. This happiness 
was to be attained only through fidelity to the law of man's nature and the 
divine law of morality. The moral sense was the ever present and functioning 
internal monitor urging man to that fidelity. 
This was the faculty that Jefferson described as "the brightest gem with 
which the human character is studded" and the want of which is "more degrading 
than the most hideous of the bodily deformities." His conception of the moral 
sense conformed exactly to Hutcheson's description outlined above. 
Jefferson wrote that "nature hath implanted in our breasts . . . a moral 
instinct." He believed that the moral sense was "instinct and innate" and that 
it was "as much a part of our constitution as that of feeling, seeing, or hearing." 
He believed that its function was to impel man to virtuous actions and to warn 
him against those that are vicious. 28 He advised his daughter Martha when she 
was only eleven years old that "if ever you are about to say any thing amiss or 
to do any thing wrong, consider before hand. You will feel something within you 
28TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144; TJ to John Adams, Oct. 14, 1816, Ibid., XV, 23-26. 
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which will tell you it is wrong and ought not to be said or done: that is your 
conscience, and be sure to obey it. Our maker has given us all, this faithful 
internal monitor, and if you always obey it, you will always be prepared for 
the end of the world: or for a much more certain event which is death. "29 
Though this advice may seem to be nothing more than a solemn homily by a 
dutiful father, Jefferson, like Hutcheson, regarded the operation of the moral 
sense as much more than an easily disregarded twinge of discomfort arising 
from the contemplation of immoral behavior. 
Jefferson's description of the operation of the moral sense conformed to 
Hutcheson's description of its analogy to the appreciation of beauty. Hutcheson 
had written that the operation of the moral sense was simply ·~Determination 
of~ Minds to receive amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they 
occur to our Observation, ... even as we are pleas'd with a regular Form, 
or an harmonious Composition. " 30 In one of his earliest expressions on this 
subject Jefferson wrote that "when any signed act of charity or of gratitude, 
. . . is presented either to our sight or imagination, we are deeply impressed 
with its beauty and feel a strong desire in ourselves of doing charitable and 
29TJ to Martha Jefferson, Dec. 11, 1783, Boyd Collection, VI, 380-381. 
I. Woodbridge Riley has attributed the source of this idea in Jefferson's philos-
ophy, incorrectly I believe, to Thomas Reid's An Enquiry into the Human Mind 
~the Principles of Common Sense (1764). He seems to base this assertion 
simply on the similarity of ideas. American Philosophy: The Early Schools 
(New York, n. d.), 281. Reid was an outstanding spokesman for the Scottish 
philosophy in the late eighteenth century, but I have found no evidence to indi-
cate that Jefferson was familiar with this particular work. 
3<1-:lutcheson, An Inquiry, 134-135. 
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grateful acts also. Or the contrary when we see or read of any atrocious deed, 
we are disgusted with its deformity and conceive an abhorrence of vice. " 31 
This statement also contains a subtle but definite impli.cation of another char-
acteristic of the moral sense which is reminiscent of Hutcheson's explication. 
The quotation is taken from a letter in which Jefferson was justifying the in-
elusion of works of fiction in a list of recommended books. The reader will 
note that he refers to virtuous acts presented either to our sight or imagination 
and to atrocious deeds which we see or read about. The significance of this 
argument is that it makes the moral sense responsive even to fictional acts or 
deeds, that "we are . . . wisely framed to be as warmly interested for a 
fictitious as for a real personage. " 32 Hutcheson had written that the moral 
sense caused us to admire "even feign'd Characters, ... according as they 
appear Kind, Faithful, Compassionate, ... toward their imaginary Contem-
poraries. " 33 In his work, this characteristic was offered as evidence of the 
disinterested nature of the moral sense. Certainly one could not anticipate 
advantage from the approval of virtuous conduct ascribed to fictional characters. 
By implication Jefferson attributed this same disinterested quality to the moral 
sense. 
Jefferson also used Hutcheson's exact argument to show that the judgment 
31TJ to Robert Skipwith, Aug. 3, 1771, Boyd Collection, I, 76-81. The 
date of this reference is an additional evidence of Jefferson's early familiarity 
with the sentimentalist ethical theory. 
3~utcheson, An Inquiry, 117-127. 
110 
of the moral sense was disinterested even in the anticipation of divine reward. 
Hutcheson had dismissed religion or divine sanctions as the basis of moral 
approbation by simply pointing to the fact that there were many who showed a 
high appreciation for moral virtue and despised its opposite, yet held no belief 
about a deity or the prospects of future reward or punishment. Jefferson pointed 
to Diderot, D'Alembert, D'Holbach, and Condorcet, men who had publicly 
affirmed their atheism, and yet who were "known to have been among the most 
virtuous of men." Like Hutcheson, Jefferson believed that such evidence was 
sufficient to show the independence of moral judgment from considerations of 
the prospect of divine sanctions. 34 
Hutcheson had carefully elevated the role of the moral sense over that of 
reason in the matter of morals. He did not demean either the role or efficacy 
of reason in human affairs. But he did insist that the discovery of moral truth 
could more safely be entrusted to the moral sense than to the processes of 
intellectualization. He stated very specifically his belief that few men possessed 
the intellectual powers or energy that would be necessary to arrive at the con-
elusions that were rendered immediately by the moral sense. 35 Jefferson's 
description of the superiority of the moral sense in the matter of morals agreed 
with Hutcheson's. He wrote that "He who made us would have been a pitiful 
bungler if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science." 
Like Hutcheson he recognized that only a small part of the human family had 
34yJ to Thomas Law, Esq. , June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138•144. 
35Hutcheson, An Inquiry, xiv. 
111 
the opportunity of education or training that would expose them to the discipline 
of intellectualized ethics, and even those would stand on a weak foundation. 
"This sense is submitted indeed in some degree to the guidance of reason; 
but," he added, "it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less 
one than what we call Common sense." To illustrate his thinking, Jefferson 
used an example that, recast in dozens of forms, would become a basic faith in 
the nineteenth century Romantic philosophy of human nature. "State a moral 
case to a ploughman and a professor, " he wrote. "The former will decide it 
as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by 
artificial rules. " 36 It seems clear that throughout his adult life, Jefferson 
remained convinced that morality was not a matter of ethical systems made up 
of artificial rules. In 17 87 he advised his nephew, who was entering college, 
that it would be "time lost" to attend lectures in moral philosophy because 
moral conduct was a matter of "sense" rather than science. Thirty-three 
years later, when his grandson was beginning college, Jefferson wrote that it 
would be "time lost" for him to attend professors of ethics. The rules of moral 
conduct could, he believed, "be as well acquired in the closet as from living 
lecturers. " 37 Jefferson was certainly not an anti-intellectual, but like Hutcheson, 
he believed that the discovery of moral truth, and consequently man's happiness, 
was too important a matter to entrust to unaided reason. For this reason the 
36rrJ to Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1787, Boyd Collection, XII, 14-19. 
37Ibid.; TJ to Dr. James Cooper, Aug. 14, 1820, Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XV, 264-266. 
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Creator had given men an internal monitor with superior jurisdiction in this 
area of human life. Jefferson's most eloquent statement of this belief is found 
in the head and heart dialogue contained in a letter to Maria Cosway. 
[Heart] When nature assigned us the same habitation, she gave us over it 
a divided empire. To you she allotted the field of science, to me that of 
morals. When the circle is to be squared, or the orbit of a comet to be 
traced; when the arch of greatest strength, or the solid of least resistance 
is to be investigated, take you the problem: it is yours: nature has given 
me no cognizance of it. In like manner in denying to you the feelings of 
sympathy, of benevolence, of gratitude, of justice, of love, of friendship, 
she has excluded you from their controul. To these she has adapted the 
mechanism of the heart. Morals were too essential to the happiness of 
man to be risked on the incertain combinations of the head. She laid their 
foundation therefore in sentiment, not in science. That she gave to all, 
as necessary to all: this to a few only, as sufficing with a few. 38 
This was the first major principle that Jefferson took from the Scottish 
sentimentalists -- that man is naturally endowed with an innate sense of moral 
right and wrong, and that the function of this internal monitor is to urge man 
toward a life of virtue. The logical extension of this argument, and one that 
Jefferson accepted, was that man is by nature moral. 
The second major principle that Jefferson took from the Scottish senti-
mentalists was that man is naturally benevolent. This principle, like that of 
the moral sense, was suggested by Shaftesbury and then developed by Hutcheson 
and Kames later in the eighteenth century. 
According to Shaftsbury, man's nature is shaped by the natural harmony 
of cosmological relationships. Man belongs to a "system" of animals, and the 
"whole system of animals, together with that of vegetables, and all other things 
38 Oct. 12, 1786, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, X, 443-453. 
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in this inferior world" forms "one system of a globe or earth. " The earth, 
as it "appears to have a real dependence on something still beyond, as, for 
example, either on its sun, the galaxy, or its fellow-planets, then is it in 
reality a party only of some other system." There is then ultimately "a 
system of all things" and "a universal nature" to which all its parts belong. 
"Therefore," he wrote, "if any being be wholly and really ill, it must be ill 
with respect to the universal system." or, in other words, the behavior of 
man can be called virtuous or vicious only on the basis of whether it contributes 
to the good or ill of the system. 39 
Having determined this, Shaftesbury turned to the question of obligation 
or motivation to virtue. He believed that man's nature, in harmony with the 
"universal nature," is naturally inclined toward benevolence. He believed 
that this human inclination is proved by the natural affections such as parental 
kindness, zeal for posterity, concern for propagation and nature of the young, 
love of fellowship, and company, compassion, mutual succour, etc. He be-
lieved that this benevolent human affection towards the good of the species or 
common nature is as natural to man as any part or member of his body. 
But he also recognized that there are other natural affections within the 
human breast, namely those that have regard for "the private nature or self-
system." And it was obvious that there would be occasions in the human ex-
perience when the natural affections for the common system would contradict the 
natural affections for the self-system. Man is a mixture of these contradictory 
39shaftesbury, An Inquiry, 246-247. 
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affections and is judged virtuous or vicious with respect to their balance. It 
was his conclusion that "to deserve the name of good or virtuous, a creature 
must have all his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and 
temper, suitable, and agreeing with the good of his kind, or of that system in 
which he is included," and that "to be wanting in any of these, or to have their 
contraries, is depravity, corruption, and vice." He drew the further con-
clusion that man is naturally inclined to the former state, and that his happi-
ness is derived from the fulfillment of his natural social benevolence and that 
the habitual rejection of this natural inclination is the cause of misery. 40 
Again building on the foundation laid by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson described 
benevolent affection as the immediate motive to all virtuous actions. He 
declared that every action that can be judged morally good has to originate in 
the affection towards ones fellow creatures, or in other words, in the natural 
affections imposed by the common nature of the species. Even the so-called 
cardinal virtues of temperance, courage, prudence and justice "obtain that 
Name, because they are Dispositions universally necessary to promote publick 
Good, and denote Affections toward rational Agents;" and to any extent that 
they are employed in the furtherance of private ends "there would appear no 
Virtue in them. ,,4! Thus benevolence, described by Hutcheson as "some 
Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others; ~ ~ Instinct, 
antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of 
401bid.' 280-293. 
41H utches on, An Inquiry, 136-137. 
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others" was posited as the true spring of virtue. It is the natural force oper-
ating within man that motivates that kind of behavior which would be approved 
by the moral sense. The relationship between the moral sense and benevo-
lence is then complementary; the former performing an apprehensive function 
and the latter an energizing one. Acting together they stimulate moral 
behavior in man. 42 
If benevolence was to be considered a part of the natural foundation of 
moral virtue in man, it would have to be, like the moral sense, a demonstrably 
universal human tendency or trait. The initial evidence offered by Hutcheson 
to confirm the universality of benevolence was the natural, disinterested, 
affection of parents for their children. But this was only a beginning, for this 
natural affection extended beyond the family circle to embrace friends, neighbors, 
communities, and eventually, all mankind. He acknowledged that the strength 
of the benevolent affection varied in proportion to the nearness of the relation-
ship, and even conceded that this natural inclination could be diluted some-
times by the opposition of private interests. 43 But it is clear that Hutcheson 
considered benevolent affection as a natural human trait, extending to the most 
distant members of the species, and acting in conjunction with the moral sense 
42Ibid. , 155. Raphael notes this ambiguity in Hutcheson's failure to dis-
tinguish clearly between the discernment of right actions and the motive from 
which such actions are right to be done. He believes that this is due "to the 
fact that Hutcheson's chief aim in this work is not to establish the moral sense 
theory, but to refute the egoist. He wants to show that we often do actions from 
a motive other than self-love. This motive he holds to be benevolence." The 
Moral Sense, 22-23. 
4~utcheson, An Inquiry, 158-161. 
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to stimulate virtuous behavior in man. 
It was on this theme that Lord Kames began his Essays on the Principles 
of Morality and Natural Religion (1751), a book that apparently made a deep 
impression on Jefferson. Kames was an advocate and jurist by profession, 
serving as one of the lords of the justiciary court for more than thirty years. 
He also achieved a considerable reputation as a metaphysician and amateur 
agriculturist. He was a voluminous writer, producing at least twenty-one 
publications on law, moral philosophy and agriculture in a period spanning 
slightly more than a half century. 44 His literary reputation was undoubtedly 
known to a very limited number in America, although one of his books event-
ually went through thirty-one printings here. 45 Benjamin Franklin had met 
him during a visit to Scotland in October 1759, and the two carried on a spirited 
correspondence for several years thereafter. Kames included a list of maxims 
written by Franklin in both Introduction to the Art of Thinking (1761) and 
Sketches of the History of Man (177 4), and also sent Franklin copies of Princi-
ples of Equity (1760) and Elements of Criticism (1762). The latter reciprocated 
by purchasing Principles of Equity and Historical Law Tracts for the Library 
Company of Philadelphia and also sent Kames a report on the situation of 
British affairs in America. 46 There can be no doubt that Kames' views on the 
44see George Fisher Russell Barker, in DNB s. v. "Home, Henry, Lord 
Kames." 
45Arthur E. McGuinness, Henry Home, Lord Kames (New York, 1970), 59. 
46The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. by Leonard W. Larabee (10 vols.; 
New Haven, 1959--), II, 420; VI, ll6-118; VIII, 431; IX, 5-10, 103-106, 
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relationship between Britain and the colonies endeared him to the hearts of 
those who read the Virginia Gazette. The issues of November 24, 177 4 and 
March 4, 1775 contained a rather lengthy argument, attributed to "that judicious 
and dispassionate writer, Lord Kames, " to the effect that in matters of com-
merce all privileges and opportunities should be equal and reciprocal as be-
tween the mother country and the colonies. "To bar a colony from access to 
the fountain head for commodities that cannot be furnished by the mother country 
but at second hand, is oppression; it is so far degrading the colonists from being 
free subjects to be slaves No connexion between two nations can be so 
intimate," he continued, "as to make such restraint an act of justice." The 
Parliament, in enacting legislation prohibiting the Americans from having any 
direct commerce with any nation other than Britain, had, in his opinion, "acted 
like a step mother to her American colonies." Such regulation, he concluded, 
"is not only unjust but impolitic; as by it the interest of the colonies in general 
is sacrificed to that of a few London merchants. "47 The Virginia Gazette of 
274, 277, 374·376; X, 27-29, 147·149. Councillor Robert Carter of Virginia 
owned copies of "Principles of Equity, " "Homes Decisions of the Court of 
Sessions," "Elements of Criticism" and "Kaim's Law Tracts," William and 
Mary Quarterly, 1st Ser., X (1901), 233-236. 
47Purdie and Dixon's Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), Nov. 24, 1774; 
Dixon and Hunter's Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), Mar. 4, 1775. Caroline 
Robbins has pointed out that Francis Hutcheson voiced views about the relation-
ship between colonies and mother countries that were known at least to those 
Americans who attended his classes in the early eighteenth century. These 
views included the assertion of the rights of colonists to resist tyranny. Robbins 
quotes a passage from !! System of Moral Philosophy (1755 ): "If the plan of the 
mother-country is changed by force, or degenerates by degrees from a safe, 
mild, and gentle limited power, to a severe and absolute one; or if under the 
same plan of polity, oppressive laws are made with respect to the 
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November 17, 1774 contained "A Prophecy of Lord KAMES, concerning the 
North American Colonies." He was quoted as saying that the colonies were 
growing in both prosperity and population and that they would soon be "a Match 
for the Mother Country, if they choose to be independent. " And, the prediction 
continued, once they were "delivered from a foreign Yoke, their first Care 
will be the Choice of a proper Government, and it is not difficult to foresee 
what Government will be chosen. A people animated with the new Blessings of 
Liberty, and Independence, will not incline to a kingly Government. " 48 Such 
sentiments and predictions would not have been unwelcome among the more 
angry of the Virginia gentry in 1774-1775. 
Jefferson was attracted to Kames's writings early in his career. The 
numerous citations in his letters, spanning the greater part of his adult life, 
indicate that it was a lasting attraction. In fact, the similarities in their in-
tellectual natures is amazing. Like Jefferson, Kames possessed a most active 
and varied intellectual curiosity. This is most vividly attested to by the sub-
ject matter of his publications. He was a member of the Ranken Club, the 
colonies or provinces; and any colony is so increased in numbers and strength 
that they are sufficient by themselves, for all the good ends of a political union; 
they are not bound to continue in their subjection, when it is grown so much 
more burdensome than was expected. Their consent to be subject to a safe and 
gentle plan of power or laws, imposes no subjection to the dangerous and 
aggressive ones." The chapter on "Right of Governors" in this work was re-
printed in the Massachusetts Spy, Feb. 13, 1772. " 'When It Is That Colonies 
May Turn Independent:' An Analysis of the Environment and Politics of Francis 
Hutcheson," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., XI (1954), 216. 
48Purdie and Dixon's Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), Nov. 17, 177 4. 
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Select Society, and the Hlilosophical Society, which were the centers of Edin-
burgh's intellectual life. Kames and Jefferson also shared a less sophisticated 
credulity in their entHusiastic acceptance of the authenticity of the poems of 
Ossian. 
A list of recommended books for a gentlemen's library composed by 
Jefferson in 1771 included "Ld. Kaim's elements of criticism," "Ld. Kaim's 
Natural religion," and "Ld. Kaim's Principles of equity. "49 A list of books 
that he recommended for self study in law composed in 1790 included "Kaim 's 
Principles of equity" and "Kaim's moral essays ... so He mentioned Kames' 
proposal of "an essence of dung, one pint of which should manure an acre" in 
a letter to George Washington in 1794. 51 He provided another list of books 
recommended for the study of law in 1814. It included "Lord Kaim 's Natural 
Religion," "Ld. Kaim's Elements of criticism," and "Lord Kaim's principles 
of Equity," the latter listing updated to specify the third edition of 1779. 52 In 
the same year he suggested the inclusion of Lord Kames in "the roll of associ-
ates" advocating the moral sense principle. 53 Jefferson's continuing interest 
49yJ to Robert Skipwith, Aug. 3, 1771, Boyd Collection, I, 76-81. 
S(}yJ to John Garland Jefferson, June 11, 1790, Ibid., XVI, 480-482. 
51May 14, 1794, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, IX, 286-288. 
52TJ to General Mercer, Aug. 30, 1814, quoted in Southern Literary 
Messenger, March, 1848, 187. 
S~J to Thomas Law, Esq. , June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
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in Kames' writings is further indicated by his collection of the Scot's books. 
The collection sold to the Library of Congress in 1815 included ten different 
titles by Kames, making him one of the most frequently represented authors 
in the collection. 54 Of these, the two that most influenced Jefferson's concept 
of human nature were Essays~ the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion 
and Historical Law Tracts. The former of these continues the philosophical 
genre of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and the latter exhibits a considerable 
application of human psychology to legal principles. 55 
Essays was written "to illustrate the nature of man," and in so doing to 
support the authority of the natural senses, "external and internal. " The 
author's thesis rests upon the proposition that man's "reasonings on some of 
the most important subjects, rest ultimately upon sense and feeling. " He 
acknowledged the influence of both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and conceived of 
54sowerby lists the following: Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Ses-
sions, from the year 1730 to the year 1752, 1st ed., 1766 (Sowerby #1739); 
Essays upon severaf stib}ects concern.iiig'i3ritish Antiquities, 3d ed. , 17 63 
(Sowerby #2007); The Decisions of the Court of Session from its first institution 
to the present time, 1st ed., 1741 (Sowerby #2186); Essays~ the Principles £f 
Morality and Natural Religion, 1st ed., 1751 (Sowerby #1254); Historical Law 
Tracts, 2d ed. , 1761 (Sowerby #2008); Principles of Equity, 1st ed. , 1760, 
2d ed., 1767, 3d ed. 1778 (Sowerby #1716-17-18); Introduction!.£ the Art of 
Thinking, 2d ed., 1764 (Sowerby #1345); Elements of Criticism, 3d ed., 1764 
(Sowerby #4699); Statute Law of Scotland abridged, 1st ed., 1757 (Sowerby 
#2183); The Gentlemen Farmer, 2d ed., 1779 (Sowerby #710). 
55Jefferson 's Commonplace Book contains extracts from thirteen of the 
fourteen theses outlined by Kames in Historical Law Tracts. Also the passages 
attacking Wollaston and relating duty to impulsive feeling in Jefferson's letter 
to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, bear a striking resemblance to Kames' 
wording in spite of his profession that it had been fifty years since he had read 
Kames' book. 
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his work as an extension of the scheme that they had begun. 56 He described 
the moral sense as having the authority of judgment over all our appetites and 
affections. Its authority is derived from the fact that it is an immediate feeling 
or sensation not influenced by reflection. From it man perceives those actions 
he is bound to perform and those he is bound to avoid. · "It is the voice of God 
within us, " he declared, "which commands our strictest obedience, just as 
much as when his will is declared by express revelation." But, like Hutcheson, 
he conceded that the moral sense is not the immediate motivation tc human 
behavior. "Its province," he wrote, "is to instruct us, which of our princi-
ples of action [immediate motivations] we may indulge, and which of them we 
must restrain. It is the voice of God within us, informing us of our duty. "57 
The immediate motivations, or principles of action, that make up the 
common nature of man were divided by Kames into five categories. The first 
two, directed toward self, are self-preservation and self-love. The other three, 
directed toward others, are fidelity, gratitude, and benevolence. Man's be-
havior is then, according to Kames, the reflection of these internal "appetites, 
passions, and affections" and in the normal course of things, they operate 
together for the general good. The role of the moral sense is that of instructor 
and governor, given "to regulate our actions, to enforce one motive, to restrain 
56[Kames, Henry Home, Lord], Essays~ the Principles of Morality and 
Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751), 54-57, 121-122. Citations are from a 
facsimile copy of the first edition (Ann Arbor, 1970). Jefferson owned a first 
edition which was part of the collection sold to Congress. Sowerby, Catalogue, 
II, ii. 
57[Kames], Essays, 63-76. 
122 
another, and to prefer one to another, when they are in competition. " This 
judgment by the moral sense in itself places man under obligation to obey. 
"The Author of nature has not left our actions to be directed by so weak a 
principle as reason, " he wrote. Like Hutcheson he believed that the bulk of 
mankind had little capacity for such reasoning. "Nature has dealt more kindly 
by us, " he continued. "We are compelled by strong and evident feelings, to 
perform all the different duties of life . .,SS 
The opening essay in Kames' work is about man's natural benevolence, and 
its arguments and conclusions conform readily to those of Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson. But its very placement as an introductory feature to the overall 
work is significant. It was Kames' plan to begin with this proposition of man's 
natural benevolence and to treat its ramifications for society with greater 
detail than either of the other two writers. His ultimate conclusions on this 
theme will be fully described in a later chapter. 
With regard to the subject of benevolence, Kames concluded that nature 
has so designed man that we participate fully with the joys and miseries of our 
fellow creatures. "We have a strong sympathy with them; we partake of their 
afflictions; we grieve with them and for them; and," he wrote, "in many 
instances, their misfortunes affect us equally with our own. " 59 In the argu-
ments by which he arrived at this conclusion, he launched a direct attack on 
those philosophers who had demeaned human nature by attributing a false 
581bid. ' 76-99, 122-127. 
591bid. ' 16. 
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stature to the power of pleasure and pain as the sole motivations to human 
behavior. "li man is considered as a being, whose only view, in all his 
actions, is either to attain pleasure, or to avoid pain," Kames wrote, "we 
must conclude pleasure and pain to be his only impulses to action. " But he did 
not accept such a presupposition. "When we more attentively examine human 
nature," he countered, "we discover many and various impulses to action, 
independent of pleasure and pain." 
Kames conceded that human existence was characterized by a continuous 
experience of impressions to which man is sensitive. And that, with the 
exception of some slight, insignificant impressions that can be safely neglected, 
the bulk of these impressions can be distinguished into pleasant and painful. 
These sensations are usually translated into desire or aversion, i.e., we de-
sire to possess that which causes pleasant impressions and to avoid those which 
raise our aversion. No doubt it is true that "in infancy, appetite and passions, 
and the desires and aversions accompanying them are our sole impulses to 
action. But in the progress of life, when we learn to distinguish the objects 
around us as contributing to pleasure or pain, we acquire, by degrees, im-
pulses to action of a different sort. " 
Of course it might be argued that self-love would naturally stimulate 
desire for those objects that contribute to one's pleasure and aversion to those 
that cause pain. And indeed, Kames conceded, pleasure and pain are the only 
motives to action so far as self-love is concerned. But our natural affections 
of compassion and benevolence are different in their nature from self-love. 
The latter operates "by means of reflection and experience, " whereas the 
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former operate "by direct impulse, without the intervention of reason." 
Natural affection is a direct impulse which "operates blindly, and in the way 
of instinct, without any view to consequences." Though it may be true that 
pleasure is the usual consequence of indulging the natural instinct, "it is not 
necessarily, nor indeed universally so." Locke, and the other philosophers 
like him, held too simplistic a notion about human nature according to Kames. 
They tried to cast human motivation into a one dimensional pattern. "They 
acknowledge no motive to action, but what arises from self-love; measures 
laid down to attain pleasure or to shun pain. " Kames believed that man's 
nature is multi-dimensional. "So various is human nature, and so complicated 
its acting powers, " he wrote, "that it is not readily to be taken in at one view. " 
He believed that though the pleasure-pain principle was operative, the natural 
affections were probably more important as impulses to action. 60 
Kames believed that man feels many natural affections and their attendant 
impulses, but there are none more admirable than compassion or benevolence. 
It is the most valuable principle in human nature, one which unites mankind 
"by ties stronger than those of blood. " Yielding to this instinct is frequently 
accompanied by pain, but not by aversion. It would seem that these experiences 
of pain would eventually blunt the benevolent impulse. "But the author of our 
nature has not left his work imperfect," Kames wrote. "He has given us this 
noble principle entire, without a counter-balance, so as to have a vigorous and 
universal operation. Far from having any aversion to pain, occasioned by 
60Ibid. , 9-15. 
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social principles, we reflect upon such pain with satisfaction, and are willing 
to submit to it upon all occasions with a chearfulness and heart-liking, just as 
much as if it were a real pleasure. " 61 
In summary, Lord Kames believed that human behavior is influenced by 
both the pleasure-pain principle, operating from reflection and reason, and 
natural affections which operate instinctively. He believed the latter to be 
more influential. Of the natural affections, the most noble is compassion or 
benevolence. He believed that man is "imbued with a principle of universal 
benevolence" and wrote that "sympathy with our fellow -creatures is a princi-
ple implanted in the breast of every man. "62 It is the universal and constant 
bond that exists among the members of the human race. Kames, like Hutcheson, 
recognized that though benevolence is universal, it is not "equally directed to 
all men" and he conceded that it "gradually decreases, according to the dis-
tance of the object." But nature, he wrote, "to supply the want of benevolence 
towards distant objects," has given power to abstract conceptions like religion, 
country, and mankind "to raise benevolence or publick spirit in the mind." 
This enabling trait in human nature serves "to excite us to generous and 
benevolent actions, of the most exalted kind; not confined to particulars, but 
grasping whole societies, towns, countries, kingdoms, nay, all mankind. " 
This universal system of benevolence, he concluded, "which is really founded 
in human nature, and not the invention of man, is infinitely better contrived to 
61Ibid. ' 25-26. 
62lbid. ' 68, 82. 
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advance the good and happiness of mankind, than any Utopian system that ever 
has been produced, by the warmest imagination. "63 
Jefferson embraced these arguments by the Scottish sentimentalists that 
man is naturally benevolent. He believed that compassion and generosity are 
"innate elements of the human constitution. " 64 He believed that "every 
human mind feels pleasure in doing good to another. "65 And in a passage that 
could serve as an abstract of Kames' first essay, Jefferson declared his con-
viction that nature has implanted in the heart of man "a love of others, a sense 
of duty to them, a moral instinct, in short, which prompts us irresistibly to 
feel and succor their distresses. "66 
This declaration could accurately be described as the first article of faith 
in what Adrienne Koch has called Jefferson's "religion of humane morality. "67 
Though the record is at best cryptic, sometimes puzzling, and more often 
frustratingly silent in its revelation of Jefferson's religious beliefs, there is 
one area that is perfectly clear. He believed that the fundamental teaching of 
all religions is ethical, and more specifically, that the central thrust of Jesus' 
teaching was in the area of moral duties and relationships. He gave a great 
63Jbid. ' 82-86. 
64TJ to Dupont de Nemours, Apr. 24, 1816, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 487-488. 
65TJ to John Adams, Oct. 14, 1815, Ibid., XV, 76. 
66rJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Ibid., XIV, 138-144. 
67 Koch, The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, 39. 
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deal of thought to the latter, especially during the years of his presidency, and 
consciously or unconsciously, he was formulating in his own mind an inter-
esting correlation of sentimentalist and Christian ethics. 
Jefferson described Jesus as a reformer. He believed that one of Jesus's 
most important achievements was the reformation of both the philosophical and 
theological ethical principles established by the ancient philosophers of Greece 
and Rome, and of Moses. Jefferson's criticism of the moral doctrines of 
Pythagoras, Epicurus, Epictetus, Socrates, Cicero, Seneca, and Antoninus 
was temperate; he indeed believed that only one blinded by prejudice could deny 
them the great degree of merit that they deserved. Their defect, in Jefferson's 
opinion, was that they were too self-centered. "Their philosophy," he wrote, 
"went chiefly to the government of our passions, so far as respected ourselves, 
and the procuring our own tranquillity. In our duties to others they were short 
and deficient. They extended their cares scarcely beyond our own kindred and 
friends individually, and our country in the abstract." His criticism of Moses 
was more severe. He believed that he "had bound the Jews to many idle cere-
monies, mummeries, and observances, of no effect towards producing the 
social utilities which constitute the essence of virtue." In both instances, 
Jefferson had detected and criticized the lack of social benevolence as a basic 
force in their ethical theories. 
He believed that it was this orientation that Jesus attacked in his brief 
ministry. Jesus offered, in contrast to their self-centeredness, a philosophy 
of morals that "embraced with charity and philanthropy our neighbors, our 
countrymen, and the whole family of mankind." In place of the teaching of 
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Moses that "instilled into his people the most antisocial spirit towards other 
nations; . . . [Jesus] preached philanthropy and universal charity and benev-
olence." This benevolent moral theory had been "disfigured by the corruptions 
of schismatizing followers, " Jefferson warned, "who have found an interest in 
sophisticating and perverting the simple doctrines he taught, by engrafting on 
them the mysticisms of a Grecian sophist, frittering them into subtleties, and 
obscuring them with jargon." But when these "artificial vestments in which 
they have been muffled by priests ... as instruments of riches and power to 
themselves" have been stripped off, there will be found remaining "the most 
sublime and benevolent code of morals which has ever been offered to man." 
It was its emphasis on benevolence that led Jefferson to judge Jesus' system of 
morality "more perfect than those of any of the ancient philosophers. "68 It 
was the same emphasis that led him, late in life, to blend the ethical theory of 
Jesus and that of the sentimentalists into an indistinct whole as revealed in the 
following passage in a letter to John Adams: 
If by religion we are to understand ~rian dogmas, in which no two of 
them agree, then your exclamation on them is just, "that this would be the 
best of all possible worlds, if there were no religion in it." But if the moral 
precepts, innate in man, and made a part of his physical constitution, as 
necessary for a social being, if the sublime doctrines of philanthropism 
and deism taught us by Jesus of Nazareth, in which all agree, constitute 
6~J to Dr. Joseph Priestley, Apr. 9, 1803, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
X, 374-376; TJ to Edward Dowse, Esq., Apr. 19, 1803, Ibid. , 376-378; 
TJ to Dr. Benjamin Rush, Apr. 21, 1803, Ibid. , X, 379-385; TJ to Thomas 
Leiper, Jan. 21, 1809, Ibid., XII, 236-238; TJ to John Adams, Oct. 13, 1813, 
Ibid., XIII, 387-394; TJ to William Short, Aug. 4, 1820, Ibid., XV, 257-264. 
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129 
true religion, then without it, this would~, as you again say, "something 
not fit to be named even, indeed a hell. " 9 
Jefferson subscribed to the Christian code of morality, in the form taught by 
Jesus, largely because it confirmed what he had already come to believe about 
the nature of man, i.e., that benevolence was a natural impulse in the human 
constitution. 
69TJ to John Adams, May 5, 1817, Ibid., XV, 109. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 
The sentimentalist's appraisal of human nature, which attributed to man 
natural tendencies toward virtue and benevolence, attracted criticism from 
several different quarters. The potentially most destructive criticism was 
directed at the most apparent weakness. The sentimentalist theory declared 
man to be strongly motivated by an innate sense of benevolence toward his 
fellowman. This analysis of human nature was attacked with wrath by both 
cynics and skeptics. Neither their immediate experience nor their knowledge 
of man's historical record of atrocious behavior suggested to them such a 
natural sense. In response to Shaftesbury's theory of natural benevolence, 
Mandeville countered that "there is nothing so universally sincere upon earth 
as the love which all creatures, that are capable of any, bear to themselves; 
and there is no love but what implies a care to preserve the thing beloved, so 
there is nothing more sincere in any creature than his will, wishes and en-
deavours to preserve himself. This," he insisted, "is the law of nature. " 1 
Shaftesbury had written that it was unreasonable to deny that man had a strong 
natural affection toward the good of the species or common nature. But Mande-
ville and others found it more unreasonable to propose than to deny such 
!Mandeville, Fable, 156. 
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affections. They countered that it was man's so-called base passions, pride, 
lust, cruelty, that accounted for his behavior and indeed the course of history. 
And, he wrote, "if we consult history both ancient and modern, and take a 
view of what has past in the world, we shall find that human nature since the 
2 fall of Adam has always been the same." Closely related to this criticism 
founded on the evidence of history was another which attacked the sentimental-
ist concept with the argument that, even in contemporary experience, the 
proposal of universal benevolence would not stand examination. A cogent and 
representative statement of this criticism is that of Henry Saint-John, Viscount 
Bolingbroke: "We were not of Council with the Eternal Wisdom, when he re-
solved to form the human System, and therefore cannot presume to say that 
any principle is innate, till we find by Observation that it is common to all men, 
and constant in its Operation. If it be not common to all men, " he continued, 
"if it doth not act upon some Occasions where it ought to act, good Sense will 
not let us attribute its Effects to an innate and fixed Principle. " Bolingbroke 
did not believe that benevolence was a universal instinct in the human species 
as the sentimentalists claimed. The record of human cruelty and barbarism, 
including such primitive practices as raising children for sacrificial slaughter, 
gladiatorism as a source of human amusement, and the long record of Christian 
carnage, extended in new and modified forms into his own time. And "an innate 
Principle" he concluded, "which is not universal is an Absurdity. " 3 
2Ibid. , 17 8. 
3Reflections Concerning Innate Moral Principles (London, 1752), 17-29. 
132 
This was a serious challenge to the validity of the whole moral sense con-
cept. The answer of the Scottish philosophers is the third principle that Jeffer-
son found attractive in the sentimentalist theory, and it provides an additional 
indication of his responsiveness to their philosophical guidance. 
The question that was debated is whether there is a faculty natural to man 
which persuades him to a life of morality and benevolence. And if it is held 
that there is such a moral sense, how can one account for the diversity of 
behavior that exists and that has always been a part of man's history. The 
sentimentalist philosophers had proposed the reality of the moral sense with 
its implication of natural benevolence. The cynics had countered that com-
passion was no more natural to man than cruelty. "The only innate Principle," 
Bolingbroke wrote, "and the main Spring of all our Movements is the Love of 
our Being, the Desire of Pleasure, Aversion to Pain. "4 There seemed to be no 
dearth of evidence to support his accusation. 
The Scots had little choice but to acknowledge man's historical record of 
inhumanity, but they argued that bad conduct is not evidence against the reality 
of the moral sense. Hutcheson, for example, declared that "the absurd 
Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men 
have no Reason than that they have no Moral Sense of Beauty in Actions. "S But 
this kind of answer was more of a protest than a satisfactory rebuttal to the 
challenge. The Scots were forced either to give a better account of the 
4Bolingbroke, Reflections, 33, 69. 
5Hutcheson, An Inquiry, 207-212. 
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diversity of moral behavior or abandon the concept of the moral sense. 
Of course, none of the sentimentalists, though they had proposed the 
universal existence of the moral sense as an innate faculty, had claimed that 
the good side of man would always prevail. All of them had acknowledged a 
diversity of human conduct and a diversity of moral principles. But thE:se 
diversities, they held, emerged from wrong judgment, from the confusion of 
real and apparent good. 
Shaftesbury proposed that man's behavior was influenced and governed by 
a mixture of affections or passions. These he categorized as the natural 
affections, which tended toward the public good, the self affections, which 
tended toward the private good, and the unnatural affections, which tended to 
be contrary to either public or private good. He believed that the majority of 
mankind are in their daily lives governed by a mixture of natural and self 
affections, each enjoying varying degrees of dominance in flux, and together 
producing a nature reflecting the relative ascendancey of these impulses. 6 He 
believed that for the majority of men the natural affections would predominate, 
but he also recognized that in some the self affections would be the stronger 
and that this condition would be reflected in a vicious nature. This would not 
indicate the absence of natural affections or of a moral sense, but rather an 
alteration, for one reason or another, of the usual mixture of man's natural 
inclinations. And, he noted, it would be impossible for these natural affections 
to be effaced "without much force and violence" or to be "struck out of the 
6shaftesbury, An Inquiry, 2 86. 
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natural temper, even by means of the most extravagant belief or opinion in the 
7 
world." 
It was those tendencies in a minority of men, or in an historically primitive 
context, that were contrary to the advantage of both the species in general and 
the creature in particular, that were so often used by the critics of the moral 
sense theory. Shaftesbury conceded that some men were governed by unnatural 
affections, and he was hard pressed to account for this while still retaining the 
basic thesis of a universal moral sense. 
History shows, he admitted, that "this has been the reigning passion of 
many tyrants and barbarous nations" and even in the present it "belongs in 
some degree to such tempers as have thrown off that courteousness of behaviour 
which retains in us a just reverence of mankind, and prevents the growth of 
harshness and brutality." 
Shaftesbury attempted to account for these moral perversions in two ways. 
There was first of all the possibility of mental imbalance. In these cases the 
moral sense is overruled by their insanity. But such a condition would account 
for only a small minority. By far the larger number of cases of unnatural 
affections could be attributed, according to Shaftesbury, to the lack of opportun-
ity for the development of the natural affections. The distempers of nature 
described above are almost always "peculiar to the more savage nations" and 
are "a plain characteristic of uncivilised manners and barbarity." These 
passions do not enter "where civility or affable manners have the least place." 
7Ibid.' 261. 
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There might be some undesirable traits in civilized man, but "such is the 
nature of what we call good breeding, that in the midst of many other corrup-
tions it admits not of inhumanity or savage pleasure. " 8 By introducing this 
explanation for some of the diversity of human behavior, in both an historical 
and geographical sense, Shaftesbury was attributing a developmental quality to 
the moral sense faculty. 
Hutcheson too acknowledged the diversity of human behavior, but, like 
Shaftesbury, argued that this did not invalidate the moral sense theory. He 
wrote that men frequently perform actions that tend toward their own harm, 
but that we do not from this infer that they are void of self .. love. · In the same 
sense, we should not infer that, because there are some actions performed 
which tend toward public harm, the performers are void either of a sense of 
morals or a desire for the public good. "And it is strange," he continued, 
"that Reason is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, 
ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in many Places, and yet absurd Practices, founded 
upon those very Opinions, shall seem an Argument against any moral Sense." 
To Hutcheson the matter was plain. Man's irregular behavior was caused 
either by his mistaken appraisal of the tendency of his actions, or by the 
victory of his violent passions over the voice within. But rather than destroy-
ing the theory of a moral sense faculty, this only proved "that sometimes there 
may be some more violent Motive to Action than a Sense of moral Good; or 
that Men, by Passions, may become blind even to their own Interest. " In other 
81bid. , 330-336. 
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words, Hutcheson did not believe that the critics had invalidated the moral 
sense theory. He did not believe that the universe was large enough, or the 
variety of character varied enough, to yield even a single person who was 
totally indifferent in regard to actions in interpersonal relationships. He wrote 
that the idea of a totally "ill-natur'd Villain" is incomprehensible. There 
were, no doubt, many instances of irregular behavior in man's record, but 
these were to be accounted for by reason of the perversion of his natural in-
clinations by religious or some other persuasion. Hutcheson believed that the 
crimes that fill history arise, not from malice or a delight in the misery of 
others, but rather from "an injudicious unreasonable Enthusiasm" for what is 
at best "some kind of limited Virtue. ,.9 
Of the three philosophers under study, it was Lord Kames who gave the 
most spirited defense of the moral sense theory against the attacks of the 
critics. They ask, he wrote, "why was not every man endued with so strong 
a sense of morality, as to be completely authoritative over all his principles 
of action, which would prevent much remorse to himself, and much mischief 
to others?" Their question was, of course, inspired by the reality of irregu-
lar behavior observed both historically and in their fellowman. Kames replied 
that to have so created man would have resulted in a species unknown to our 
experience. "To complain of a defect in the moral sense," he explained, 
"is to complain, that we are not perfect creatures. And if this complaint be 
well founded, we may, with equal justice, complain, that our understanding is 
9Hutcheson, An Inquiry, 196-212. 
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but moderate, and that, in general, our powers and faculties are limited. Why 
should it be urged as an objection, " he continued, "that the moral sense is 
imperfect, when all our senses, internal and external are imperfect? In short, 
if this complaint be, in any measure, just, it must go the length . . . to prove, 
that it is not consistent with the benevolence of the Deity, to create such a being 
as man. 1110 
This answer was again more of a protest than an explanation. Kames gave 
a much more satisfactory defense by proposing an evolutionary or develop-
mental capability for the moral sense faculty in man. It was his goal to show 
that the moral sense is natural, innate, and universal, but that it exists in 
varying degrees of development, and consequently authority, depending upon the 
experience of the subject observed. 
In "the original situation of mankind, 11 Kames proposed, "when the earth 
was uncultivated, and in a great measure barren," the necessities of life were 
scarce and difficult to obtain. Because of the very tenuous character of exist-
ence, man was rightly motivated by the principle of self-preservation. He was 
entitled to supply his needs in any way that he could without any condemnation 
from his moral sense. The competition for the means of sustaining life created 
perpetual discord, and it was the consequent barbarity that formed the human 
character. Man's most malevolent principles were encouraged. In this climate 
of primitive rudeness and illiteracy, man was governed by his most basic 
appetites, and thus his nature was inevitably cruel. 
1
°Kames, Essays, 377-378. 
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This was, according to Karnes, a portrait of primitive man in a "histori-
cal context and also of modern man in a primitive civilization." But this is not 
evidence that even the greatest of savages are destitute of the moral sense. 
"Their defect rather lies in the weakness of their general principles of action, 
which terminate in objects too complex for savages readily to comprehend." 
Rather than indicating an absence of an innate moral sense, their irregular 
behavior is the result of the lack of development of this faculty. 
This development of the moral sense in the human species was shown by 
Karnes to be recapitulated in the life of every individual. All men are governed 
by passions and appetites in their infancy, and it is only as they begin to form 
complex and general ideas that they begin to feel the urges of benevolent 
affections. "We acquire by degrees the taste of public good, and of being use-
ful in life. " As this occurs "the selfish passions are tamed and subdued, and 
the social affections gain the ascendant." 
Karnes conceived his larger task to be the analysis of human actions with 
th€ view of determining the "internal frame" from which comes human be-
havior, i.e. , the development of a psychology of human behavior. 11 In pur-
suing this task, he developed a rather elaborate, if mechanical, appraisal of 
human psychology. "Man is a complex machine," he discovered, "composed 
of various principles of motion, which may be conceived as so many springs and 
weights, counteracting and balancing one another. These being accurately 
11Kames, Sketches of the History of Man, New ed. (3 vols.; Edinburgh, 
1813), Ill, 103-109. 
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adjusted, the movement of life is beautiful, because regular and uniform. But 
if some springs or weights be withdrawn, those which remain, acting now with-
out opposition from their antagonist forces, ·will disorder the balance, and de-
range the whole machine. " Kames recognized that man is subject to contrary 
impulses, but believed that if there were a proper equilibrium between these 
impulses, the result would be an essentially moral being. On the other hand, 
if one of the "weig~ts" were removed, or if one of the "springs" were weak, 
and the essential equilibrium was thus disrupted, it would be reflected in 
inconstant and perverse conduct. As in the case of savage man, the moral 
sense would lack authority in such a case to overcome the imbalance and 
command obedience. 
Perverse behavior then does not reflect the absence of a moral sense, but 
rather, in the general scheme of human psychology, a relative weakness of that 
faculty in the situation where a disequilibrium of passions exists. Karnes 
always maintained that the moral sense is "rooted in the nature of man," but 
he also proposed that it could be significantly refined "by culture and education." 
This was an important point, and one that was especially appealing to Jefferson. 
Karnes believed that one of the great advantages of modern over primitive civili-
zation was in the opportunity for the development of the authority of the moral 
sense through education and imitation. This is not education in the normal 
sense, for Karnes constantly maintained that only the "shining light of intuition, " 
not reason, possessed authority in matters of moral perception. 12 He meant 
121bid.' 110, 164-165. 
140 
an "education" of the moral sense by its exposure to higher realms of moral 
activity and approbation. To illustrate he wrote that "the most polished 
nations differ only from savages in refinement of taste . . • . Hence it is, 
that many actions, which make little impression upon savages, appear to us 
elegant and beautiful." And, on the other hand, "actions, which give them no 
pain, raise in us aversion and disgust. " To illustrate this, he gave the ex-
ample of the treatment of prisoners. The savage, accustomed to acts of cruelty, 
would feel little or no aversion to putting an enemy to death in cold blood, 
whereas such an act would shock a more civilized person "to the highest de-
gree." This difference according to Kames, was simply a reflection of the 
difference of the refinement of their respective moral faculties. "The opera-
tions of the moral sense in a savage, bear no proportion to its operations in a 
person, who stands possessed of all the advantages which human nature is 
susceptible of by refined education." The refinement of the moral sense re-
sults in an ever stronger feeling of immorality on the occasion of every vicious 
action and in the end produces a more delicate and benevolent nature. 13 
Kames thus explained the diversity of human behavior as the result, not of 
the absence of a moral sense, but of varying degrees of development of that 
innate universal faculty. A limited development, due to the conditions of a 
primitive society, resulted in only limited authority over the natural passions. 
The educational and other advantages of a more advanced culture contributed 
to the refinement of the moral sense which would in turn overrule the basic 
13Kames, Essays, 138-147. 
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appetites and result in socially approved behavior. 
Jefferson too was forced to wrestle with the contradictions recognized by 
Bolingbroke and others. 14 He was too familiar with history to be blinded by a 
naive appraisal of human nature. He was aware of human weaknesses, and the 
record of the good nature of man having been undermined by various evil inc lin-
ations and temptations. But, like the Scots, Jefferson argued that this was not 
evidence against the existence of a moral sense. "Some men," he wrote, 
"are born without the organs of sight, or of hearing, or without hands. Yet it 
would be wrong to say that man is born without these faculties, and sight, 
hearing, and hands may with truth enter into the general definition of man." 
Likewise, by some unexplainable twist of nature, some men are born with such 
mental and moral defects as to render them different from the general species. 
But certainly "there is no rule without exceptions," he continued, and "it is 
false reasoning which converts exceptions into the general rule." Following 
Hutcheson, he believed that "the want or imperfection of the moral sense in 
some men, like the want or imperfection of the senses of sight and hearing in 
others, is no proof that it is a general characteristic of the species. "l5 But 
14Jefferson was probably introduced to Bolingbroke's writings while at the 
College of William and Mary. There are lengthy quotations from his "philosoph. 
works" in Jefferson's "Literary Bible," and he appears on the latter's recom-
mended reading lists as early as 1771 and as late as 1821. In addition Jefferson 
owned a copy of Reflections concerning innate moral Principles (1752) cited 
above, which was part of the collection sold to Congress. Sowerby, Catalogue, 
II, 4; TJ to Robert Skipwith, Aug. 3, 1771, Boyd Collection, I, 76-81; TJ to 
Francis Eppes, Jan. 19, 1821, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XV, 304-306. 
Also see Chapter 5 above. 
15TJ to Thomas Law, Esq. , June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
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these protests did not satisfactorily rebut the criticisms that had been leveled 
at the moral sense theory. Jefferson, like the Scottish writers, was forced to 
account for the diversity of moral behavior that existed among men. 
Like his Scottish mentors, he believed that human behavior was influenced 
by many different passions and affections, some of which tended toward the 
public good and some toward private interests, some benevolent and some 
selfish. And like them he believed that "the perfection of the moral character" 
was to be found in "a just equilibrium of all the passions. "16 The corollary to 
this is that irregular behavior is the result of an imbalance or disequilibrium of 
the natural passions. In those very rare cases where there appeared to be the 
want of a moral sense, or where it was so extremely weak as to seem essen-
tially inoperative, Jefferson believed that the defect could be alleviated or cor-
rected by education. By this he meant that, if the condition "is not too profound 
to be eradicated," appeals to reason or intelligent self-interest might convince 
those "so unhappily conformed" to do good and eschew evil. For example, he 
believed that moralists could demonstrate that honesty promotes self-interest 
in the long run, and preachers could make a strong appeal to their desire for 
divine rewards or fear of divine retribution. 17 This indicates Jefferson's 
belief that, though the moral sense is superior to reason in matters of moral 
judgment, reason will normally confirm the finding of the moral faculty. It also 
explains his description of religion as a "moral supplement" in his classification 
16TJ to John Adams, April 8, 1816, Ibid., 466-471. 
17TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Ibid., 138-144. 
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of ethical knowledge discussed earlier. 
In any event, the want of a moral sense would be very rarely encountered. 
The problem of diverse behavior among men stemmed not from the want, but 
rather the imperfection, of this innate monitor. Thus for Jefferson, as for 
Shaftesbury and the Scots, the problem of diverse behavior could be most 
effe~tively resolved by the attribution of a developmental quality to the moral 
sense. 
Hutcheson wrote that "as some others of our immediate poweJ~s are capable 
of culture and improvement, so is this moral sense. . . . As we improve and 
correct a low taste for harmony by enuring the ear to finer compositions; a low 
taste for beauty, by presenting the finer works, which yield a higher pleasure; 
so we improve our moral taste by presenting larger systems, to our mind. " 18 
Early in his adult life Jefferson copied a passage from Kames' Historical Law 
Tracts that said that "moral duties, originally weak and feeble, acquire great 
strength by refinement of manners. " 19 Jefferson wrote to his nephew, Peter 
Carr, that the moral sense "is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker 
degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may 
be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body." He 
cautioned his kin to "above all things lose no occasion of exercising your dis-
positions to be grateful, to be generous, to be charitable, to be humane, to be 
true, just, firm, orderly, couragious etc. Consider every act of this kind as 
1 ~utcheson, !: System of Moral Philosophy (1755), Reprints of Economic 
Classics (New York, 1968), 59-60. 
19In his Commonplace Book, 103. 
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an exercise which will strengthen your moral faculties, and increase your 
worth. "20 As early as 1771 he wrote that even the benevolent emotions aroused 
by reading fiction "is an exercise of our virtuous dispositions; and the disposi ·· 
tions of the mind, like limbs of the body, acquire strength by exercise." Such 
exercise, he continued, "produces a habit of thinking and acting virtuously. " 21 
He obviously believed that the moral sense could be developed by use, or 
"exercise. " 
Jefferson, like Lord Kames, recognized that an advanced culture encouraged 
the development of the nwral sense, and that so long as the progress of civili-
zation was diverse there would be diversity of moral judgments and behavior. 
He wrote that "men living in different countries, under different circumstances, 
different habits and regimes, may have different utilities; the same act, there-
fore may be [judged] useful and consequently virtuous in one country which is 
injurious and vicious in another differently circumstanced. " He believed that 
the development of the moral sense was directly responsive to the needs of a 
culture in its various stages of refinement. He rejected, for this reason, the 
arguments that there could be no moral sense unless its judgments were abso-
lute and universally consistent. 22 
Though ethical relativism in a trans -cultural context did not trouble 
20rJ to Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1787, Boyd Collection, XII, 14-19. 
21TJ to Robert Skipwith, Aug. 3, 1771, Ibid., 76-81. 
22TJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
XIV, 138-144. 
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Jefferson, the same concept in a trans-racial context posed a perplexing 
dilemma. Most of Jefferson's biographers have described the contradictions 
or confusion that exists in his statements about race, and the attendant subject 
of slavery. 23 There is clear evidence that he never totally resolved the con-
flict between his beliefs about human nature and his observations of what 
appeared to be racial differences. One of the sources of his mental dilemma 
is directly related to his belief in the universality of the moral sense. 
Jefferson's beliefs about race 'vvcrc shaped by both direct observation and 
studies of writings on the subject. He accepted the "scientific" concept of a 
single creation for the human species, and accounted for the physical and 
mental differences that he observed between white, red, and black men as 
representing "varieties" within the species. The variety within species con-
cept had already become an accepted principle in the taxonomy of animals. 
In describing racial differences, Jefferson constructed a racial hierarchy 
based on physical, mental, and moral criteria. On the basis of physical and 
mental endowments, he appears to have concluded that the American Indian 
occupied a position between the white and black races. Contrary to some Euro-
pean scientific opinion, the Indian was described by Jefferson as physically 
strong and sexually potent. He is brave, when bravery is called for; he endures 
23rhe most extensive treatments are Daniel Boorstin, Lost World, Chap. 2; 
Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 
1550-1812 (Baltimore, 1969), Chaps. 12-15; Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of 
Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian (Chapel Hill, 
1973), Chaps. 1-4; and Fawn M. Brodie, Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate 
History (New York, 1974), Chap. 30. 
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torture with firmness and meets death without fear. The Indian is affectionate 
to his family, to the point of extreme indulgence toward his children, and is 
strong and faithful in his friendships. Though they attempt to appear "superior 
to human events," they are in reality keenly sensitive. The Indian possesses 
a vivacity and activity of mind equal to that of the white man in the same situ-
ation. They have demonstrated artistic and oratorical talents that, though 
uncultivated, prove strong sentiment and elevated imagination. Taking all these 
things into consideration, Jefferson concluded that the American Indian is 
formed "in mind as well as in body" on the same principles as the white race. 
He indeed anticipated the early political amalgamation and eventual physical 
amalgamation of the red and white Americans into a single people. 
Using the same physical and mental criteria, Jefferson found that nature 
had made a greater distinction between white and black men than between white 
and red men. 24 The physical differences that he described, ranging from 
color to body odor, were, he said, "fixed in nature," and seemed to consign 
the Negro to the lowest realm within the species. One could easily deduce from 
his description in Notes ~the State gf Virginia that he found the natural Negroid 
features repugnant. He praised the superior beauty of both red and white and 
wrote that if "the circumstances of superior beauty, is thought worthy of 
attention in the propagation of our horses, dogs, and other domestic animals; 
why not in that of man?" He seemed to believe that the monotony of the Negro's 
24winthrop D. Jordan believes that "confronted by three races in America 
he (Jefferson] determinedly turned three into two by transforming the Indian into 
a degraded yet basically noble brand of white man." White Over Black, 477. 
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color matched what he suspected was a monotony of emotions behind their 
"immovable veil of black. " 
Jefferson conceded that the Negro was at least as brave as the white man, 
and probably even more adventuresome, but this, he wrote, probably proceeds 
"from a want of forethought, which prevents thej.r seeing a danger till it be 
present. " His appraisal of Negro sensibilities was in harmony with the pre-
vailing estimates of the eighteenth century. He believed that they were "more 
ardent after their female, " but that their love is more a sexual impulse than 
the "tender delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation" which characterizes 
the love between the male and female members of the white race. He said that 
the Negro is less sensitive to grief or affliction, and is able to soon forget both. 
"In general," he concluded, "their existence appears to participate more of 
sensation than reflection. " 
Turning to the mental faculties, Jefferson declared the Negro to be equal 
to the white in the power of memory, but much inferior in the powers of reason 
and imagination. The dullness of the latter faculty emphasized to him the 
inferiority of the Negro in comparison to the Indian. He had detected evidences 
of great imagination in the Indian which only awaited cultivation, but, he wrote, 
"never yet could I find that a black had uttered a thought above the level of plain 
narration; never saw even an elementary trait of painting or sculpture." He 
noted their reputation for musical gifts, but cautioned that "whether they will 
be equal to the composition of a more extensive run of melody, or of compli-
cated harmony, is yet to be proved. " He also noted that misery is often the 
inspiration for great poetry, but that though there is among the blacks misery 
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enough, there has been no poetry. 
Jefferson recognized that it would be unfair to make such comparisons 
between the white man and an African native who had never had the opportunities 
or inspiration of a civilized environment. But he denied that the same reasoning 
applied to a comparison of the white man and the American Negro. It would, of 
course, be proper to make allowances even in this case for differences in 
education and of the different spheres in which they moved. But having made 
this allowance the comparison was proper because, in the general sense, the 
American Negro walked "on the same stage with the whites." Jefferson be-
lieved that the mental disabilities of the American Negro as compared to the 
white man or the Indian resulted from nature rather than their circumstances. 
He offered two proofs. First, the slaves of the Romans were burdened by the 
same discouraging circumstances as the American slaves, yet the slaves in 
Rome were often their rarest artists because "they were of the race of whites." 
Second, every instance of the mixture of black and white in procreation has been 
observed to result in the improvement of the blacks in both body and mind, and 
this, he concluded, "proves that their inferiority is not the effect merely of 
their condition of life. "25 
It is clear that Jefferson believed the Negro, on the basis of both physical 
and mental criteria, to be inferior to both the white and red races of men. The 
slighter inferiority of the Indian to the white could be attributed to the lack of 
25 Jefferson, Notes, 56-64, 90, 132-138. 
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the opportunities of a more civilized environment. Given time, he believed 
that the Indian genius would equal that of the white man. But Jefferson could 
not be as generous in the case of the American Negroes. He was uneasy in his 
judgment of the latter. He admitted that it was hazardous to affirm their in-
herent inferiority in the faculties of reason and imagination. But his final 
judgment, couched in the protection of "suspicion," was that "the blacks, 
whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, 
are inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind. "26 
To have maintained this hierarchical pattern of relative strengths by a 
moral criterion would have conflicted in some degree with Jefferson's pro-
nouncements on the universality of the moral sense. Thus one finds that, as ,he 
turned to this criterion, the hierarchy gives way to an image of general equality 
in the power of moral perception. The Indians, he wrote, are able to live in a 
society without government, laws, or coercive power, controlled only by "their 
manners, and that moral sense of right and wrong, which, like the sense of 
tasting and feeling in every man, makes a part of his nature. " This easy com-
pliment reflects the eighteenth-century representation of the American Indian as 
the noble savage. 27 The more immediate and widespread contact between white 
261bid. ' 13 8. 
27Bernard W. Sheehan has noted that "the moral sense not only provided 
the basis on which white and Indian might come together but also, from the 
white man's point of view, put such relations in a moral context. The unity of 
mankind became more than a fact, it became a moral imperative." Seeds of 
Extinction, 2 8. 
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and black Americans along the eastern seaboard apparently necessitated, in 
Jefferson's mind, a fuller explanation. He wrote that though nature had been 
less bountiful to the Negro race in "the endowments of the Head," he believed 
that "in those of the heart she will be found to have done them justice." Per-
haps anticipating objections, he went on to explain that the apparent disposition 
to theft among the Negroes "must be ascribed to their situation, and not to any 
depravity of the moral sense. " 28 Their membership in a society whose laws 
of property were for the benefit of only the propertied race could hardly be 
expected to elicit a respect for property from those who had none. The basis 
of the law of equity is reciprocation of rights, he argued, and the denial of 
reciprocation is by common sense a just cause for a denial of the attendant 
standards of moral right and wrong. This, Jefferson concluded, "is neither 
new, nor peculiar to the color of the blacks." He noted that in spite of this 
circumstance "we find among them numerous instances of the most rigid integ-
rity, and as many as among their better instructed masters, of benevolence, 
gratitude, and unshaken fidelity." 
I think it is clear that if Jefferson had based his theories of race on physical 
and mental criteria only, his conclusions would not have been a matter of con-
fusion or doubt for either himself or his interpreters. But this was not the case. 
His psychology of human nature required consideration of the additional criter-
28As Winthrop D. Jordan has noted, Jefferson's divergent conclusions 
about environmental influence on the Negro's intellectual and moral strengths 
were consistent with his belief in the independence of the intellectual and 
moral faculties. White OVer Black, 439-440. 
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ion of moral sensitivity. And because this was true, he felt a very real 
reluctance to insist upon Negro inferiority when such a conclusion would not 
only imply the absenl:e of a moral faculty but would consequently "degrade a 
whole race of men from the rank in the scale of beings which their Creator may 
perhaps have given them. "29 He believed that the moral sense is as natural 
to the Negro as to any other race of men, and that it would be as universally 
evident if the proper encouragement and example were a part of their social 
environment. 
The equality of moral sensitivity notwithstanding, Jefferson could not afford 
the Negro equal citizenship in the new nation. The basis of his denialwas his 
judgment of their mental incapabilities, perhaps unconsciously reinforced by a 
personal revulsion to the physical features of their race. This seems to call 
into question the weight that he had professed to give to moral sensitivity as the 
29TJ to Chastellux, June 7, 1785, Boyd Collection, VIII, 184-186; TJ to 
Col. Benjamin Hawkins, Feb. 18, 1803, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, X, 
360-365; TJ to Gov. William H. Harrison, Feb. 27, 1803, Ibid., 368-373; 
TJ to Baron Alexander Von Humboldt, Dec. 6, 1813, Ibid., XIV, 20-25. Daniel 
J. Boorstin believes that Jefferson "was not sure enough of the irrelevance of 
the Negro's color to assign him the same ancient parents as the white man; 
yet he was too much of an equalitarian to suggest that the Negro might have been 
created a distinct species." Lost World, 93. Erik H. Erikson attributes 
Jefferson's "passionate and diffident attempts to liberate himself from prejudices 
then apparently vindicated by the knowledge available to him and yet experienced 
as a human tragedy" to the psychological concept of pseudospeciation, i.e., 
that in the formulation of a new identity for America it was necessary to demon-
strate the superiority of his own species. "At that time he seems to have 
needed for his new consciousness the certainty that white is beautiful, and that 
the nobility of emotion he saw in the white face guaranteed both moral power 
and restraint in the usurpation of power." Dimensions of a New Identity: The 
1973 jefferson Lectures in the Humanities (New York, 19'74), 27-28, 113. -
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prime attribute of a social being. But Jefferson believed that an educated cit-
izenry was essential to the success of democratic government. If the blacks 
were inherently incapable of becoming educated, they could never make good 
citizens. Jefferson had anticipated criticism of his "liberal" views on slavery 
contained in the Notes, but his widely read remarks about the Negroes elicited 
the most spirited criticism from defenders of the black race. He reluctantly 
answered at least some of those who took public issue with his views. His 
replies were consistently couched in terms of a hope that time would prove him 
wrong. "Nobody wishes more than I do," he wrote, "to see . . . proofs • . 
. that nature has given to our black brethren, talents equal to those of the other 
colors of men, and that the appearance of a want of them is owing merely to the 
degraded condition of their existence, both in Africa and America. I can add 
with truth," he continued in a statement that confirmed his contrary belief, 
"that nobody wishes more ardently to see a good system commenced for raising 
the condition both of their body and mind to what it ought to be, as fast as the 
imbecility of their present existence, and other circumstances which cannot be 
neglected, will admit. " Almost two decades later he was protesting in the 
same vein. "Be assured that no person living wishes more sincerely than I do, 
to see a complete refutation of the doubts I have myself entertained and expressed 
on the grade of understanding allotted to them by nature, and to find that in this 
respect they are on a par with ourselves." Both of these letters were later 
described by Jefferson as "soft answers" intended to conceal the harshness of 
his convictions. Obviously the passage of time had not brought any evidence to 
change his mind since he had so definitively outlined his beliefs in the Notes. 
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Jefferson, in the early 1780s believed that the mental inferiority of the Negro 
was a powerful obstacle to the abolition of slavery. Though he recognized other 
obstacles more closely related to the economic fortunes and fears of the so nth-
ern aristocracy, his judgment of the understanding given to the Negro by nature 
remained for him, despite his protestations, an undeniable argument against 
full citizenship. And despite his oft repeated affirmation of moral sensitivity 
as the prime qualification for a harmonious society, in the case of the American 
Negro, this quality was of insufficient import to overcome the other disability. 30 
His doubts about the Negro race notwithstanding, the developmental quality 
of the moral sense was an important part of the foundation of Jefferson's gen-
eral optimism about the future and the progress of the human race. Though he 
should not be labeled an eternal optimist, he believed that the historical record 
demonstrated a general strengthening of the moral sense which was reflected 
in 'the progressive growth of benevolence in human affairs. There were moments 
of discouragement when the contemporary record seemed to expose man as the 
"only animal which devours his own kind," and when "civilization seems to have 
no other effect on him than to teach him to pursue the principle of bellum 
onmium in omnia. " 31 But on the whole, there was considerable improvement, 
30yJ to Benjamin Banneker, Aug. 30, 1791, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
VIII, 241-242; TJ to M. Henri Gregoire, Feb. 25, 1809, Ibid., XII, 254-255; 
TJ to Joel Barlow, Oct. 8, 1809, Ibid., 321-323. 
31TJ to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, Boyd Collection, XI, 48-50; 
TJ to James Madison, Jan. 1, 1797, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, IX, 357-360. 
Boorstin, as well as others, focuses upon these statements to prove Jefferson's 
uncomplimentary view of human nature. Lost World, 173-179. I believe that 
such emphasis is in error, simply because it ignores the far greater testimony 
in favor of a contrasting conclusion. 
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and not only did he affirm at age seventy-three and again at eighty-two that he 
would agree to live his years over, but hinted that he would like to be able to 
return from the grave once in awhile "to see how things have gone on. " 32 
Jefferson believed that the general improvement in human nature was 
evident in a growing harmony in interpersonal and international relations. In 
one debate with the more sceptical John Adams he went so far as to declare that 
no definite limits could be assigned to this progress. 33 Kames wrote that the 
so-called law of nations is "no other but gradual refinements of the original 
law of nature, accommodating itself to the improved state of mankind. The law 
of nature, which is the law of our nature, cannot be stationary. It must vary 
with the nature of man, and consequently refine gradually as nature refines." 
In illustration he wrote at some length about how the treatment of prisoners of 
war had become more humane in modern times. "Putting an enemy to death in 
cold blood," he wrote, "is now looked uponr-with distaste and horror, and there-
fore as immoral; tho' it was not always so in the same degree." When Jefferson 
read this, he paused to write in the margins of the appropriate pages: 
this is a remarkeable instance of improvement in the moral sense. the 
putting to death captives in war was a general practice among savage 
nations. when men became more humanized the captive was indulged with 
life on condition of holding it in perpetual slavery; a condition exacted on 
this supposition, that the victor had right to take his life, and consequently 
to commute it for his services. at this stage of refinement were the Greeks 
about the time of the Trojan war. at this day it is perceived we have no 
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32TJ to John Adams, April 8, 1816, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XIV, 466-
471; TJ to Abigail Adams, Jan. 11, 1817, Ibid., XV, 95-97; TJ to addressee 
unknown, Dec. 18, 1825, Ibid., XVI, 139-140. 
33-rJ to John Adams, June 15, 1813, Ibid. , XIII, 252-256. 
right to take the life of an enemy unless where our own preservation renders 
it necessary. but the ceding of his life in commutation for service admits 
there was no necessity to take it, because you have not done it. and if there 
was neither necessity nor right to take his life then is there no right to his 
service in commutation for it. this doctrine is a.:knowledged by later 
writers, Montesquieu, Burlamaqui, etc. who yet suppose it just to require 
a ransom from the captive. one advance further in refinement will 
relinquish this also. if we have no right to the life of a captive, we have 
no right to his labor; if none to his labor we have none to his absent property 
which is but the fruit of that labor. in fact, ransom is but commutation in 
another form. 34 
In a letter to Patrick Henry regarding the treatment of British prisoners during 
the Revolution, he repeated Kames' thesis when he wrote that "the practice . 
. . of modern nations of treating captive enemies with politeness and generos-
ity is not only delightful in contemplation but really interesting to all the world. " 35 
One further example of Jefferson's belief in the progressive refinement of 
human nature is to be found in his contribution to the revisal of the Virginia 
laws in the late 1770s. He told his old mentor, George Wythe, one of the mem-
bers of the legislative committee that was charged with the task of revision, 
that he disliked the inclusion of the doctrine of lex talionis because, though it 
was a restitution of the common law, it "will be revolting to the humanised 
feelings of modern times. " 36 
For Jefferson, as for the Scottish writers, the attribution of a develop-
mental nature to the moral sense provided a resolution of the problems that 
34Kames, Essays, 147-149. See Jefferson's personal copy in Rare Book 
Collection, Library of Congress. 
35TJ to Patrick Henry, March 27, 1779, Boyd Collection, II, 242. 
36TJ to George Wythe, Nov. 1, 1778, Ibid., 230. 
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arose from the acknowledgement of diverse moral behavior patterns. It allowed 
him to maintain a steadfast faith in the concept of the moral sense as a universal 
human faculty which, with a strength corresponding to the degree of its devel-
opment, urged man to an increasingly benevolent and humane pattern of exist-
ence. It seems clear that he embraced the theory of the moral sense in the 
specific terms that were proposed by the Scottish sentimentalist philosophers. 
It seems clear also that this was not a case of his having simply accepted the 
conclusions of a popular philosophy, but rather of his having studied and 
followed closely both the basic meaning and development of the theory. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DESTINED FOR SOCIETY 
The final idea of the Scottish sentimentalists that Jefferson embraced was 
one that had experienced considerable refinement between Shaftesbury and 
Lord Kames. Shaftesbury wrote that man's nature, and his ideas of morality, 
were shaped by his membership in the species system to which he belonged and 
ultimately to the universal system of all things. Inherent in this philosophy was 
the notion that man's natural affections, even the self-affections, tend toward 
the good of the species. He wrote that the wisdom of Nature "has made it to be 
according to the private interest and good of every one to work towards the 
general good, which if a creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far 
wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own happiness and welfare." Man 
cannot, in other words, "be good or useful to himself than as he continues good 
to society, and to that whole of which he is himself a part." When man's 
natural constitution is impaired or disordered the result is personal torment. 
Likewise in the case of society, if the people collectively depart from Nature 
the result will be social misery. Thus moral virtue, "which of all excellences 
and beauties is the chief and most amiable; that which is the prop and ornament 
of human affairs; which upholds communities, maintains union, friendship, and 
correspondence amongst men; that by which countries, as well as private fam-
Hies, flourish and are happy, and for want of which everything comely, con-
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spicuous, great, and worthy, must perish and go to ruin; that single quality, 
thus beneficial to all society, and to mankind in general is found equally a 
happiness and good to each creature in particular, and is that by which alone 
man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable." Shaftesbury's 
conclusion was that "virtue is the good, and vice the ill of every one. " 1 
The seed idea contained in this philosophy is that the moral sense as a 
powerful component of individual human nature is the foundation of a harmon-
ious society. This idea was given considerable refinement by Hutcheson and 
Kames, culminating in the latter's belief that the primary object of the moral 
sense is to fit man to live in society. 2 
Hutcheson, once again expanding on an idea suggested by Shaftesbury, 
described man's natural benevolence as "the Foundation of all apprehended 
Excellence in social Virtues." He said that any controversy about any practice 
could be settled by simply inquiring whether this certain conduct or the con• 
trary will most effectually promote the public good. In other words, morality 
is determined by the tendency or influence of the action "upon the universal 
natural Good of Mankind. " That kind of action "which produces more Good 
than Evil in the Whole, is acknowledg'd Good; and what does not, is counted 
Evil. " The morality of the actor, he concluded, is determined by how well he 
1Shaftesbury, An Inquiry, 337-338. 
2 Louis Schneider has noted that the Scottish moralists "frequently engaged 
in what one may call gifted social-psychologizing, talented if not very system-
atic reflection about man as being endowed with certain traits who is constrained 
to operate within a social order." The Scottish Moralists on Human Nature and 
Society (Chicago, 1967), xvi. 
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makes "a Part of the great System. " 3 
Having concluded that the morality of an action is determined by its 
tendency toward the public good, Hutcheson proceeded to develop a calculus of 
morality by which one could judge between several actions, all of which to 
some degree met this criterion. He wrote that in comparing the moral quality 
of given actions to find which of them has the greatest moral excellency, and 
thus to help us choose the proper action, the moral sense leads us to judge that 
the virtue of an action is in proportion to the number of persons to whom hap-
piness shall be extended. The obvious conclusion for Hutcheson was that 
"that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest 
Numbers: and that, worst, which in like manner, occasions Misery." In those 
instances "when the Consequences of Actions are of a mix'd Nature, partly 
Advantageous, and partly Pernicious; that Action is good, whose good Effects 
preponderate the evil, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and that, 
evil, which is otherwise." Hutcheson's calculus of morality employed formu-
las to measure such variables as self-interest vs. public interest, degree of 
good vs. degree of evil, ability, intention, etc. But when the final calculations 
were made, "what then properly constitutes a virtuous Character, is not some 
few accidental Motions of Compassion, natural Affection, or Gratitude; but such 
a fix'd Humanity, or Desire of the publick Good of all, to whom our Influence 
can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of Beneficence, according to our 
utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interests of others: and a strong 
3Hutcheson., An Inquiry, 165-166. 
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Benevolence will not fail to make us careful of informing our selves right, 
concerning the truest Methods of serving the Interests of Mankind." From all 
these observations, Hutcheson concluded that the moral sense would recommend 
as most virtuous those actions that extend the greatest happiness to all those 
whom their influence can reach. 4 
In concluding that benevolence was the foundations of the moral sense, and 
that all actions could be judged morally good only so far as they were useful to 
the public good, Hutcheson was amplifying what Shaftesbury had only suggested; 
i.e. , that the moral sense is the foundation of a harmonious society. 
While both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson praised the moral sense for its 
support of benevolence, and alluded to social criteria as the measure of human 
behavior, it was Lord K..ames who added the final refinement of this theme by 
proclaiming that indeed the divine purpose of the moral sense faculty is to 
prepare men to live in society. Nowhere is Kames's influence ·on Jefferson 
clearer than in the latter's acceptance of this idea. Very early in his career 
Jefferson noted Kames's study of human nature as a foundation for a philosophy 
of law, and he copied in his commonplace book the Scottish jurist's observation 
in Historical Law Tracts that "man, by his nature is fitted for society, and 
society by it's conveniences is fitted for man. ,S Within a few years this state-
ment defined the sociological dimension of Jefferson's theory of government. 
Kames began with the proposition that man is prepared by "the constitution 
4Ibid. , 177-191. 
Scommonplace Book, p. 107. 
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both of his body and mind" to live in society. He asserted that this is indeed 
the end for which man is designed by the auth<;>r of human nature. The human 
relationships imposed by the social existence obviously depend on the faithful 
observance of certain duties and conventions if it is to be a harmonious society. 
Among these duties are fidelity to promises, respect for property, reciproca-
tion of favors, etc. Seeing then that fidelity to duties and conventions are 
necessary to a harmonious society, can it be that man's reason is sufficient 
foundation on which to erect a society? The Scot's answer was an emphatic 
no. Since man is evidently intended to live in society, and since mutual 
sympathy and trust are necessary to that condition, nothing in man, he declared, 
could be more finely adjusted than the natural affections to answer these 
purposes. 6 It may be gathered from the study of human nature, he concluded, 
that "that nature, which designed us for society, has connected us strongly 
together, by a participation of the joys and miseries of our fellow creatures." 
Sympathy, trust, compassion, and all the other components of a benevolent 
nature such as are approved by the moral sense -- these are "the great cement 
of human society. "7 Kames believed that it would be very strange indeed if 
man had been made by nature for society, and not possess within his very nature 
some impulse that would excite him and prepare him for that experience. 
If we are fitted by our nature for society; if pity, benevolence, friendship, 
love, the general dislike of solitude, and desire for company, are natural 
6Kames, Essays, 67. 
7Ibid. ' 16-17. 
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affections, all of them conducive to society, it would be strange if there 
should be no natural affections, no preparation of faculties, to direct us to 
do justice, which is so essential to society. But nature has not failed us 
here, more than in the other parts of our constitution. We have a feeling 
of property; we have a feeling of obligation to perform our engagements; 
and we have a feeling of wrong in encroaching upon property, and in being 
untrue to our engagements. Society could not subsist without these 
affections, more than it could subsist without the social affections properly 
so called. We have reason, a priori, to conclude equally in favour of 
both, and we find, upon examiiiation, our conclusion to be just. 8 
Kames rejected the Hobbesian thesis that the state of nature is a state of 
war because he rejected the notion "that man, by nature, is a wild and rapacious 
animal." He also rejected the attendant thesis that moral systems are nothing 
more than unnatural artificial creations of modern societies. 9 He believed 
rather that man is intended to live in societies, and that the author of human 
nature has planted within him an instinct, an impulse, a moral sense, that 
shaped the social affections and thereby created the possibility of communal 
harmony. 
It seems clear that Jefferson encountered Kames' basic thesis, that man 
is by nature fitted for society, while he was studying law at Williamsburg. His 
correspondence shows beyond doubt that it came to be for him a basic article of 
faith. He believed that man was created to be a social being, and that the 
Creator had carefully and deliberately implanted within his nature the qualifying 
dispositions for that role. Indeed he believed that the goal of a harmonious 
society was the divine foundation underlying human morality. 
8Ibid., 41, 117-119. 
9Ibid. ' 136-137. 
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"Man was destined for society, " he wrote to his young nephew in 17 87. 
"His morality therefore was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with 
a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. " 10 He believed that God 
has "formed us moral agents" for the specific purpose "that we may promote 
the happiness of those with whom He has placed us in society, by acting honest-
ly towards all, benevolently to those who fall within our way, respecting 
sacredly their rights, bodily and mental, and cherishing especially their free-
dom of conscience, as we value our own. " 11 Like Kames he believed that a 
society could not exist without a basic trust in the fidelity of the members to 
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certain conventions, especially justice. "Man was created for social intercourse," 
he wrote to a close friend, "but social intercourse C<:lnnot be maintained with-
out a sense of justice," Therefore, he continued, "man must have been 
created with a sense of justice. " 12 These inextricably related ideas, that God 
has created man to live in society and that He has deliberately shaped his 
nature for that purpose, form a constant theme in Jefferson's thought through-
out his adult life. It is a theme that is summed up in his declaration that "the 
Creator would indeed have been a bungling artist, had he intended man for a 
social animal, without planting in him social dispositions. " 13 
10-rJ to Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1787, Boyd Collection, XII, 14-19. 
llTJ to Miles King, Sep. 26, 1814, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XIV, 
196-198. 
12TJ to Francis W. Gilmer, June 7, 1816, Ibid., XV, 23-26. 
13-rJ to Thomas Law, Esq., June 13, 1814, Ibid., XIV, 138-144. 
The channel through which this divine plan was implemented was, Jefferson 
believed, the moral sense, that innate faculty that is "as much a part o_f our 
constitution as that of feeling, seeing, or hearing; ~ 2 wise creator ~ have 
~to be necessary in an animal destined to live in society. " 14 As the moral 
sense was the monitor of virtue within the individual, and thus the key to human 
happiness, it was collectively the monitor of virtue in society, and thus the key 
to social harmony. Just as individual morality was too important to entrust to 
reason, social harmony was too important to be founded upon man's rational 
faculty, and in the ,ivine plan it too was assigned to the sentimental faculty. 
"The practice of morality being necessary for the well-being of society, " 
Jefferson wrote, "[God] has taken care to impress its precepts so indelibly on 
our hearts that they shall not be effaced by the subtleties of our brain. ,lS 
Though Jefferson's faith may have won more general acceptance with the 
passage of time, it was based upon suppositions about human nature that were 
highly questionable to many of those who were engaged in the development of an 
American philosophy of government during the last three decades of the eight-
eenth century. And it was their doubts about human nature that inspired their 
fears of an anarchic tendency in democracy, and their consequent attempts to 
design safeguards for the government against the turbulence inherent in demo-
cratic passions. Jefferson accurately described this tension among the founding 
fathers as arising from the belief on the part of some that governmental power 
1~1 to John Adams, Oct. 14, 1816, Ibid., XV, 73-81. [Italics mine]. 
l~J to james Fishbeck, Sep. 27, 1809, Ibid., XII, 314-316. 
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should be exercised by an elite class in order to insure an orderly society, and 
those on the other hand who rtad confidence in the people as a whole and be-
lieved that they were the only safe depository of power. 16 
This relationship between theories of human nature and theories of the 
nature and function of government is a commonplace consideration in twentieth 
century political thought. Political scientists generally agree that most political 
ideas are grounded on some particular conception of human nature. 17 The 
central question which shapes contemporary political ideas is the same one that 
was so obviously at the forefront of the debate among the founding fathers in 
eighteenth century America. Cast in its simplest terms, it asks whether man 
is naturally benevolent, and therefore inclined toward a harmonious social 
existence; or selfish and naturally disorderly, and thus ill-equipped for fashion-
ing a harmonious community. If the optimistic view is accepted, human nature 
itself is seen as the basic source of social order. If the more pessimistic view 
is accepted, then one must look to some external source by which the disorderly 
tendency can be counteracted and order imposed. Political ideas shaped by the 
optimistic view, usually called "liberal," tend to stress less the regulatory 
function of government and to anticipate orderly amendment of its basic premises. 
Political ideas that rest on the pessimistic view of human nature, usually called 
16TJ to Henry Lee, Aug. 10, 1824, Ibid. , XVI, 73-74. 
17This discussion of contemporary political thought follows generally the 
survey by Glenn Tinder, Political Thinking: The Perennial Questions, 2nd ed. 
(Boston, 1974), 4, 21-29, 76-78. 
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"conservative," tend to emphasize strong and highly centralized political 
authority and a cautious approach to change. Few of the optimists, however, 
extend their confidence in human goodness to the point of advocating the abolish-
ment of government. The liberals hold that man is good, but not perfect. They 
believe that human nature contributes to order in society, but that it is not in 
itself sufficient for social integration. They believe that social relationships 
should be regulated by a combination of natural inclinations and the limited 
exercise of governmental power. Even so, their beliefs contrast sharply with 
the conservative view that man is irremediably disorderly and that there are no 
natural inclinations with sufficient authority to insure harmonious social 
relations. These are not definitive descriptions of liberal and conservative 
political theories, but they illustrate the kind of ideas that are implicitly or 
explicitly a part of almost every political scheme. 
The question of whether social harmony or estrangement is more natural 
to man has a long history. It was a subject of concern to the classical philoso-
phers of Greece and Rome, and medieval philosophers from Augustine to 
Aquinas. Modern political theorists have had to take into consideration the 
Freudian attack on the concept of rational man. Freud's description of the 
basic nature of man calls into question previous political social theories, 
especially those posited on the concept of rational or benevolent man, and 
indeed offers a good degree of credibility to the general psychological premises 
of Hobbes, Burke, Hamilton, etc. His study led him to the conclusion that 
society and its coercive agent, government, would always be alien to the psycho-
logical nature of man. He wrote that societies and governments were both 
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artificial contrivances created to oppose the anarchy inherent in the freedom of 
the individual following his natural instincts and passions. This means that the 
· advance of civilization, as represented in the development of societies, has been 
achieved by the suppression or repression of powerful instincts basic to man's 
nature. He found that "men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and 
who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the 
contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a 
powerful share of aggressiveness." This means that as far as social relations 
are concerned, "their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sex-
ual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on 
him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually 
without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him 
pain, to torture and to kill him." Ordinarily this cruel aggressiveness is sub-
limated or directed at some relatively harmless purpose, but "in circumstances 
that are favourable to it, when the mental counter-forces which ordinarily 
inhibit it are out of action, it also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man 
as a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is something 
alien." Unlike the behavioral psychologists who would follow, Freud said that 
man's aggressiveness is "an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in 
man" rather than the result of experience. Society then exists only by the 
. .,. 
frustration of individual instincts, a---condition that is never totally and perman-
ently achieved. Freud warned that "in consequence of this primary mutual 
hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with dis-
integration." There is no natural bond with sufficient authority to overrule the 
instinctual passions. Therefore there must be an external authority to suppress 
man's natural aggressive forces. He said that the great task of civilization is 
to find a way to set limits to man's aggressive instincts without, if possible, 
compounding the neuroses that are caused by their cultural frustration. "One 
of the problems that touches the fate of humanity, 11 he wrote, "is whether such 
an accommodation can be reached by means of some particular form of civili-
zation or whether this conflict is irreconcilable. " Freud was not optimistic 
about the possibility of finding such an accommodation because the command to 
"love thy neighbor, 11 necessary to a harmonious society, is psychologically 
impossible in human nature. 18 According to one writer, it is that aspect of 
Freud's thought that holds that "the insatiability of man's drives produces in-
securities so deep that only social coercions can provide relief, 11 that has had 
the greatest effect on modern political thinking. 19 
Freud's revisionists have tended to be a bit more optimistic about the 
possibility of reconciling the conflict between cultural demands and individual 
instincts. They also have given more of their attention to the urgent relationship 
between psychology and political and social philosophies. Though they agree 
with Freud that the free gratification of man's instinctual needs is incompatible 
with civilized society, they propose diversion as preferable to repression of 
instinctual energy. They also tend to see man's behavior as the result of the 
18sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. by James Strachey 
(New York, 1961), 42-44, 56-69, 90. 
19paul Roazen, Freud: Political and Social Thought (New York, 1968), 
250-255. 
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interaction between psychological and sociological factors, and his psyche as 
the product of cultural as well as biological factors. Both disciples of Freud 
and his revisionists reject the notion of a moral world order. In Freud's words, 
"ethics are a kind of highway code for traffic among mankind." Ethical systems 
are ·simply fabrications of man "not based on an eternal world order but on the 
inescapable exigencies of human cohabitation. "20 
Most modern political theorists, though certainly not all, have rejected the 
notion that social estrangement is inherent in the nature of man, but they have 
had to account in other ways for the undeniable conflict that has constantly been 
a part of man's social history. Explanations of unseemly behavior have placed 
blame on divergent causes from Adam's sin to socio-economic imbalances, with 
consequent theories of the function of government ranging from rigid control 
to support of the human quest for an earthly paradise. 
Though the influence of theories of human nature on political theory has 
thus been constant through history, there have been few if any times when this 
question has been more intensely debated than during the eighteenth century. 
The confluence of social and political change with Enlightenment ideas about the 
nature of man stimulated new thinking about political theory and institutions. 
And because of the peculiar task in which they were engaged, the question 
assumed a unique urgency for the founding fathers. Their debate was solidly in 
20rJerbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into 
Freud (Boston, 1966), 3-5, 48, 153-155; Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom 
(New York, 1941), viii, 3-19; Psychoanalysis and Faith: The LetterS of 
Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister, ed. by Heinrich Meng· and Ernst L. Freud 
and trans. by Eric Mosbacher (New York, 1963), 123-129. 
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the historical tradition outlined above and specifically in the tradition of a 
particular phase of that debate begun a century before and continuing with 
increasing intensity through what R. R. Palmer has called The Age of the 
Democratic Revolution. 
This latter phase was introduced by the publication of Thomas Hobbes' 
Leviathan after the English civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century. Hobbes, 
spoke directly to the question. He described the "generall inclination of all 
mankind" as "a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that 
ceaseth onely in Death." In consequence of this inclination, so long as men 
"live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition 
which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every 
man. " Having recognized this condition, "the finall Cause, End, or Designe 
of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others, ) in the intro-
duction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in 
Common -wealths, ) is the foresight of their own preservations, and of a more 
contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that 
miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent • . • to the 
naturall Passions of men." Hobbes believed that communities are simply 
groups of egotistical individuals who are united only in a geographical sense. 
He also believed that social virtues, such as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, 
are totally contrary to man's natural passions, and that in "the condition of 
meer Nature," private appetite is the sole measure of good and evil. If social 
virtues are necessary to society, then they must be imposed by "the terrour of 
some Power" with sufficient authority to overrule the natural inclinations. This 
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power, according to Hobbes, was properly and necessarily invested in govern-
21 
ment. 
Most of the censure directed at Leviathan resulted from Hobbes' "violation 
of the accepted norms of political theory construction, " i.e. , that political 
theory should be based on general characteristics of civilized people. But this 
was at the heart of Hobbes' political philosophy. The philosophy of human 
nature that underlay his political theory gave little credence to the authority of 
man's "civilized nature." His basic assumption was that man is an apolitical 
being, that he is not fitted by nature for society, and that even continual school-
ing in the rudiments of civility can never transform him into a social animal. 
Society is nothing more than a contrivance with no natural dependency among its 
members that might blend the parts into a whole. He really believed that Euro-
pean civilized Christians were but little removed from the nasty and brutish 
state of savagery, and that their civilization was therefore a very fragile creation. 
Hobbes' almost Calvinistic emphasis on man's wickedness led him to a political 
theory in which the function of government was to subdue man's asocial inclin-
ations. Even so, he recognized that these inclinations could only be suppressed 
at best, and that his political order, "for all its compelling necessity, remained 
an alien presence, limited to playing upon the 'outside' of man." Because of 
man's natural egotism, government would always remain alien to his inner 
nature, but at the same time absolutely essential to a harmonious society. 22 
21Leviathan, 75, 96, 122, 128. 
22Richard Ashcraft, "Leviathan Triumphant: Thomas Hobbes and the 
Politics of Wild Men," The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from 
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The Hobbesian portrait of man, which Jefferson later described as a 
"humiliation of human nature, " and his political theories elicited many direct 
responses from outraged Englishmen who assaulted Leviathan in the defense of 
liberty, religion, tradition, and civilized man. The response most familiar to 
Americans was the indirect one that appeared in John Locke's political treatises 
written four decades after the appearance of Leviathan. The point of basic dis-
agreement between Hobbes and Locke, of course, concerns the extent of author-
ity to be given to government. Hobbes gave absolute power, whereas Locke 
insisted on limitations. What might be overlooked in this divergence of opinion 
is the role of their conceptions of human nature in shaping their ideas of the 
character and function of government. As has been shown above, Hobbes held 
an extremely pessimistic view of natural human inclinations, and consequently 
thought of government in terms of the necessity of absolute and irresistible 
power for the necessary regulation of human behavior. Locke held a more 
optimistic view of man, though certainly not a utopian one, and consequently 
described the regulatory function of government in different terms. The liberal 
case against political authority was an indictment, not of political authority in 
general, but of "authority personified and personalized." Locke substituted 
for the traditional model of society sustained by authority vested in a political 
center, a conception of self-sustaining society capable of self-direction. This 
view paved the way for the "socialization" of authority and as a result a new 
the Renaissance to Romanticism, ed. by Edward Dudley and Maximillian E. 
Novak (Pittsburgh, 1972), 163-164; Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: 
Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), 272-275. 
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definition of the character and function of political institutions. 2 3 
Locke believed that social relations are shaped largely by man's economic 
desires and expectations, and that the function of government is simply to 
provide the opportunity for free economic intercourse and to act as arbiter 
through the application of laws "received and allowed by common consent to be 
the standard of right and wrong." The restraint on individual liberty necessary 
to this function is inoffensive because impersonal. Government is not thus 
alien to man's nature, but is "the soul that gives form, life, and unity to the 
commonwealth. " 
The underlying assumption in this political theory is that man is capable of 
not only creating such a government; but of also exercising supervision and 
control of its operations to the end that it remains faithful to the collective will. 
Locke acknowledged the role of bias and ignorance in human judgment, but he 
believed that in the long run men could be trusted to judge correctly in public 
matters through the expression of the collective will. This faith in the people 
as self-governors rested on the belief that the majority of men are naturally 
amenable rather than hostile toward one another. 24 
A belief in the natural goodness of man gathered momentum steadily during 
the course of the eighteenth century and "became the common property of nearly 
23wolin, Politics and Vision, 293-309, 346-347. 
24John Locke, Two Treatises~ Civil Government: An Essay Concerning 
the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government (London, 1887), 256-259, 
301-320; !: Letter Concerning Toleration, Vol. 35: Great Books of the Western 
World, ed. by Robert M. Hutcheson (Chicago, 1952), 3. 
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every political critic. " 25 In spite of this trend, the debate over the nature of 
man and its relation to political theory was perhaps even more intense during 
the Jeffersonian era. The French Revolution elevated to a new intensity the 
debate over man's qualifications for self-government. To Jefferson and Adams, 
it confirmed that theirs was an "age of experiments in government" that had 
begun in America in the previous decade. 26 Jefferson was a personal (and 
involved) witness to the events leading to the outbreak of revolution in July 17 89. 
He offered friendly counsel and encouragement to Lafayette and the Patriot Party 
which tried after the opening of the Estates General in May to affect peaceful 
constitutional reform. He attended the meetings of the National Assembly 
almost daily from June to September and, in spite of his frequently voiced 
. 
desire to return home, wrote that "this scene is too interesting to be left at 
present. " Throughout the summer and fall he frequently expressed the belief 
that the revolution was proceeding quietly and steadily; that "the nation is in a 
movement which cannot be stopped." Jefferson believed that the Patriot Party, 
using America as its model, would be able to guide the movement past any 
temporary irregularities or interruptions. He believed it to be a revolution 
that would furnish material for a new chapter in the work of Montesquieu. 
Perhaps he saw an extension of his own influence in the Declaration of the Rights 
25Geoffrey Smycos, "The Wild Man's Return: The Enclosed Vision of 
Rousseau's Discourses," The Wild Man Within, ed. by Dudley and Novak, 229-
230. Howard Mumford Jones notes the emergence of a "Pre-romanticjsm" in 
eighteenth century literature reflecting the development of a movement of sensi-
and sentimentalism. Revolution and Romanticism (Cambridge, 1974), 2, 81-115. 
2~J to John Adams, Feb. 28, 1796, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, ed. by 
Cappon, 259-260; John Adams to TJ, Apr.O, 1796, Ibid., 261-262. 
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of Man. But even more to the point, he saw in the revolution of 1789 the con-
firmation of his dreams and faith in the progress of the human spirit. It will 
not end here, he predicted; this "is but the first chapter of the history of Euro-
pean liberty. "27 The redirection of the revolution in the mid-1790s came as a 
seyere blow to Jefferson. He excused it as being the result of trying to accom-
plish too much too fast; of the leadership having been grasped from the moder"" 
ate constitutionalists by radicals; of trying to advance liberty beyond that for 
which the French people were ready. It was nonetheless undoubtedly a painful 
experience to have to answer John Adams, who, looking back over the years to 
"the commencement of the Troubles in France" and recalling Jefferson's 
optimism, asked: "Let me now ask you, very seriously my Friend, where are 
now in 1813, the Perfection and perfectability of human Nature? Where is now, 
the progress of the human Mind? Where is the Amelioration of Society?"28 
The nature of the debate during the last decade of the eighteenth century is 
illustrated in the published arguments of Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine. 
These arguments, contained in Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France 
(1790) and Paine's The Rights of Man (1791), took place before the execution 
of the Royal family and the beginning of the Reign of Terror. They were thus 
27TJ to Moustier, May 20, 1789, Boyd Collection XV, 141-142; TJ to John 
Turnbull, June 18, 1789, Ibid., 199-200; TJ to James Madison, July 22, 1789, 
Ibid., 299-301; TJ to Diodati, Aug. 3, 1789, Ibid., 325-327; TJ to James Mad-
ison, Aug. 28, 1789, Ibid., 364-369; TJ to John Jay, Sep. 19, 1789, Ibid., 
454-460. -- --
28John Adams to TJ, July 15, 1813, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XIII, 
313-316; TJ to the Marquis de Lafayette, Feb. 14, 1815, Ibid., XIV, 245-255. 
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unencumbered with the burden of explaining this turn of the revolution, and 
were devoted to more theoretical aspects of the nature of government and its 
relationship to the nature of man. These books appeared after the ratification 
of the new American constitution, but during the years of suspense as to the 
success of the infant republic. The terms of their arguments are included here, 
not so much to suggest an influence on American thought, but to show the con-
tinuing debate through the era under study. 
Burke portrayed government as an artificial contrivance erected to protect 
men from their own natural evil inclinations: 
Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. 
Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. 
Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a 
sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the 
passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and 
body as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently 
be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into sub-
jection. 29 
In addition to recognizing that society requires the harnessing of human passions, 
Burke also argued that "this can only be done.!?!~ power out of themselves; 
and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that evill and to those 
passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. " The necessary power out 
of themselves is the function of government which in Burke's scheme is a 
"consideration of convenience" to administer artificial restraints upon man's 
liberty to simply govern himself. Because of this arbitrary function, the 
29Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, and Thomas 
Paine, The Rights of Man, in one volume (New York, 1961), 72. Citations 
hereafter identified by individual author. 
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constitution of a government requires a delicate skill. He wrote that it re• 
quires, among other things, "a deep knowledge of human nature and human 
necessities. " Conversely, and here we come to the application of his ideas to 
the French Revolution, "it is with infinite caution than [sic] any man ought to 
venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree 
for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without 
having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes." 
Burke believed that the restraining power of government was the only 
barrier which prevented man from degenerating into the frightful control of his 
aggressive passions. The French revolutionaries were, to his mind, following 
a dream about the nature of man that would lead to disaster. All of their talk 
about the "metaphysic rights" of man indicated to him their naivete about the 
real forces that mold human behavior. Burke was convinced that the French 
revolutionaries were attempting to erect a new political edifice on the foundation 
of a nah ~ly optimistic opinion of the nature of man. He believed that political 
theories and institutions had to be founded on immediate and actual circum-
stances, not on metaphysical fantasies. Even if the "pretended rights" claimed 
by the French theorists were metaphysically true, they were, in their simplistic 
extremism, politically false. 
In the final analysis Burke distrusted liberty in the abstract because without 
wisdom or virtue, "it is the greatest of all possible evils." He distrusted man's 
faculties, both rational and sentimental, as the source of social integration. He 
believed that government, as a "power out of themselves," was necessary to 
avoid the folly, vice, and madness that was the product of liberty "without 
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tuition or restraint." Based upon his observation of the needs of man, he 
emphasized the regulatory function of government, and cautioned that only 
"much thought, deep reflection, a sagacious, powerful and combining mind" 
could make a government that could temper together the "opposite elements of 
liberty and restraint. " 30 
Thomas Paine's rebuttal of Burke's political theory rested firmly on the 
contrary view of human nature. He despised Burke's "contemptible opinion of 
mankind, " which Paine believed was the starting point of his overall theory. 
It is wrong, Paine wrote, to equate human nature with "a baseness of heart, 
and hypocrisy of countenance." He did not believe that man is the enemy of 
man, except where false systems of government have made it so, but rather 
that "man is so naturally a creature of society, that it is almost impossible to 
put him out of it. " Man is naturally the friend of man, he wrote, and "instinct 
in animals does not act with stronger impulse, than the principles of society 
and civilization operate in man." Paine believed that society was intended in 
the natural order of things. More importantly, he declared that as nature 
created man for social life, "she fitted him for the station she intended." He 
believed that nature has implanted in man "a system of social affections, which 
though not necessary to his existence, are essential to his happiness." In sum, 
Paine believed that man is fitted by nature to live in society, and that "there is 
no period in life when • . . [his] love for society ceases to act. " 31 
30surke, Reflections, 19, 72-75, 100, 263. 
31Paine, Rights of Man, 385, 398•409, 445. 
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This conception of human nature and natural inclinations had a powerful 
influence in shaping Paine's political theory. He wrote that "to understand the 
nature and quantity of government proper for man, it is necessary to attend to 
his character." Whereas Burke, starting from a pessimistic view of man, 
had emphasized the regulatory function of government, Paine, beginning with an 
optimistic appraisal of man, emphasized a supportive function. First of all, 
he did not believe that government was the source of order in society. Rather 
than having its origin in governmental control, Paine declared that order was 
the result of "the principles of society and the natural constitution of man." 
Order in society existed prior to government and thus order, not anarchy, would 
succeed the dissolution of government. He argued that "the mutual dependence 
and reciprocal interest which man has upon man, and all parts of a civilized 
community upon each other, create that great chain of connection which holds 
it together." Paine's conclusion then, logically growing out of these assump-
tions, was that 
if we examine . . . the composition and constitution of man, the diversity 
of his wants, and the diversity of talents in different men for reciprocally 
accommodating the wants of each other, his propensity to society and 
consequently to preserve the advantages resulting from it, we shall easily 
discover that a great part of what is called government is mere imposition. 
The achievements of the American and French Revolutions promised "a new 
era to the human race. 11 They would prove that "government founded on a 
moral theory, ~~system of universal peace, on the indefeasible, hereditary 
rights of~, 11 was best suited to man's nature and his happiness. So 
conceived, the operation of government is restricted to the making and admin-
istering of laws that reflect the collective concerns of the members of society. 
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Whenever government had attempted in history to go beyond this role, its 
effect had been divisive rather than cohesive. In Paine's scheme, neither laws 
nor government are sacrosanct or protected by any shroud of tradition. Both 
are simple creations of man for the furtherance of his own happiness, and both 
must advance commensurately with the progress of knowledge and the human 
spirit. 32 Burke, fearing man's natural instincts, propensities, and prejudices, 
revered tradition as an expression of the collective wisdom of the ages and 
man's protection against the error that might flow from momentary passions. 33 
Paine believed that man, fitted by natural inclinations to form societies, was 
capable of designing, modifying, and immediately supervising the operation of 
his own government without condemnation from the past or fear of the future. 
The question of human nature, and its relationship to the design of govern-
mental institutions, assumed an urgency in the era of the American and French 
Revolutions and the "age of experiments is government." The debates in 
America were cast into divisions like those discussed above. The contending 
beliefs among the major political figures here is predictably suggested in their 
response to Paine's political ideas. For example, Jefferson, who had maintained 
a correspondence with Paine in the years since the beginning of the American 
Revolution, welcomed The Rights of Man as an expression reflecting the prin-
ciples held by most Americans and expressed the hope that its publication here 
would counter some of the political heresies that had sprung up in the years 
32Ibid. , 392-401. 
33George Sabine, !: History of Political Theory, 3d ed. (New York, 1961), 607. 
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immediately preceding. John Adams, on the contrary, compared Paine's 
writing to the "Ravings and Rantings of Bedlam" and wrote that if Paine was 
to be recorded as the great author of the American Revolution, he wanted his 
own name to be "blotted out forever, from its Records. " It was in recognition 
of the differences in their basic beliefs partially revealed in their response to 
Paine that caused Adams to add in his letter to Jefferson: "You and I ought not 
to die, before We have explained ourselves to each other. " 34 
34TJ to John Adams, July 17, 1791, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, VII, 
212-214; TJ to John Adams, Aug. 30, 1791, Ibid., 242-245; John Adams to TJ, 
July 15, 1813, Adams-Jefferson Letters, ed. by Cappon, 357-358. 
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CHAffER IX 
HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICS: 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
A great deal of explanation would be necessary to bridge the philosophic 
chasm that existed between those labeled "democratical" and those called 
"aristocratical" among the founding fathers. Jefferson's faith in human nature 
and its influence on his political ideas comes into sharper clarity when con-
trasted with the thought of the most influential spokesman of the "aristocratical" 
persuasion, Alexander Hamilton. Jefferson and Hamilton emerged as the lead· 
ers of the major contending factions in the political life of the new nation. The 
basic ideological antagonism between the two cabinet officers surfaced within 
weeks following Jefferson 1 s arrival in New York to take up the duties of Secretary 
of State. This antagonism erupted into a public campaign of bitter invective by 
the fall of 1792. In responee to President Washington's expression of concern 
about the disruptive effect of the argument between his two colleagues, Jefferson 
declared that his disapproval of Hamilton's policies was founded not on a mere 
"speculative difference, " but from a deep-seated conviction that the Secretary 
of the Treasury's "system flowed from principles adverse to liberty, and was 
calculated to undermine and demolish the Republic. " 1 
1TJ to George Washington, S~p. 9, 1792, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, 
VIII, 394-408. 
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Alexander Hamilton's appraisal of human nature and his concept of the 
function of government form a consistent philosophy from which emerged his 
notions about the proper character of government. This philosophy, combining 
a pessimistic appraisal of human nature, a distrust of the masses, and a strong 
doubt about the efficacy of democratic government is in every feature a rebuttal 
to Jefferson's tenets. 
It is impossible to determine with certainty the roots of Hamilton's negative 
view of human nature, though one might attribute some influence to his move .. 
ment in Presbyterian circles during his youth. In any event, his earliest sur-
viving pronouncement on the subject, written while an undergraduate at Kings 
College, states rather emphatically that "a vast majority of mankind is intirely 
biassed by motives of self-interest. Most men are glad to remove any burthens 
off themselves, and place them upon the backs of their neighbours. 112 Even 
though he mentioned once that "the general notion of justice and humanity are 
implanted in almost every human breast, 11 this was a singular event and even 
then he cautioned that these were indeed fragile instincts. 3 With this one 
exception, his declarations on human nature were consistently negative. They 
ranged from a relatively standard Calvinistic reference to the "depravity of 
human nature, 11 to his conclusion several years later that "experience is a 
211 A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress, from the Calumnies 
of their Enemies; In Answer to a Letter, Under the Signature of A. W. Farmer, 11 
[Dec. 15,] 1774, Hamilton Papers, ed. by Styrett, I, 45-78. 
3Hamilton to George Clinton, Mar. 12, 177 8, Ibid. , 439-442. 
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continued comment on the worthlessness of the human race. "4 He believed 
that mankind in general is vicious. He believed that self-interest is the "most 
powerful incentive of human actions; that "opinion [approbation], whether well 
of ill founded, is the governing principle of human affairs. "5 He believed that 
invariably "momentary passions and immediate interest have a more active and 
imperious control over human conduct than general or reiJlote considerations of 
policy, utility or justice. " 6 It is obvious that Hamilton did not hold any senti-
mental notions about man's natural virtue or benevolence. 
Hamilton believed that the same passions that "govern most individuals," 
avarice, ambition, interest, also govern public bodies. This point was made 
several times during his long and passionate campaign in the 1780s for a 
stronger central government. Six months after the ratification of the first 
constitution of the new nation and before the Revolutionary War ended, he was 
4"The Farmer Refuted: or A mo:re impartial and comprehensive View of 
the Dispute between Great-Britain and the Colonies, Intended as a Further 
Vindication of the Congress: In Answer to a Letter From A. W. Farmer, 
Intitled A View of the Controversy Between Great-Britain and her Colonies: 
Including a Mode of determining the present Disputes Finally and Effectually, 
etc.," [Feb. 23] 1775, Ibid., 81-164; Hamilton to Richard Kidder Meade, 
Aug. 27, 1782, Ibid., Ill, 150-151. 
5"The Farmer Refuted, etc.," [Feb. 23] 1775, Ibid. , 81-164; Hamilton 
to William Duer, June 18, 1778, Ibid., 497-501; Remarks in the Constitutional 
Convention, June 22, 1787, Ibid., IV, 216-217. 
6
"The Federalist No. 6." Nov. 14, 1787, Ibid., 309-317. Hamilton be-
lieved that the "female heart" was even more susceptible to these inclinations 
than the male. He wrote his "beloved Betsy" shortly before their marriage 
that while men are "full of vices, " females are "full of weaknesses. " He said 
that he did not "entertain an ill opinion of all your sex, " but experience had 
demonstrated that "there are very few of either [sex] that are not very worth-
less." Hamilton to Elizabeth Schuyler, Sep. 3, 1780, Ibid., II, 418-420. 
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already advocating a new design of government because, he wrote, "political 
societies, in close neighbourhood, must either be strongly united under one 
government, or there will infallibly exist emulations and quarrels. This is in 
human nature; and we have no reason to think ourselves wiser, or better, than 
other men." He perceived that as some of the larger states grew more popu-
lous and prosperous, motives of "vanity and self importance" would overpower 
their true interest to preserve the union and schism would follow. 7 He believed 
that the success of the American experiment depended upon cooperation be-
tween the independent minded states, but he doubted that they would ever "be 
brought to cooperate in any reasonable or effectual plan. " He urged reforms 
a.nd exertions but "the answer constantly is what avails it for one state to make 
them without the consent of the others?" He found that it was "in vain to 
expose the futility of this reasoning" because "it is founded~ all those passions 
which have the strongest influence on the human mind. " 8 In arguing against 
taxation by requisition for the support of the new government that would be 
erected by a new constitution, he emphasized that under that arrangement 
"states will contribute or not, according to their circumstances and interests. " 
Requisitioned contributions would not work because states function "on the 
principle of human nature" and these "are as infallible as any mathematical 
7"The Continentalist No. II," Aug. 9, 1781, Ibid. , 660-665 [italics mine]; 
Speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 18, 1787, Ibid., IV, 178-210. 
8Hamilton to Robert Morris, July 22, 1782, Ibid. , III, 114-116 [italics 
mine]. 
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calculations. " 9 
Hamilton's belief in the power of self-interest and avarice shaped his con-
ception of human nature, both in the individual and collective sense. This 
belief, which stands in such stark contradiction to Jefferson's belief in the 
function and power of the moral sense, contains strong implications which 
inevitably were expressed in Hamilton's ideas on government. His crusade for 
a stronger central government during the 17 80s was obviously motivated by his 
fears for the success of the new nation, but it was largely shaped by his doubts 
about the efficacy of participatory government. These doubts stemmed directly 
from his appraisal of human nature and were manifested in his obvious lack of 
faith in both the interest and the ability of the masses to participate rationally 
in government. There is certainly a danger of exaggeration in the contrast 
that is thus developed between basic philosophical principles in the minds of 
Hamilton and Jefferson, but it appears that the latter's description of the dis-
agreement as one between Aristocrats and Democrats is accurate. 
Hamilton associated democracy with anarchy. His fear of "the amazing 
violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit" led to his belief that the 
original function of government is restraint. Government is instituted, he 
wrote, "because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason 
and justice, without constraint. " An accurate observation of the conduct of 
mankind, he continued, shows conclusively that societies of men do not act "with 
9speech to the New York Ratifying Convention, June 25, 1788, Ibid., V, 
114-125 [italics mine]. 
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more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals. ,lO In other 
words, the same anarchical tendencies that were generated in man by his very 
nature were transferred to men in the collective and would tend to generate 
anarchy in society. 
Hamilton's distrust of the multitude and his association of anarchy with 
democracy were fixed by the time of his earliest participation in the establish-
ment of the new nation. At the very beginning of the Revolution he warned that 
the democratic passions that would be generated in the struggle against British 
tyranny could very easily be transformed into a contempt and disregard for all 
authority. "In times of such commotion as the present," he declared, "while 
the passions of men are worked up to an uncommon pitch there is great danger 
of fatal extremes." He said that the multitudes do not have a "sufficient stock 
of reason and knowledge" to check their passions and to guide them. "The due 
medium is hardly to be found among the more intelligent, it is almost impossible 
among the unthinking populace." It was his belief that when the minds of the 
latter "are loosened from their attachment to ancient establishments and courses, 
they seem to grow giddy and are apt more or less to run into anarchy." It 
would require in such tempestuous times, he warned, "the greatest skill in the 
political pilots to keep men steady and within proper bounds" and to prevent 
"a spirit of encroachment and arrogance in them. " 11 In this context it is 
10speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 18, 1787, Ibid., IV, 
178-210; "The Federalist No. 15," Dec. 1, 1787, Ibid., 356-364. 
11Hamilton to John Jay, Nov. 26, 1775, Ibid., I, 176-178. 
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interesting to note the sharp contrast provided by Jefferson's comments on the 
opportunities afforded by the "spirit of revolution" for advancing and securing 
democracy in America. Rather than fearing the passions generated by the 
Revolution, he believed that they were essential to the achievement of the 
ultimate goals of the struggle. Rather than !Nanting to suppress them, he ~anted 
to take full advantage of their force to establish "every essential right on a 
legal basis" while the people were alert and unified. "From the conclusion of 
this war we shall be going down hill," he wrote, and then the people "will be 
forgotten . . . and their rights disregarded. " Now, in the passion of revo-
lution, was the time for action, because those shackles that were not knocked 
off before the end of the war "will remain on us long, will be made heavier and 
heavier, till our rights shall revive or expire in convulsion. " 12 
Hamilton's convictions about the potential dangers inherent in the passions 
generated by the ·Revolution were reinforced by the history of the next thirteen 
years. The reactions of Jefferson and Hamilton to one event during that period 
serve to illustrate the different conceptual framework from which each of them 
acted. There is no doubt that the resort to arms by an army of discontented 
Massachusetts farmers in 1786 and early 1787 to prevent action against debtors 
served to support the arguments of those who were advocating an overhaul of the 
governmental apparatus established by the first constitution. The crisis had 
demonstrated the impotence of the central government to react to a situation 
that in its implications threatened the stability of the nation. To many it was 
12Notes, 154. 
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additional evidence that there was an urgent need for the strengthening of nation-
.al authority. But for both Jefferson and Hamilton, Shays's Rebellion held 
meaning beyond the immediate crisis of government. 
Jefferson was in Paris at the time of the rebellion, but he was aware of it 
by at least as early as January 17 87. To him the event was of less importance 
than the potential dangers inherent in the great reaction that followed. He 
dreaded what appeared to him to be a headlong rush toward the embrace of an 
authoritarian style of government. To the author of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence this would be an abhorrent betrayal of the principles that had led his 
generation into revolution against another authoritarian tyranny. He recognized 
the seriousness of the rebellion, but his reaction was a simple plea for patience. 
"I am persuaded myself," he wrote, "that the good sense of the people will 
always be found to be the best army. They may be led astray for a moment, 
but will soon correct themselves. The people are the only censors of their 
governors: and even their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles 
of their institution. " Looking beyond the immediate problem he added that "to 
punish these errors too severely would be to suppress the only safeguard of the 
public liberty. " 13 What bothered him most however, was the fear that some 
might conclude, as a result of Shays's Rebellion, that "nature has formed man 
insusceptible of any other government but that of force. " This, to Jefferson, 
would be the ultimate tragedy. He confessed that democracy was not perfect, 
that its very liberties made it subject to a degree of turbulence. But if this was 
13TJ to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, Boyd Collection, XI, 48-50. 
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an evil, it was one which paled in comparison to the evils of authoritarian 
systems. 14 His plea was for patience, for caution, for the avoidance of any 
precipitate decisions based upon hasty and unproved conclusions about the 
efficacy of the democratic system. 
Shays's Rebellion meant everything to Hamilton that it did not mean to 
Jefferson. He considered it an event of immense proportions, fraught with 
awesome potentialities. "Who can determine," he asked, "what might have 
been the issue of her [Massachusetts'] late convulsions, if the malcontents had 
been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell?"15 He pointed to the rebellion's 
pernicious influence on the neighboring state of Connecticut where "of late the 
Governt. had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact suspended many 
of its ordinary functions [including the imposition of taxes] in order to prevent 
those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. " 16 It showed the need 
for the maintenance of a standing military force. Most importantly, the 
14TJ to James Madison, Jan. 30, 1787, Ibid., 92-97. That Jefferson's 
fears were well founded is shown in John Marshall's confession written in the 
same month in response to Shays's Rebellion: "I fear, and there is no opinion 
no more degrading to the dignity of man, that these have truth on their side 
who say that man is incapable of governing himself. " Marshall to James 
Wilkinson, Jan. 5, 1787, The Papers of John Marshall, ed. by Herbert A. 
Johnson (1 vol.; Chapel Hill, 1974--);1, 199-201. Marshall also was advocating 
that some examples be made "in order to impress on the minds of the people 
a conviction that punishment will surely follow an attempt to subvert the laws 
and government of the commonwealth." Marshall to Arthur Lee, Mar. 5, 1787, 
Ibid. , 205-206. 
15"The Federalist No. 21," Dec. 12, 1787, Hamilton Papers, ed. by 
Styrett, IV, 396-401. 
16speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 26, 1787, Ibid., 218-220. 
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rebellion was to him a predictable exhibition of the "amazing violence and 
turbulence of the democratic spirit'' wherein a notion "seizes the popular 
passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable. " 17 It was an 
experience that "corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other 
nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, 
however constituted; that seditions and insur:r:ections are unhappily maladies 
as inseparable from the body politic, as tumours and eruptions from the natural 
body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which 
we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government) 
has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors, whose sagacity dis-
dains the admonitions of experimental instructions. " 18 In contrast to Jefferson's 
plea for patience, Hamilton veritably screamed that it was "time to awake from 
the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the 
direction of our political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of 
the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect 
virtue. " This, said Hamilton, was the meaning of Shays 's Rebellion. 19 
Hamilton's reaction to the crisis in Massachusetts reflects a complex set 
of convictions which were only reinforced, not c1·eated, by the event. These 
17speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 18, 1787, Ibid., 178-210. 
18"The Federalist No. 28," Dec. 26, 1787, Ibid., 439-443. 
19"The Federalist No. 6," Nov. 14, 1787, Ibid., 309-317. Howard 
Mumford Jones catalogues a list of violent events in the eighteenth century 
that supported a pessimistic view of human nature. Revolution and 
Romanticism, 27-28. 
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convictions, founded on a general distrust of human nature and of the masses, 
not only associated anarchy with democracy but indeed included a basic distrust 
in the democratic process as an efficacious form of government. 
He believed in the first analysis that human nature is not suited to the 
pretensions of democracy. He believed that private prejudices and private 
interests would be ever present "antagonists too powerful for public spirit and 
public good. "20 He said that "we may preach till we are tired of the theme, 
the necessity of disinterestedness in republics" but this will not make it occur. 21 
The "turbulent and uncontrouling disposition" of the mass of the people will 
always require firm checks. 22 The experiences of the 1780s only served to 
reinforce these convictions. As the French embarked upon their revolution in 
1789, Hamilton warned Lafayette against too much zeal for democratic forms. 
He wrote him that he dreaded "the reveries of your lliilosophic politicians who 
appear in the moment to have great influence and who being mere speculatists 
may aim at more refinement than suits either with human nature or the compo-
. . f N . ,23 Sitlon o your atwn. 
Hamilton's basic distrust of the efficacy of the democratic process was 
obvious. It was not founded solely on his belief that· democracy was too easily 
2
'\.Iamilton to Lt. Col. John Laurens, Sept. 11, 1779, Ibid., II, 165-169. 
21
"The Continentalist No. VI," July 4, 1782, Ibid., Ill, 99-106. 
22speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 18, 1787, Ibid., IV, 
178-210. 
23Hamilton to Marquis de Lafayette, Oct. 6, 1789, Ibid., V, 425-426. 
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bent to anarchy, though this fear was consistently expressed. He believed that 
it was an inefficient process of government, lacking in the dynamism necessary 
to the successful ordering of national affairs. He shared the widespread be-
lief in the eighteenth century that republicanism was not suited to nations of 
1 1-. d" . 24 arge geograpulC 1mens10ns. But more basically, his dislike for the dem-
ocratic process was again related to his view of human nature. 
Hamilton saw no need to believe that the electoral process would produce 
good governors. In the first place, the electors for the most part would be 
unqualified, by both imperfect judgment and lack of interest, to choose good 
leaders. "It sometimes happens," he wrote for example, "that a temporary 
caprice of the people, leads them to make a choice of men, whom they neither 
love nor respect; and that they afterwards, from an indolent and mechanical 
habit, natural to the human mind, continue their confidence and support merely 
because they had once conferred them. "25 In the second place, election to 
office by the democratic process would not by some magical power guarantee 
the skill or trustworthiness of those elected. Good government could not be 
created by republican incantation. Hamilton believed that one of the most basic 
weaknesses of republics lay in the fact that "persons elevated from the mass of 
the community by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great 
preeminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, 
24speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 18, 1787, Ibid., IV, 
178-210. 
25"Publius Letter II," Oct. 26, 1778, Ibid., I, 567-570. 
194 
which to any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue may appear to 
exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to over-
balance the obligations of duty. "26 The weakness of human nature and limited 
durations of office formed an explosive compound with a destructive potential 
that could reach the most important office in the land. Hamilton warned that 
a man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief magis-
trate, possessed of but a moderate or slender fortune, and looking forward 
to a period not very remote, when he may probably be obliged to return to 
the station from which he was taken, might sometimes be under temptations 
to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it would require superlative 
virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the 
interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth. An ambitious man might 
mak.e his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price of 
his treachery to his constituents. 27 
Hamilton believed that there were few indeed that possessed such "superlative 
virtue." In speaking of those who could be candidates for judicial offices, he 
wrote that after "making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of 
human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite 
integrity with the requisite knowledge. "28 There was no reason to believe, 
Hamilton declared, that elected bodies would always act with "an unbiased 
regard to the public weal. " And what was the basis for this sentiment? It 
"results from the constitution of human nature. "29 It was, he believed, a 
particular defect in the democratic process that "popular assemblies [are] 
26"The Federalist No. 22," Dec. 14, 1787, Ibid. , IV, 402-411. 
27 "The Federalist No. 75," Mar. 26, 1788, Ibid.' 628-633. 
2 8"The Federalist No. 78, II May 28, 1788, Ibid., 655-663. 
29"The Federalist No. 15," Dec. 1, 17 87' Ibid. ' 356-364. 
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frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and 
other irregular and violent propensities." And even more damning was the 
known fact "that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals, 
in whom they place confidence, and are of course liable to be tinctured by the 
passions and views of those individuals. " 30 All of these expressions of con-
tempt and distrust provide a striking contrast to Jefferson's belief in the ability 
of the people to govern themselves. 
Finally, Hamilton believed that democratic government was less efficacious 
than other forms because it could not provide dynamic leadership. The "gen-
eral disease which infects all our constitutions," he wrote, is "an excess of 
popularity. There is no order that has a will of its own. The inquiry constantly 
is what will please not what will benefit the people. In such a government," 
he concluded, "there can be nothing but temporary expedient, fickleness and 
f 11 1131 0 y.' This tendency to inertia created by the fear of public judgment was, 
to Hamilton, a debilitating feature in the democratic process. As a young man 
he copied in a private notebook a line from Demosthenes Orations: "As a 
general marches at the head of his troops, so ought wise politicians, if I dare 
to use the expression, to march at the head of affairs; insomuch that they ought 
not to wait the event, to know what measures to take; but the measures which 
they have taken, ought to produce the event. " 32 When he presented his ideas 
30
"The Federalist No. 6," Nov. 14, 1787, Ibid., 309-317. 
31Hamilton to Robert Morris, Aug. 13, 1782, Ibid., III, 132-145. 
32Pay Book of the State Company of Artillery, [1777], Ibid., I, 373-411. 
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on government to the Constitutional Convention in 17 87 he argued that "the 
goodness of a government consists in vigorous execution. " This a republican 
government could not affect. It would necessarily be rendered "feeble and 
inefficient" by its own democratic principles. 33 The ideological distance be .. 
tween Hamilton and Jefferson is shown by the contrast between the former's 
plea for vigorous government and the latter's confession to Madison, made at 
about the same time, that he was "not a friend to a very energetic government" 
because they always lead to oppression. A decade later, in his first inaugural 
address, Jefferson said that he believed the government of the United States to 
be the most powerful on earth precisely because of its democratic principles. 34 
Hamilton believed by 17 87 that his earlier fears had been realized, that 
the zeal for liberty generated in the Revolution had become "predominant and 
excessive. " It was this passion that had shaped the Confederation, and render-
edit inoperative. 
There are few positions more demonstrable than that there should be in 
every republic, some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check 
the intemperate passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly. 
It is evident that a body instituted for these purposes must be so formed as 
to exclude as much as possible from its own character, those infirmities, 
and that mutability which it is designed to remedy. It is therefore necessary 
that it should be small, that it should hold its authority during a considerable 
period, and that it should have such an independence in the exercise of its 
powers, as will divert it as much as possible of local prejudices. It should 
be so formed as to be the center of political knowledge, to pursue always a 
33speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 18, 1787, Ibid., IV, 
178-210. 
34rJ to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, VI, 
385-393; Inauguration Address, Mar. 4, 1801, Ibid., III, 317-323. 
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steady line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity to system. 
Without this establishment, we may make experiments without end, but 
shall never have an efficient government. 
He did not doubt, he said, that the body of people in every country desired its 
prosperity, but, he added, "it is equally unquestionable, that they do not 
possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government." 
The result of this disability is that 11 popular assemblies are frequently mis-
guided by ignorance, by sudden impulses and the intrigues of ambitious men." 35 
Perhaps the statement that best illustrates Hamilton's association of human 
nature and the defects of democracy is found in his familiar speech in the Con-
stitutional Convention in Philadelphia in June, 1787: 
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are 
the rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the 
people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this 
maxim has been quoted and believed it is not true in fact. The people are 
turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give there-
fore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in government. They will 
check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any 
advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. 
Can a democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people, 
be supposed steadily to pursue the public good?36 
This was an urgent question, and the answer could be anticipated to determine 
the course, and indeed the success or failure, of their experiment. Hamilton 
professed that he was "as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man, " but 
openly acknowledged to the Convention that he despaired in the attempt to solve 
35speech in the New York Ratifying Convention, June 24, 1788, Hamilton 
Papers, ed. by Styrett, V, 67-74. 
36speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 18, 1787, Ibid., IV, 
.178-210: 
198 
the difficulties of the time through a republican form of government. He be-
lieved that nothing short of a blend of monarchy and republicanism as repre-
sented in the British government, which he described as "the best in the world, " 
could save America. He acknowledged that he was arguing an unpopular side, 
and that it would probably be unwise for the Convention to propose any other 
than a republican form of government. But at the same time he pleaded with 
his colleagues to "go as far in order to attain stability and permanency, as 
republican principles will admit." He answered his own rhetorical question 
quoted above: "Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of 
democracy." He proposed that both the Executive and the Senate be elected 
for life as a means of encouraging fidelity in office and stability in government. 
This was what he meant by a blend of monarchy and republicanism. 37 
37 Ibid. ; Speech in the Constitutional Convention, June 26, 17 87, Ibid. , 
218-220. Hamilton was apparently following Montesquieu closely in his develop-
ment of this argument. This frequently cited autitority on government had 
written that in any republic "there are always persons distinguished by their 
birth, riches, or honors: but were they to be confounded with the common 
people, and to have only the weight of a single vote like the rest, the common 
liberty would be their slavery, and they would have no interest in supporting it, 
as most of the popular resolutions would be against them. The share they have, 
therefore, in the legislature ought to be proportioned to their other advantages 
in the state; which happens only when they form a body that has a right to check 
the licentiousness of the people, as the people have a right to oppose any en-
croachment of theirs. The legislative power is therefore committed to the body 
of nobles, and to that which represents the people, each having their assemblies 
and deliberations apart, each their separate views and interests • • • . The 
body of the nobility ought to be hereditary. In the first place it is so in its own 
nature; and in the next there must be a considerable interest to preserve its 
privileges -- privileges that in themselves are obnoxious to popular envy, and 
of course in a free state are always in danger." Baron de Montesquieu, The 
Spirit of the Laws (1748), trans. by Thomas Nugent (New York, 1949), Vol. I, 
Bk XI, 155-156. 
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Though these ideas were rejected by the Convention, as he anticipated, 
Hamilton nevertheless worked untiringly for the ratification of the Constitution 
that was adopted. But his continuing despair in the succeeding years is evident 
in the fact that his faith in the success of the American experiment fluctuated in 
inverse proportion to the rising tide of republican sentiment. 
Jefferson, in contrast, said that he believed that man "was a rational 
animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of justice; 
and that he could be restrained from wrong and protected in right, by moderate 
powers, confided in persons of his own choice, and held to their duties by· 
dependence on his own will. " 38 In other words, Jefferson believed in the 
efficacy of republican government erected on the foundatiqn of the democratic 
process. This does not mean that he held some naive notion that all men were 
created with an equal capacity for the exercise of the responsibilities of 
governing. It must be admitted that Jefferson was every bit as much an elitist 
as Hamilton. But his was a different kind of elitism. And there is a level at 
which their thinking is remarkably convergent. Both feared the corruption of 
men in power, but this fear is more pronounced in Jefferson than in Hamilton. 
This in part explains Jefferson's belief that the role of the masses as electors, 
and checks, was of as much importance as the role of the administrators. He 
explained to the Abbe Arnoux that he thought it necessary "to introduce the 
people into every department of government as far as they are capable of 
38rrJ to Judge William Johnson, June 12, 1823, Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XV, 439-452. 
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exercising it," because "this is the only way to ensure a long-continued and 
honest administration of it's powers." The people, he explained, "are not 
qualified to exercise themselves the EXECUTIVE department: but they are 
qualified to name the person who shall exercise it." Likewise "they are not 
qualified to LEGISLATE," and therefore they are called upon only to ''chuse 
the legislators." And finally "they are not qualified to JUDGE questions of 
law; but they are very capable of judging questions of fact. " They therefore 
in the form of juries "determine all matters of fact, leaving to the permanent 
judges to decide the law resulting from those facts." Jefferson believed that 
it was important that the most talented and qualified be given the responsibility 
for the administration of government. But he would disagree with Hamilton as 
to how that "first class" should be identified. He believed that there is "a 
natural aristocracy among men," one that rests upon the foundations of "virtue 
and talents." He believed that Hamilton's "first class" was really only an 
"artificial aristocracy," one that was "founded on wealth and birth, without 
either virtue or talents. " He was convinced that the foundations on which the 
artificial aristocracy rested were less desirable qualifications than those which 
marked the character of the natural aristocracy. The latter, he wrote, "I 
consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and 
government of society. And indee~..L.4e continued, expanding a faith elaborated 
upon earlier, "it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man 
for the social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to 
manage the concerns of the society." Even though there was then, a natural 
elite prepared by special talents and traits of character that could best perform 
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the responsibilities of government, Jefferson recognized the danger inherent in 
the selection process by which they would be elevated to office, and especially 
the need to guard against any trend toward granting them independence from the 
will of the electors. The electoral process seemed to solve both problems. He 
believed it best "to leave the citizens the free elections and separation of the 
aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from the chaff. In general they 
will elect the really good and wise. .In some instances, wealth may corrupt, 
and birth blind them; but not in sufficient degree to endanger the· society. " And, 
in marked contrast to Hamilton's appraisal of the masses, Jefferson believed 
that once the electors had confided power to persons of their choice through the 
electoral process, they could by the same process supervise them and hold them 
"to their duties" by dependence on the will of the electorate. 39 Though his 
faith in the citizens may have been based as much on quantitative as qualitative 
considerations, Jefferson's answer to the question posed by Hamilton about the 
efficacy of a democratic assembly would have been a definite yes. 
This contrast between Hamilton's and Jefferson's philosophies of human 
nature and politics is vivid, but is perhaps distorted to some degree unless 
certain factors are kept in mind. In the first place Hamilton, though certainly 
well read and familiar with both ancient and modern political writings, was more 
executor than theorist. Jefferson's unhappy experiences as governor of Virginia 
and as President only serve to underscore that he was more suited to the realm 
39Ibid.; TJ to Abbe" Arnoux, July 19, 1789, Boyd Collection, XV, 282-283; 
TJ to John Adams, Oct. 28, 1813, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XIII, 394-403. 
202 
of theory than practice. Secondly, our insight into Hamilton's political ideas 
is provided almost entirely by his efforts in the Constitutional Convention and 
in the ratification struggle that followed. His ideas were shaped by the urgent 
need to design immediate and practical solutions to political problems that 
threatened the very existence of the new republic. Jefferson's political the?ries 
were for the most part conceived in places like Paris or Monticello, far removed 
from the crisis atmosphere of Philadelphia in 1787. Jefferson was considered 
by some of his contemporaries as a philosophical dreamer, or as John Marshall 
called him a "speculative theorist, "40 appraisals resulting from a perhaps 
overly optimistic view of human nature and his vision of a political and social 
utopia separated by an ocean from the degeneracy of European cities and cor-
ruption of European politics. A remark by John Adams in 1791 is revealing. 
Jefferson had in a letter to Adams stated that their disagreement over the best 
form of government was obvious to both of them. Adams shot back an immediate 
challenge denying that this was obvious to him: "I know not what your Idea is of 
the best form of Government. You and I have never had a serious conversation 
together that I can recollect concerning the nature of Government. The very 
transient hints that have ever passed between Us," he continued, "have been 
jocular and superficial, without ever coming to any explanation. "41 The design 
40Marshall to Charles Pinckney, Mar. 4, 1801, quoted in Leonard &.1.ker, 
John Marshall: !:: Life in Law (New York, 1974), 359. 
41TJ to John Adams, July 17, 1791, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, VIII, 
212-214; John Adams to TJ, July 29, 1791, Adams-Jefferson Letters, ed. by 
Cappon, 247-250. 
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of political theory may not require the same precision of definition, or compro-
mise with circumstances, as the design of a political apparatus that must 
immediately assume the practical function for which it is called into being. 
This is not to demean the necessity or value of either, but simply to suggest 
that Hamilton's and Jefferson's political ideas, fashioned under different cir-
cumstances and out of different intellectual natures, do not form an exact philo-
sophical dialogue. Perhaps if these circumstances were altered, their political 
ideas would have taken a different form from that described here. 
Jefferson's and Hamilton's ideas on human nature and political institutions 
and on the relationship of one to the other accurately reflect the philosophical 
differences between the democratical and aristocratical factions among the 
founding fathers in a general sense. It would be inaccurate however to describe 
all Jeffersonians as naive optimists or all Federalists as morbid pessimists 
in their appraisal of human nature or in the attendant political implications. 
The example of James Madison provides a needed corrective to prevent such 
a distortion. 
Madison and Jefferson, in what Adrienne Koch has called "the great collab-
oration," were the two men most responsible for designing the ideology of early 
American democracy. 42 Yet when one compares Madison's philosophical 
assumptions with those of Jefferson, some interesting contrasts develop. Mad-
ison's conception of human nature is not as clearly revealed as that of Jefferson, 
and the indications that are available are ambivalent. His biographers describe 
42Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration (Oxford, 1964). 
204 
his feelings about the nature of man as more or less a balance between gloom 
and hope or between despair and optimism, Saul K. Padover concludes that 
Madison's "sober appraisal of human nature was, at bottom, Calvinistic rather 
than jeffersonian, but he was enough of a child of the eighteenth-century En-
lightenment to balance his gloom with a streak of hopefulness. While not sharing 
jefferson's optimistic faith in progress and human perfectibility, Madison at 
the same time rejected the Hamiltonian concept of total human depravity. " 43 
Like Hamilton, Madison believed that "the strongest passions and most 
dangerous weaknesses of the human breast" are "ambition, avarice, vanity, 
[and] the honourable or venial love of fame." These passions acted together 
in a "conspiracy" which was largely responsible for man's failure in history to 
reconcile discordant opinions, to adjust conflicting interests, and to assuage 
mutual jealousies. The history of man was, according to Madison, a history 
of factions, contentions, and disappointments which displayed "the infirmities 
and depravities of the human character." This indicated to him that one of the 
functions of government is to control and regulate man's natural passions. 
This appraisal did not, however, argue "that there is not sufficient virtue 
among men for self-government" or "that nothing less than the chains of 
despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another." The 
optimistic strain in his appraisal of human nature is shown in his affirmation 
that "as there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain 
4~he Complete Madison: His Basic Writings (New York, 1953), 11. Also 
see Ralph L. Ketcham, "James Madison and the Nature of Man," Journal of 
the History of Ideas, XIX (1958), 62-76. -
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degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human 
nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence." In the final 
analysis, Madison believed that man's nature was composed of both good and bad, 
and that individual behavior reflected the balance of these elements. As a 
political theorist he believed that government could safely be built upon the sup-
position that man's be~ter qualities were more influential than the baser sort. 
One of the cornerstones of his political theory was that "republican government 
presupposes the existence of these [better] qualities in a higher degree than any 
other form. " He believed that the genius of the American people and the prin-
ciples of the Revolution demanded that the designers of the Constitution rest all 
of their "political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. "44 
How this balance between good and evil in man's nature affected his ideas on the 
design of government will be developed below. 
Ralph L. Ketcham, in an article entitled "James Madison and the Nature of 
Man," has correctly noted that there are no explicit references in Madison's 
writings to the origins of his ideas about human nature. Ketcham suggests that 
they were probably derived from both Enlightenment and classical works ranging 
from Aristotle to Locke, all of which were standard fare for young scholars in 
the eighteenth century. 45 I would suggest an even more immediate source of 
44, Letter of Helvidius No. 4, " Sep. 1793, Hunt Collection, VI, 171-175; 
"The Federalist No. 37, " The Federalist, ed. by Edward Mead Earle (New 
York, 1937), 224-232; "The Federalist No. 39," Ibid., 242-250; "The Federal-
ist No. 49," Ibid., 327-332; "The Federalist No."""'"S5,""" Ibid., 359-365. 
45Journal of the History of Ideas, XIX (1958), 68n. 
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these ideas, and one that contains the same ambivalence that is characteristic 
of Madison's ideas. 
Madison entered the College of New Jersey at Princeton in 1769, one year 
after John Witherspoon was brought from Scotland to be president of the colonial 
Presbyterian college. He received the bachelor of arts degree in 1771 but 
remained at the college for another year studying Hebrew and ethics under 
Witherspoon. Their relationship extended beyond the academic realm to the 
political realm as they served together as delegates to the Continental Congress 
after each had served on committees in 1776 designing constitutions for Virginia 
and New Jersey. 
It seems plausible to suggest that Witherspoon's lectures on moral philoso-
phy helped to shape Madison's ideas on the nature of man. This suggestion 
seems even more plausible in the light of the complexity of Witherspoon's blend 
of Calvinistic ideas of human depravity with the moral sense theory that had 
received so much currency in his native country. 
Witherspoon taught that the principles of ethical systems must be based on 
the nature of man and must conform to the purpose of his creation. Since man's 
relation to God lies at the foundation of moral sentiments and duties, man 
"ought to take the rule of duty from conscience enlightened by reason, exper-
ience, and every way by which we can be supposed to learn the will of our 
Maker, and his intention in creating us such as we are. " Though he did not 
accept either the intellectualist or sentimentalist arguments as being totally or 
exclusively true, he did teach that "a sense of moral good and evil, is as really 
a principle of our nature, as either the gross external or reflex senses, and as 
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truly distinct from both, as they are from each other." He described the 
sources of man's knowledge as I. Sensations, external and internal, and 
II. Reflection. His definition of the moral sense, taken from Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, was "the law which our Maker has written upon our hearts, and both 
intimates and enforces duty, previous to all reasoning." According to Wither-
spoon then, man is equipped with an internal monitor or sensation that unerring-
ly reveals to him his duties to God (love, fear, trust, worship), to man (sincere 
and active love manifested in justice and mercy), and to self (discipline of 
desires and affections, protection of moral character and religious hope). And 
the obligation to this virtue is founded on the particulars of intrinsic excellence, 
present happiness, duty to the Supreme Being (most important), hope of future 
happiness, and the fear of future misery. 46 
In the classroom Witherspoon taught that man possesses a moral sense that 
"both intimates and enforces duty, " but in the pulpit he was less optimistic 
about the forces that shape human behavior. Here he denounced in true Calvin-
istic fashion those "men of lax and corrupt principles" who took "great delight 
in speaking to the praise of human nature, and extolling its dignity, without 
distinguishing what it was, at its first creation, from what it is in its present 
fallen state. " This praise, he said, was nothing but distorted speculations of 
the worldly mind, and were disproved by both the historical record and by daily 
experience, both of which "ought to humble us in the dust." Witherspoon 
preached that "all the disorders in human society, and the greatest part even of 
46Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 4, 11-17, 29-35, 45-61. 
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the unhappiness we are exposed to, arises from the envy; malice, covetous-
47 
ness, and other lusts of man. " 
While arguments for the existence of a moraf sense and for the fallen state 
of man are not exactly dialectical opposites, there is an antagonism between 
them that is probably best described as one of emphasis. To credit man with a 
moral faculty that has the authority to both judge and urge correct moral be-
ha vior strongly suggests a generally optimistic view of human nature and the 
prospect of harmonious social relations. Conversely, to attribute to man an 
inherent depravity, which is irrepressibly expressed through base passions, 
just as strongly supports a generally pessimistic view of both. Madison, as a 
student of Witherspoon, was subjected to both emphases, which may well account 
for his conception of human nature. 
The balance between the positive and negative aspects of the nature of man 
as conceived by Madison had a significant influence on his political theory. And 
just as his beliefs about human nature place him in a category somewhere 
between Jefferson and Hamilton, his related political ideas assume a similar 
relationship. 
Madison's political theory begins with the assumption that government is 
necessary for a harmonious society. This fact was in itself a reflection on 
human nature. "If men were angels, " he said, "no government would be 
necessary." He believed that the absence of government would lead to anarchy, 
47The dominion of providence~ the passions of men. !: Sermon preached 
at Princeton,_£!! the 17th of May 1776 (Philadelphia, 1777), 11-13. 
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and then to despotism. But, he wrote, "in framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must 
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself. "48 He wrote that the basic responsibility of political 
institutions is the preservation of the safety and happiness of society. From a 
negative viewpoint, this meant that government must have the strength to pro-
vide an "authoritative termination of occurring controversies, " and to sub-
stitute "law and order, for uncertainty, confusion, and violence. "49 From a 
more positive viewpoint, government was simply charged with the responsi-
bility of guarding or arbiting the personal and property rights of citizens who 
lived in basic harmony anyway. Yet he was ever conscious that "the essence 
of Government is power; and power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will 
ever be liable to abuse. " This danger was true of all forms of government. 
"In monarchies, the interests and happiness of all may be sacrificed to the 
caprice and passions of a despot. In aristocracies, the rights and welfare of 
the many may be sacrificed to the pride and cupidity of the few." And even in 
republics there is a danger "that the majority may not sufficiently respect the 
rights of the minority. "50 All of these different forms of abuse were the 
result of the weakness of human character. Like Hamilton he recognized that 
48
"The Federalist No. 51," The Federalist, ed. by Earle, 335-341; 
Speech in Virginia Convention, June 14, 1788, Hunt Collection, V, 197. 
49Madison to Edward Everett, Aug. 28, 1830, Ibid. , IX, 383-403. 
50speech in Virginia Convention, Dec. 2, 1829, Ibid., 358-364. 
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"bodies of men (governments] are not less swayed by interest than individuals" 
and indeed "are less controlled by the dread of reproach and the other motives 
felt by individuals.,, But though no form of government would be perfectly free 
from the danger of the abuse of power, he believed that the republican form was 
51 less vulnerable to abuse than any other. Recognizing the more positive 
aspects of man's nature, he believed that the people must ever control and 
regulate the power of government. Only a republican form, defined as "a 
government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great 
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during 
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior," placed this control 
in the governed. 52 
It was this preference for republican principles that signalled the end of 
the collaboration between Madison and Hamilton that had existed during the 
ratification struggle, and the beginning of the close political collaboration of 
Madison and jefferson in the 1790s and after. As has already been noted, 
Madison believed in the ability of man to fashion and control his own political 
institutions. Like Jefferson he believed that there was "a deep distinction" 
between the Republican and Federalist philosophies, a distinction that had "its 
origin in the confidence of the former, in the capacity of mankind for self Govt 
and in a distrust of it by the other or by its leaders:53 He elaborated on this 
51Madison to Thomas Ritchie, Dec. 18, 1825, Ibid., 231-236. 
52"The Federalist No. 39," The Federalist, ed. by Earle, 242-250. 
53Madison to William Eustis, May 22, 1823, Hunt Collection, IX, 135·137. 
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theme in a political "position paper" published in the National Gazette. There 
he spelled out the Republican principle that the people themselves are the best 
keepers of their own liberties. "The sacred trust can be no where so safe," 
he wrote, "as in the hands most interested in preserving it. " The other party, 
he said, fashioned its policies on the belief that "the people are stupid, sus-
picious, licentious" and that "they cannot safely trust themselves. " 54 Madison 
believed that the struggle between these contrasting philosophies had shaped the 
early political history of the new nation. Looking back over the first half-
century of that experience, he judged that time had proven that it was the Repub-
lican principles that were in harmony with the spirit of the American people. 55 
Jefferson and Madison were in perfect agreement on the principles of 
republican government, but as Adrienne Koch has noted, "there was no total 
unanimity on the methods or specific proposals for attaining their common 
ideals." Koch concludes that their partnership was "a working compromise, 
a powerful amalgam of two distinct minds striving to approximate the public 
56 good. " Such minor differences as did exist can be traced almost entirely to 
three factors listed here in order of ascending importance: 1) the difference 
in their basic temperaments, 2) their relative involvement in the crises of the 
17 80s, and 3) the variance between their views of human nature. Moderation 
and temperance are the two words most frequently encountered in descriptions 
5·inec. 20, 1792, Ibid. , VI, 120. 
55Madison to William Eustis, May 22, 1823, Ibid., IX, 135-137. 
56Jefferson and Madison, 43-46. 
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of Madison's thought. One biographer has written that Madison could be 
described as "the exegete of the American democracy and Jefferson as its poet;" 
that "where Jefferson had a sweeping vision and lively imagination, Madison 
was cool and exquisitely balanced. Jefferson loved to theorize about men and 
nature and to let his fancy soar; Madison was judicious and almost passion-
57 less." ,Madison's responsibilities in the Constitutional Convention demanded 
pragmatism over theory, and the empirical evidence of the events leading to 
that Convention reinforced his natural caution. But in the final analysis, it 
was more likely the difference in their optimism about human nature that was 
at the root of the differences in their political ideas. 
Although both shared the belief that man possessed the virtue necessary to 
make democracy work, Madison's optimism was much more cautious than 
Jefferson's. This caution was revealed in a number of areas. A good example 
is his twofold argument in support of a senate in the proposed reorganization 
of the government under the new constitution. First he argued that "the 
necessity of a senate is . . . indicated by the propensity of all single and 
numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, 
and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolu-
tions." He also argued that "such an institution may be sometimes necessary 
as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions." 
He certainly held that the will of the people should always ultimately prevail 
over the views of the rulers, but "there are particular moments in public 
57Padover, Complete Madison, 10. 
affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passions, or some 
illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, 
may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready 
to lament and condemn. " Madison believed that in these critical moments 
growing out of the weakness of human character, there should be some "temper-
ate and respectable body of citizens" to step in and "suspend the blow meditated 
by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain 
their authority over the public mind. "58 Another example that contrasts 
Jefferson's and Madison's confidence in man is shown in the latter's uneasiness 
about submitting important constitutional questions to the decision of the whole 
society. Whereas Jefferson tended to think in terms of frequent review and 
modification of the fundamental laws with the consent of the people, Madison 
believed that in spite of America's success in governmental revision in the 
1770s, such "experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily 
multiplied." He feared that frequent appeals might not only "disturb the public 
tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions," but that they would 
deprive the government of what Burke thought so important, "that veneration 
which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and 
freest governments would not possess the requisite stability. " 59 
58
"The Federalist No. 62," The Federalist, ed. by Earle, 400-407. 
59"The Federalist No. 49," Ibid., 327-332. Jefferson seems to have been 
virtually answering Burke in a letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in 
which he strongly advocated the revision of the American constitution. "Some 
men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like 
the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the 
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Madison's ideas about the function and power of the presidency provide a 
final example of his reserve about human nature and its influence on his polit-
ical ideas. Like the overwhelming majority of the other founding fathers, 
Madison felt no fear about the misuse of power by the executive so long~ 
Washington occupied that office. But he argued fervently during President 
Washington's second administration that the function of the presidency must be 
defined on the basis of human nature in general rather than on the character of 
the existing magistrate. 60 Madison was simply anticipating a future time when 
a person of less moral stature would occupy that office, and who would through 
defect of character feel a less noble devotion to his sacred trust. 
The Republican principle that most closely united Madison and Jefferson, 
beyond their belief in the source of.poUtical authority, was their common faith 
men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they 
did to be beyond amendment . . . . I am certainly not an advocate for 
frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate im-
perfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accom-
modate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill 
effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with 
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more 
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners 
and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must 
advance also, and keep pace with the times." Jefferson actually proposed that 
constitutions should be reviewed every nineteen years. "Each generation is 
as independent of the one preceding, as that was of all which had gone before. 
It has then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it 
believes most promotive of its own happiness." Lipscomb and Bergh 
Collection, XV, 32-44. 
60Political Observations (Philadelphia, 1795), 13. 
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in the ability of the people collectively to select wise rulers. Madison declared 
in the Virginia Convention of 1788: "I go on this great republican principle, 
that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and 
wisdom. " He said that the Republicans put their first confidence not in rulers, 
but in the people who are to choose them. 61 Though Jefferson in 1776 expressed 
some doubts about the wisdom of the people's choice in elections, by 1789 his 
confidence matched that of Madison. By that time he had come to believe that 
"it is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government 
as far as they are capable of exercising it" as the means of insuring the honest. 
administration of governmental powers. He was emphasizing that, though all 
of the citizens were not qualified to exercise executive or legislative responsi-
bilities, they were amply qualified to choose by ballot those who should. 62 
Both Madison and Jefferson shared the belief that this authority in the hands of 
the electorate was the ultimate safeguard against the misuse of political power 
by designing men. In this belief, they were expressing a faith in man collec-
tively rather than man individually. And indeed there is a negative implication 
in this principle that, in Jefferson's case, was much stronger during his early 
career. In his Notes he proposed that "influence over government must be 
shared among all the people. If every individual which composes their mass 
participates of the ultimate authority, the government will be safe; because the 
61June 20, 17 88, Hunt Collection, V, 223. 
62TJ to Edmund Pendleton, Aug. 26, 1776, Boyd Collection, I, 503-506; 
TJ to Abbe Arnoux, July 19, 1789, Ibid., XV, 282-283. 
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corrupting the whole mass will exceed any private resources of wealth; and 
public ones cannot be provided but by levies on the people." In terms of 
suffrage this meant that corruption "would be more effectually restrained by 
an extension of that right to such numbers as would bid defiance to the means 
of corruption." Like Madison, Jefferson believed that "in every government 
on earth is some trace of human weakness . . . which cunning will discover, 
and wickedness insensibly open, cultivate and improve. "63 His faith in the 
masses contained in this early expression is obviously a functional trust in 
numbers more than a general trust in human nature. It is clear that, during 
the next two decades, Jefferson's faith in the masses carne more and more to 
rest upon an optimistic view of human nature. 
It seems to me undeniable that Jefferson's, Hamilton's, and Madison's 
conceptions of human nature, their beliefs in the relative ascendancy of such 
behavioral shaping forces as benevolence and sel.Iishness, were reflected in 
their notions about the kind of institutions necessary for the government of man 
in society. To Hamilton, experience was but a "continued comment on the 
worthlessness of the human race. " Man, in his opinion, was by nature 
vicious, jealous, selfish, designing, and his behavior in society would reflect 
these most basic and powerful motivations. He consequently believed that a 
prime function of government is to restrain and to control these "fiery and 
destructive passions" in the human breast. Therefore, he concluded, govern-
ment should be designed in such a way as to insure it sufficient power and 
63142-143. 
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independence to carry out this r·esponsibility. In the building of governments, 
Hamilton concluded, one should begin with the supposition that all men are 
motivated purely by self-interest and should not calculate on "the weaker 
springs of human character. "64 This indictment of human nature extended 
even to those who would exercise the authority of government. But his distrust 
of leaders in power, presumably selected from "the rich and well born" and 
thus less subject to the temptation of self-interest, was far less intense than 
his fear of the "turbulent and changing" masses. 
To Madison, the historical record was hardly less discouraging. It seemed 
to prove that man needed some power outside of himself as a guard against the 
anarchy inherent in the free exercise of the natural passions. Yet he was not 
a total pessimist, and believed that there were also positive impulses within 
the human breast that, under proper circumstances, would counterbalance the 
destructive passions. Though the regulatory power of government was necessary 
to insure an orderly society, Madison believed that men collectively possessed 
sufficient natural virtue to be vested through the democratic process with 
ultimate sovereignty even over the necessary power outside of themselves. It 
seems to me that Madison's political ideas were shaped by a mixture of pessi-
mism about human nature in the individual context, and optimism about human 
nature in the collective or social context, where, on balance, positive impulses 
would prevail. 
64"The Federalist No. 34," jan. 5, 1788, Hamilton Papers, ed. by 
Styrett, IV, 470•476. 
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* * * 
The larger part of this dissertation has been devoted to showing that 
Jefferson embraced the theory of the moral sense in the specific terms that 
were proposed by the Scottish sentimentalist philosophers. That he was fam-
iliar with their works from an early date has been established beyond doubt, 
and his continued interest and study in the years subsequent to his college 
experience is equally evident. The copying of particular passages from their 
works in his commonplace book is a positive indication of their appeal. The 
marginalia previously cited, though limited, is excellent testimony of thought-
ful reading. The discussion of their theories in his personal correspondence, 
especially in the later years of his life, in an era long following his first ex-
posure to them, points to his assimilation of their ideas and the lasting 
impressions which they must have made on him. We can safely conclude that 
Jefferson, throughout his mature life, possessed a striking familiarity with 
the writings of the Scottish sentimentalists. His understanding of the moral 
sense theory, both in premise and development, followed their school. And 
four basic principles from this theory -- that man is naturally moral, that he 
is naturally benevolent, that these natural faculties are susceptible to develop-
ment, and that they prepare man for a social existence --were important 
intellectual supports for Jefferson's faith in human nature. 
It seems obvious to me that tl:lese same principles were equally important 
supports for his optimistic hope for a harmonious democratic society. It was 
Jefferson's belief in the better side of man, founded on the principles of the 
Scottish sentimentalists, that underlay his lasting confidence in "the natural 
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integrity and discretion of the people, and in the safety and extent to which 
they might trust themselves with a control over their government. " 65 He 
rejected as a "humiliation to human nature" the Hobbesian denial of a sense of 
justice and injustice natural to man. He believed that God had implanted in 
man's nature a hunger for society, that He had provided the necessary faculties 
and qualities, including a sense of justice, by which man could satisfy that 
hunger, and that therefore man could be freely trusted to regulate and control 
his society through a democratic system of self-government. 66 He rejected 
the unproved association of democracy and anarchy, because he rejected the 
negative view of human nature on which the association rested. "I have so 
much confidence in the good sense of man, and his qualifications for self-
government," he wrote, "that I am never afraid of the issue where reason is 
left free to exert her force. "67 Jefferson's optimism about man differed in 
some degree from that of Madison, especially during the later years of their 
collaboration, mainly because his optimistic appraisal was shaped by a phil-
osophy of human nature in the inJividual context. 
When Jefferson extended this sentimentalist optimism to man in the 
collective context, his faith not only transcended Madison's but assumed what 
would be called by the mid-nineteenth century a romantic dimension. The 
6~J to John Melish, Jan. 13, 1813, Lipscomb and Bergh Collection, XIII, 
206-213. 
6~J to Francis W. Gilmer, June 7, 1816, Ibid., XV, 23-26; TJ to 
Monsieur Dupont de Nemours, Apr. 24, 1816, Ibid., 487-491. 
67TJ to Dodat, Aug. 3, 1789, Boyd Collection, XV, 326. 
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essential difference between Jefferson's appraisal of man and the romantic 
appraisal was not one of conclusion, but only of philosophical foundations. 
Jefferson's faith was summed up in his declaration that "as long as the masses 
can be protected, we may trust to them for light. "68 This was an affirmation 
of the natural morality of man, and was the foundation of his admiration for 
the American yeoman. "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people 
of God, if ever He had a chosen people, " he once wrote, "whose breasts He 
has made His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue." The un-
corrupted morals of these cultivators of the earth were to him a good example 
of man's natural goodness. So long as these innocents were protected, Amer-
ica was safe. 69 
The implications of this optimistic faith in man and mankind were trans-
lated into a definition of the function of government. His definition, as outlined 
in his first inaugural address, was predictably brief and noticeably lacked 
emphasis on regulatory concerns. The sum of good government, he said, is 
one "which shall restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave 
them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, 
and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. "70 
It has been written that "the theory of Jefferson, the political scientist, 
6BrJ to Archibald Stuart, May 14, 1799, Correspondence of Archibald 
Stuart, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
69Notes, 157; TJ to the Marquis de Lafayette, Feb. 14, 1815, Lipscomb 
and Bergh Collection, XIV, 245-255. 
70Ibid., III, 317-323. 
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and the practice of Jefferson, the man of affairs, are not always free from 
inconsistency. "71 This is a frequently encountered inditement in political 
histories of the era. Daniel J. Boorstin charges that ''once in power, Jefferson 
could not but recognize that his negative concept of government was imaginary. "72 
Though there is certainly an element of truth in these charges, the apparent 
inconsistency is partially and accidentally explained in Boorstin's own observa-
tion that in Jeffersonian political theory governmental institutions "were nothing 
but the expedients by which diverse and feeble human minds grappled with 
transient problems. "7 3 More importantly, these accusations detract from 
Jefferson's consistent concern with the fundamental laws that ultimately define 
the relationship between governments and governed. It was his deep concern 
with constitutions, beginning in Virginia in 1776 and continuing through the rest 
of his life, that reveal the consistency of his thought about the non -transient 
challenges of human society and its necessary institutions, and his consistent 
faith in the people as the fashioners and guardians of their own liberty. His 
proposed constitutions for Virginia in 1776 and 17 83, and his efforts on behalf 
of legal reform in the late 177 Os were both attacks on the aristocratic structure 
of society. His bitter and continuing disappointment over the constitution that 
was adopted in Virginia in 1776, which fell far short of his goals in the extension 
71charles Edward Merriam, A History of American Political Theories 
(New York, 1968), 157. 
72Boorstin, Lost World, 200. 
73Ibid.' 186-187. 
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of the suffrage and equal representation, reveal a lingering belief that neither 
his native state nor the United States by implication, "penetrated to the mother 
principle, that 'governments are republican only in proportion as they embody 
the will of their people, and execute it.'" In arguing for constitutional revision 
in 1816 he wrote that "the true foundation of republican government is the 
equal right of every citizen, in his person and property, and in their manage-
m~nt. Try by this, as a tally, every provision of our Constitution, " he 
challenged, "and see if it hangs directly on the will of the people. "74 His con-
sistent faith in the natural morality of the people, strongly infhrenced by the 
philosophical arguments of the sentimentalist ethical theory, expressed in his 
definition of the role of the people in relationship to their government, seems 
to me to render the apparent paradoxes in his political career less significant. 
A half century after Jefferson's death, Walt Whitman, one of America 1S 
best known romanticists, expressed sentiments about the nature of man that 
capture in a most poignant way what might be described as the Jefferson credo: 
I trust humanity: its instincts are in the main right: it goes false, it goes 
true, to its interests, but in the long run it makes advances. Humanity al-
ways has to provide for the present moment as well as for the future: that 
is a tangle, however you look at it. Why wonder then, that humanity falls 
down every now and then? There's one thing we have to remember --that 
the race is not free (free of its own ignorance) -- is hardly in a position to 
do the best for itself: when we get a real democracy, as we will by and by, 
this humanity will have its chance -- give a fuller report of itself. 
I am not a witness for saviors -- exceptional men: for the nobility --no: 
I am a witness for the average man, the whole. 75 
74Notes, 104-124; TJ to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, Lipscomb and 
Bergh Collection, XV, 32-44; Editor's note, Boyd Collection, I, 330-331. -
75walter Teller, compiler, Walt Whitman's Camden Conversations (New 
Brunswick, 1973), 121. 
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